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This study examined the voluntary compliance of corporations to societal 
pressures exerted by one type of stakeholder—shareholders. Specifically, from an 
organizational legitimacy perspective, the study investigated corporate responses to 
societal expectations voiced in shareholder resolutions—a formal mechanism for social 
shareholder activism. The study consisted of three empirical studies. First, using a large 
dataset, Study 1 analyzed shareholder resolutions filed by institutional shareholders at 
U.S. publicly traded corporations between 1997 and 2011. Second, in Study 2, 
grounded in the concept of organizational legitimacy, two theoretical models were 
developed and tested to explain and predict corporate responses to societal expectations 
of shareholders voiced in the resolutions. Finally, Study 3 examined a case study that 
explored the implementation of proposed changes by one corporation as a response to a 
withdrawn social shareholder resolution.  
At an issue level, the study found that institutional shareholder activists 
primarily addressed environmental issues in the social resolutions. Shareholder 
demands for increased communication on the corporate social responsibility issues were 
prevalent in the withdrawn social resolutions. At a sponsor-level, the study found that, 
one institutional type of shareholder activists—public pension funds—had the most 
leverage in inducing withdrawal agreements as well as in imposing changes in target 
corporations. At a corporate-level, the study found that corporate environmental 
commitment was a strong predictor of the probability of reaching withdrawal 
agreements with sponsoring shareholders and achieving a high implementation level of 
a social resolution after the withdrawal agreements. In addition, industry classification 
xviii 
of a target corporation was found to be a predictor of the implementation level of a 
proposed change. Further, the case study showed that, after the withdrawal of a social 
resolution that asked the target corporation to issue a sustainability report on company 
responses to the climate change issue, the target corporation indeed implemented a 
series of structural, procedural, and communication-based changes to conform to the 
societal demands of social shareholder activists.  
The study suggested that organizational legitimacy offers a useful theoretical 
lens through which organizational conformity to societal expectations and norms can be 
explained in today’s complex society. By applying the concept of organizational 
legitimacy to a unique setting of social shareholder activism, the study proved the value 
of the concept for future research in public relations.
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 century, the interest in the larger role of public relations in society has 
been mounting in public relations research and theory. In an increasingly 
interconnected, dynamic, global yet multicultural world due, in part, to new 
communication technologies (Castells, 2009; Self, 2009, 2010), the conceptual thinking 
in public relations has moved away from functionalist approaches that place the 
organization at the locus of inquiry and theory development to societal approaches that 
focus on the larger role of public relations in society (e.g., Heath, 2006, 2010; Ihlen & 
van Ruler, 2009; Sommerfeldt & Taylor, 2011; Taylor, 2010, 2011; Kruckeberg 
&Tsetsura, 2008; Valentini & Kruckeberg, & Starck, 2012). For example, building on 
systems theory, rhetoric, and norm compliance, Heath (2006) has argued that the role of 
public relations is to contribute to a fully functioning society through building 
relationships, creating shared meanings, and collectively managing risk and uncertainty. 
In the same vein, community-building theory, originally espoused by Kruckeberg and 
Starck (1988), suggested a normative model that defined the role of public relations as 
to restore and to maintain a sense of community (Kruckeberg & Starck, 1988; Starck & 
Kruckeberg, 2001; Valentini et al., 2012). Societal approaches to public relations have 
thus emphasized the capacity of public relations to improve society at various levels. 
The heightened interest in the societal role of public relations parallels the 
growing debate in recent years about the role of business in society (e.g., Eesley & 
Lenox, 2006; den Hond & Bakker, 2007; Lee & Lounsbury, 2011; Kacperczyk, 2009; 
Reid & Toffel, 2009); this debate largely results from global economic growth, 
recurring crises in the world’s capital markets, and the failure of corporations to 
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adequately redirect resources (Heath & Palenchar, 2009; Porter & Kramer, 2011). Two 
dominant paradigms shed light on the role of the corporation in society. Classical 
financial economic theory defines the role of corporation to be shareholder value 
maximization (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Friedman, 1970). However, this classic view (also 
called the business view) of the corporation has increasingly come under pressure from 
society at large as the impact of corporations on society and the natural environment has 
grown in recent years (Heath & Palenchar, 2009; Ihlen, Bartlett, & May, 2011; Porter & 
Kramer, 2011). In a sharp contrast to the business view of the corporation, a societal 
view contends that the role of the corporation is to serve society at large, with the 
implication of social responsibility and environmental consciousness (Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Heath, 2006; Leeper, 2001; Metzler, 2001). The societal 
view seems to prevail in today’s society, which has increasingly become complex, 
volatile, and demanding (Castells, 2009; Self, 2010; Valentini et al., 2012). Grounded in 
the societal perspective, corporate social responsibility (CSR)—the notion that 
corporations have responsibilities to society that go beyond economic and legal 
expectations (Carroll, 1979)—has become a coherent way of thinking about the 
relationship between business and society (Ihlen, 2008; Taylor, 2011).  
For publicly traded corporations, the implications of these trends have been 
amplified by two separate views among shareholders: pressure for short-term financial 
returns and pressure from the socially responsible investment community to improve 
corporate social responsibility. Indeed, the trend of socially responsible investing, 
which considers corporate social responsibility as valid parts of investment decisions, 
has grown in recent years. The Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment 
3 
reported that socially responsible investing encompasses an estimated $4 trillion out of 
$33.5 trillion in the U.S. investment marketplace today (US SIF, 2013).  
This dissertation studied corporate responses to societal pressures exerted by 
shareholders—one type of stakeholder (Freeman, 1984)—from an organizational 
legitimacy perspective. Organizational legitimacy is “a generalized perspective or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, 
p. 574). In essence, the concept “organizational legitimacy” refers to the congruence 
between social system norms and social values associated with or implied by an 
organization’s activities (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). Therefore, organizational 
legitimacy provided a useful tool to explain and predict corporate responses to 
shareholders who use their ownership rights to influence a corporation’s practices and 
policies in the societal realm. Lee and Lounsbury (2011) referred to this type of 
shareholder activism on social and environmental issues as social shareholder activism 
(p. 156). In their dual roles as both stakeholders and shareholders, social shareholder 
activists challenge corporations from inside through institutional mechanisms. 
Corporate responses to social shareholder activism thus offer an excellent context to 
study the role of corporations in society from an organizational legitimacy perspective. 
Rationale for Study 
Public relations is both a professional practice and a subfield of communication 
(Botan & Taylor, 2004; Gower, 2006; Heath, 2001) that can be defined from several 
perspectives. For example, grounded in a rhetorical perspective, Heath (2001) defined 
public relations as the “management function that rhetorically adapts organizations to 
4 
people’s interests and people’s interests to organizations by co-creating meaning and 
co-managing culture to achieve mutually beneficial relationships” (p. 36). From a 
managerial perspective, Grunig and Hunt (1984) defined public relations as “the 
management of communication between an organization and its publics” (p. 4). Placing 
the process at the center of public relations, Botan (1993) defined public relations as 
“using communication to adopt relationships between organization and their publics” 
(p. 153). According to a relational perspective, public relations is building mutually 
beneficial relationships between an organization and its key publics through its actions 
and communication (Ledingham & Bruning, 1998, 2000). However, these competing 
definitions, mostly developed in the United States, explain how public relations must be 
practiced, but cannot explain the rationale why an organization engages in public 
relations.  
Using organizational legitimacy as a rationale for practicing public relations 
(Ihlen & Van Ruler, 2009; Holmstrom, 2004, 2005; Vercic et al., 2001), this 
dissertation focuses on the larger role of public relations in society. Van Ruler and 
Vercic (2004) defined  public relations as “the special concern for broader societal 
issues and approaches to any problem with a concern for implications of organizational 
behavior towards and in the public sphere” (p. 6). According to this perspective, the 
primary concern of public relations should be the organization’s inclusiveness and its 
preservation of the “license to operate” (Van Ruler & Vercic, 2004, p. 7). The essential 
aspect of public relations is that it is concerned with issues and values that are 
considered publicly relevant which means relating to the public sphere, which is 
dynamic and evolving (Bentele & Nothhaft, 2010; Jensen, 2002). This line of thinking 
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suggests that public relations is not only about relations with the public, but it is 
relations in the public sphere and for the public sphere (Bentele & Nothhaft, 2010; 
Vercic et al., 2001). Similarly, Holmstrom (2004, 2009) conceptualized public relations 
as a social activity that improves organizational ability to relate reflectively to the social 
environment. According to Holmstrom (2004), public relations function is a reflective 
mechanism that “translates and mediates between different social rationalities” (p. 126).  
From this perspective, the role of public relations is to reach agreements on mutually 
acceptable social expectations emerged in the public sphere through engagement.  
Emphasizing the consequences of organizational behavior for the public sphere, the 
conceptualization of public relations as a social activity thus highlights the importance 
of an organization’s legitimation within society.  
Ferguson (1984) identified three categories of research in public relations: social 
responsibility/ethics, social issues and issue management, and public relationships. This 
dissertation examines the social issues voiced by shareholders who demand for 
improved corporate social responsibility. To date, social pressures exerted by 
shareholders on corporations have not received scholarly attention in public relations, 
although the influence and size of social shareholder activism has grown in recent years 
(Lee & Lounsbury, 2011; O’Rourke, 2003; Sjorstrom, 2008; Tkac, 2006; US SIF, 
2013). Social shareholder activism sets an interesting research phenomenon to 
investigate for those public relations researchers who are interested in the larger role of 
public relations in society as corporations are one of the primary actors who benefit 
from public relations practice (Heath, 2010; Ihlen et al., 2011; Valentini et al., 2012). 
Indeed, with the recent theoretical shift in public relations “from making organizations 
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effective to making society more effective” (Heath, 2010, p. xiii), social shareholder 
activism can offer new insights into the larger role of public relations in society. Social 
shareholder activism facilitates the creation of legitimate agenda items in corporate 
decision-making processes (Lee & Lounsbury, 2011) and elicits changes in corporate 
policies and practices through voluntary compliance (Carleton, Nelson, & Weisbach, 
1998; Guay, Doh, & Sinclair, 2004; Logsdon & van Buren, 2008; O’Rourke, 2003). As 
such, corporate responses to social shareholder activism have important social 
implications that deserve a theoretical explanation and an extensive examination.   
Academic studies of shareholders in the field of public relations have been 
largely neglected under the communication domain (Laskin, 2006, 2009; Peterson & 
Martin, 1996), even though there is an acknowledged need for more scholarship on the 
topic (Botan & Hazelton, 2006; Toth, 2010). Although public relations claims investor 
relations—communication with shareholders—as one of its basic specializations in 
major public relations text books (e.g., Cutlip, Center, & Broom, 1999; Newsom, Scott, 
& Turk, 1993; Wilcox, Ault, & Agee, 1995), only a few scholars have paid attention to 
the study of shareholders in public relations research (e.g., Laskin, 2006, 2009; Peterson 
& Martin, 1996). Botan and Hazelton (2006) warned, “if we continue to ignore this 
area, it will become the exclusive domain of academic fields (e.g., economics, finance, 
and management) that do pay attention to it” (p. 16). Therefore, there is a need for more 
public relations theory development and research attempts to understand the 
relationship between shareholders and corporations from varying perspectives. 
Changing social norms and expectations constitute a source of pressure for 
organizations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Meyer & Rowan, 
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1977). Management disciplines recognize stakeholders as sources of environmental 
change pressures on organizations (e.g., Clarkson, 1995; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; 
Freeman, 1984). However, a reading of the literature suggests that these disciplines 
reflect a rather reductionist approach to the concept of stakeholders by using 
dichotomous terms to categorize them. These conceptualizations fall short of 
understanding the dynamic and socially constructed nature of organizational legitimacy 
(Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Suchman, 1995) in today’s world. From a societal view, a 
public relations approach can advance the understanding of the concept of stakeholder 
in relation to organizational legitimacy with its emphasis on the evolving and 
communicative nature of the public (Bentele & Nothhaft, 2010; Self, 2010). 
Theoretical Framework 
Societal approaches that explain the constructive role of business in society 
inform this dissertation. An extensive reading of the literature in organizational theory, 
public relations, and management has revealed that the concept of organizational 
legitimacy is an overriding theme that describes a meaningful link between a 
corporation and its social environment (e.g., Boyd, 2000; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Heath, 2006; Ihlen & van Ruler, 
2009; Kruckeberg & Strack, 2001; Metzler, 2001; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 
1995). Suchman (1995) defined organizational legitimacy as “a generalized perspective 
or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (p. 574). 
Although organizational legitimacy is a central concept in the study of the role of the 
organization in society, research on organizational legitimacy is fragmented across 
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several social sciences. This dissertation took a novel approach to combine three 
academic disciplines—organizational theory, public relations, and management—under 
the roof of organizational legitimacy. First, organizational theory, the sociological study 
of social organizations and their interrelationships with the environment (Dowling & 
Pfeffer, 1975; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), has used 
organizational legitimacy as an overarching concept that addresses the normative forces 
that constraint, construct, and empower organizational actors. From this perspective, 
organizations are expected to change their structures or processes to conform to societal 
expectations about what structures and processes are legitimate to maintain 
organizational legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Meyer 
& Rowan, 1977). With its emphasis on the interdependence of organization and society, 
organizational theory provides the basis for the societal approaches to public relations. 
Indeed, several public relations scholars emphasized the importance of organizational 
theory for theorizing efforts in public relations (Botan & Hazelton, 2006; Heath, 2006; 
Toth, 2010).   
The public relations literature has recognized the centrality of the concept of 
organizational legitimacy to public relations theory and practice and laid the foundation 
for future explorations of the concept (e.g., Boyd, 2000; Grunig, 1992; Metzler, 2001; 
Heath, 2001; 2010; Ihlen, van Ruler, & Frederickson, 2009). In particular, the concept 
has enjoyed a resurgence in recent years with the theoretical shift from functional 
approaches that largely focused on creating strategic messages to achieve organizational 
goals to a cocreational approach that places building relationships and mutual 
understanding at the locus of public relations theory and research (Botan & Taylor, 
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2004; Heath, 2006, 2010). In particular, the interest in the societal role of public 
relations in recent years has increased the importance of organizational legitimacy. 
Scholars grounded in a societal view argued that the role of public relations is to build 
and maintain organizational legitimacy through adjusting organizations to the changing 
expectations and norms of society (e.g., Holmstrom, 2004; Ihlen & van Ruler, 2009; 
Raupp, 2004; van Ruler & Vercic, 2004; Vercic, van Ruler, Butschi, & Flodin, 2001). 
The concept of organizational legitimacy thus ascribes a societal role for public 
relations. 
In management literature, a societal view emphasized that organizations should 
conform to the stakeholders’ expectations and act in the interests of their stakeholders—
who affect and are affected by the organization (Freeman, 1984). From this perspective, 
society has right to establish and enforce a balance of power among its institutions and 
to grant their legitimacy (Wood, 1991). This perspective has an implicit view that 
business has obligations as a social institution, and it implies that society has certain 
sanctions that can be used when these obligations are not met. Stakeholders set the 
norms for corporate behavior, experience that behavior, and also evaluate it (Clarkson, 
1995; Wood, 1991). Thus, the concept of organizational legitimacy is central for 
exploring the relationship between business and the society at the organizational level. 
Given that the concept of organizational legitimacy offers a useful theoretical 
lens through which organizational conformity to societal expectations and norms can be 
explained (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Heath, 2006; Ihlen & van Ruler, 2009; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 1995), social shareholder activism appears to be a natural new 
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setting for predicting and explaining corporate responses to societal expectations and 
norms raised by shareholders. 
Purpose and Overview of Study 
This dissertation is interested in corporate responses to social shareholder 
activism enacted by institutional shareholders—organizations that trade securities in 
large quantities (e.g., public pension funds, unions, religious organizations). The 
purpose of this investigation is twofold: a) to describe U.S. institutional social 
shareholder activism, and b) to examine the conditions under which social shareholder 
activists are likely to elicit positive corporate responses. More specifically, the 
dissertation conducts a large-scale study of social activism enacted by institutional 
shareholders through filing resolutions at publicly traded U.S. corporations between 
1997 and 2011 and develops and tests a theory of the extent to which social shareholder 
activists may elicit positive responses from corporations to their societal requests.  
Shareholder activism in the United States largely derives from the Rule 14a-8 of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Shareholder Proposal Rule) that states any 
shareholder who continuously holds shares worth $2000 of stock in a corporation (or 
1% of the market value of equity) has right to file a shareholder resolution at publicly-
traded U.S. corporations. By law, a corporation is required to include shareholder 
resolutions in its annual proxy statement—a statement required of a corporation when 
soliciting shareholder votes prior to its general shareholder meeting—and to be voted 
upon by all shareholders. The resolutions must be under 500 words in length, and each 
one ends with a “resolved” clause asking the corporation to take a specific action (e.g., 
report on greenhouse gas emissions, establish a human rights committee).  
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Shareholder resolutions are non-binding advisory proposals regarding corporate 
governance or corporate social responsibility issues (SEC Shareholder Proposals, 2013). 
In this dissertation an issue refers to a complex problem that involves various 
stakeholders with broader ethical implications (Kent, Taylor, & Veil, 2011).  
Corporations have discretion regarding whether to respond to the social issues brought 
up by shareholder activists in the resolutions. Research on shareholder activism has 
established (e.g., Carleton, Nelson, & Weisbach, 1998; Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999; 
Guay, Doh, & Sinclair, 2004; Logsdon & van Buren, 2008) that shareholder activists 
generally seek engagement with corporations and withdraw their resolutions before the 
annual meeting if they received positive responses from the corporations (e.g., 
agreement to take action on the issue outlined in the resolution, commitment to an 
ongoing engagement in order to resolve the issue). This dissertation refers to these 
formal interactions between social shareholder activists and target corporations in order 
to reach at an agreement as engagement between shareholder activists and the 
corporation. Thus, withdrawn shareholder resolutions on social issues provide an 
excellent setting for researchers to understand the nature and scope of social shareholder 
activism and the conditions under which social shareholder activists are likely to elicit 
positive corporate responses. 
This dissertation consists of three empirical studies. To lay a foundation to 
understand the nature and scope of U.S. social shareholder activism, Study 1 consisted 
of a descriptive analysis of all shareholder resolutions (N  = 14, 271) at U.S. 
corporations between 1997 and 2011. Study 1 also conducted a quantitative content 
analysis of withdrawn social shareholder resolutions (n = 1,017) in order to identify 
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types of social issues and requested changes in the resolutions that were withdrawn after 
shareholder activist-corporate engagement.  
To explain and predict the conditions under which shareholder activists elicit 
positive corporate responses, Study 2 tested two theoretical models on the probability of 
withdrawing a social resolution and on the implementation level of a withdrawn social 
shareholder resolution. Theoretical models in Study 2 incorporated the corporate social 
performance concept (CSP) from management literature (Clarkson, 1995; Wartick & 
Cochran, 1983; Wood, 1991) in order to operationalize corporate stakeholder 
commitment. The CSP model allowed the research to utilize a consistent measure to 
assess corporate commitment to stakeholders. Finally, to illustrate a positive corporate 
response to a social request for change made in a shareholder resolution, Study 3 
conducted a critical case study. 
Theoretical and Practical Contributions 
The dissertation holds the potential to make a variety of important contributions 
to public relations as well as management disciplines. In regard to public relations 
literature, the dissertation extends the societal view in public relations literature by 
using the concept of organizational legitimacy as a theoretical lens to understand 
corporate responses to social pressures exerted by shareholders—one type of 
stakeholder group who, in management literature, possess power, legitimacy, and 
urgency in the eyes of corporate management (Agle, Mitchell, & Sonnefeld, 1999; 
Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). Despite the common acceptance of organizational 
legitimacy as a central concept in public relations theory (e.g., Boyd, 2000; Heath, 
2006, 2010; Ihlen & van Ruler, 2009; Metzler, 2001), a comprehensive review of the 
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literature over the past decade revealed that our understanding of organizational 
legitimacy was limited to conceptual studies. Empirical accounts that explain the 
workings of organizational legitimacy, to date, have been largely missing in the 
literature. By testing the main assumptions of organizational legitimacy and 
investigating the effects of other factors on these assumptions, this dissertation offers an 
analytical tool for future public relations research on organizational legitimacy. A 
primary criterion in assessing the value of a theory in social sciences is determining its 
theoretical scope or generality (Chaffee & Berger, 1987; Littlejohn, 2002). Accordingly, 
if a theory is high in scope, it can be successfully applied to a number of settings and 
situations. The setting for the current dissertation—social shareholder activism—thus 
provides a compelling new situation for testing the theoretical scope of organizational 
legitimacy. Further, by analyzing the social issues raised by shareholders, the 
dissertation calls attention to the growing function of the public sphere. The dissertation 
suggests that organizational legitimacy is anchored in the public sphere and argues 
against the conceptualizations of organization-public interactions through segmenting 
publics into categories (Grunig & Hunt, 1984) and categorizing stakeholders in a 
dichotomous approach, such as primary vs. secondary, internal vs. external (Clarkson, 
1995; Jones, 1995). 
In addition, Toth (2010) lamented that public relations research has not found 
any publication traction in management discipline as well as in organizational theory 
literature in sociology. Gower (2006) and McKie (2001) called for studies that integrate 
management concepts and models into public relations research. By analyzing corporate 
responses to social shareholder activism through barrowing concepts and variables from 
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management and organizational theory (e.g., CSP model, financial variables), this 
dissertation answers calls from these public relations scholars for theory building that 
takes a multidisciplinary approach and incorporates external perspectives. 
As previously noted, there is an acknowledged need for more scholarship 
specifically on investor relations (Botan & Hazelton, 2006; Laskin, 2009; Peterson & 
Martin, 1996). This dissertation conducted a large-scale study of social activism enacted 
by shareholders between 1997 and 2011 and developed and tested models of the extent 
to which corporations respond to shareholders’ societal expectations. Given the growing 
movement of social activism by shareholders in recent years and the importance of 
communication in this process (Kiefer, 2013; Lee & Lounsbury, 2011; US SIF, 2013), 
this dissertation offers an important new venue for investor relations theory and practice 
under the public relations domain. By explaining and testing the factors that affect the 
process of organizational legitimacy in the social shareholder activism context, this 
dissertation provided a unique contribution to the overall body of knowledge in investor 
relations, which recently emphasized the importance of building relationships and trust 
with shareholders (Laskins, 2006, 2009; Dolphin, 2004, NIRI, 2013).  
The dissertation also contributes to the management disciplines by emphasizing 
the socially constructed nature of organizational legitimacy and pointing out the link 
between public and organizational legitimacy (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Sethi, 1979; 
Suchman, 1995). This dissertation argues that the public sphere—a figurative space that 
exists between individuals, organizations, and the government where issues related to 
public discussed and public opinion is generated (Habermas, 1989)—is an inclusive and 
comprehensive concept that captures the dynamic interactions among social actors that 
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help build organizational legitimacy in the 21
st
 century (Bentele & Nothhaft, 2010; 
Ihlen & van Ruler, 2009; Jensen, 2002; Raupp, 2004; Self, 2010; Vercic, van Ruler, 
Butschi, & Flodin, 2001). From this perspective, organizational legitimacy of a 
corporation is tied to its capacity to relate to the public sphere. 
This dissertation also holds the potential to make important practical 
contributions to public relations. The dissertation argues that public relations should be 
concerned with how organizations relate to the public sphere. In essence, public 
relations are concerned with issues, expectations, and values that are considered 
publicly relevant. Considering social shareholder resolutions as an expression of 
expectancy gap (Sethi, 1979) between society and business, the dissertation pointed out 
the interconnectedness of seemingly different publics. Thus, in the corporate context, 
social shareholder resolutions can provide a way for public relations practitioners to 
connect corporations to society through relating them to the public sphere. This will 
enable corporations to better understand acceptable social behaviors that are constantly 
defined in public sphere. Thus, social shareholder resolutions function as canaries in the 
coal mine. Public relations professionals can play a key role in facilitating a 
conversation with social shareholder activists and advancing an engagement process to 
improve corporate social responsibility practices. 
Organization of the Study 
To provide a background on social shareholder activism, Chapter Two presents 
a brief history of social shareholder activism and discusses the processes and issues as 
well as the outcomes and sponsors of shareholder resolutions. The chapter emphasizes 
the role of shareholder activist-corporate engagement for eliciting changes in 
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corporations. Chapter Three explicates the concept of organizational legitimacy and 
presents relevant literature in the fields of organizational theory, public relations, and 
management. After outlining the literature, the chapter then proposes a set of 
hypotheses for predicting the conditions under which social shareholder resolutions are 
more likely to be withdrawn and the extent to which withdrawn social resolutions are 
implemented by target corporations. Chapter Four describes the methodology of the 
dissertation’s three studies, including 1) a descriptive and content analysis of social 
shareholder resolutions; 2) two theoretical models predicting the probability of 
withdrawing a social shareholder resolution and the level of implementation of a 
withdrawn social resolution; and finally, 3) a case study that illustrates the 
implementation of a change proposed in a withdrawn social shareholder resolution. 
Chapter Five presents the results of the research, addresses the research questions, 
reports results of hypotheses testing, and provides results of the illustrative case study. 
Finally, Chapter Six discusses the findings as well as the theoretical and practical 
contributions, states the limitations, and suggests some avenues for future research in 




CHAPTER TWO: SOCIAL SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 
 
In 2007, a group of dissident shareholders of the Exxon Mobil Corporation, 
including large public pension funds, urged the company to take a responsible position 
on climate change by using their shares. These shareholders are, by definition, internal 
stakeholders (Freeman, 1984) and owners of a public company. They believed that even 
though Exxon had been delivering good financial returns for its investors in recent 
years, the company still lacked an adequate response to climate change (Erman, 2007). 
The Exxon Mobil shareholder case is an example of a segment of stakeholders who use 
their ownership rights to change corporate policies and practices in order to improve 
society at large, even if the return on their investment is financially acceptable.  
To ensure that corporations remain cognizant of their social and environmental 
responsibilities and stay committed to resolving social and environmental issues, 
shareholder activists attempt to influence a corporation’s practices and policies through 
institutional channels. Lee and Lounsbury (2011) referred to this type of shareholder 
activism on social and environmental issues as social shareholder activism (p. 156). 
Social shareholder activists believe that they must achieve more than financial profit 
and they voice their concerns to change unjust and harmful corporate practices that 
affect the welfare of non-shareholding stakeholders. Moving beyond the norms of 
passivity, social shareholder activists challenge corporations from inside through using 
institutional mechanisms. As Weber, Rao, and Thomas (2009) put it, these shareholders 
are “activists in the suits” rather than “activist in the streets” (p. 106).  
Gillan and Starks (1998) argued shareholder activism arises when shareholders 
believe that the corporate management has failed in its duty, that is, they are dissatisfied 
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with the performance of the corporation. These scholars defined a shareholder activist 
as “an investor who tries to change the status quo through ‘voice,’ without a change in 
the control of the firm (Gillan & Starks, 1998, p. 3).  Shareholder activists’ voice is 
most frequently expressed in shareholder activism by filing shareholder resolutions for 
inclusion on a corporation’s annual proxy statement, in private engagements with 
management or board of directors over an issue, or by putting pressure on a corporation 
by bringing the issue to the attention of the media (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; Gillan 
& Starks, 2007). Often, shareholder activists combine all of these strategies to enhance 
their influence on corporate managements.  
Because shareholders legally own shares of stock in a public or private 
corporation, they have direct connections with the corporation. Shareholders possess 
legitimate channels such as letter writing, direct communication with top management 
or board directors, filing resolutions, and posing questions at the general meetings. In a 
sense, these shareholders are engaged in activism to advocate for the well-being of non-
shareholding stakeholders. Social shareholder activism thus provides an excellent 
context in which to study the concept of organizational legitimacy in relation to the 
broader question of the role of public relations in society. 
History of Social Shareholder Activism 
While social shareholder activism has been experiencing a resurgence in recent 
years, shareholders have been attempting to hold the publicly-held U.S. corporations 
accountable for social issues well over a century (Graves, Rehbein, & Waddock, 2001). 
The history of social shareholder activism dates back to Quaker religious congregations 
in the early twentieth century, when these groups chose not to invest in alcohol and 
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weapons manufacturing corporations (Vogel, 1983). However, the early forms of 
shareholder activism were religiously motivated and largely relied on avoiding “sinful” 
businesses, such as tobacco, alcohol, and fire arms, rather than actively challenging the 
corporate managements. 
Even though the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission rule introduced the 
shareholder resolution in 1942, modern social shareholder activism emerged in early 
1970s (Gillan & Starks, 1998). In 1970, the Medical Committee on Human Rights filed 
a resolution at Dow Chemical requesting that the corporation stop napalm production 
that was being used during the Vietnam War. The corporation sent the resolution to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for disqualification, and the SEC omitted 
the resolution under the ordinary business rule. However, the shareholder activist group 
won a lawsuit through the U.S. Court of Appeals. The Court ordered the SEC to review 
its support for Dow Chemical’s decision to omit a shareholder resolution from its proxy 
regarding restricting the company’s sale of napalm (Gillian & Starks, 2007). The 
Medical Committee of Human Rights ultimately won the right to file the proxy in the 
following year. In turn, the SEC expanded the interpretation of Rule 14a-8 so that social 
responsibility-related issues could also be submitted by shareholders for inclusion on 
corporate proxy statements. The same year, an organization called the Project on 
Corporate Responsibility announced that it was submitting nine social responsibility-
related resolutions to be voted that General Motors (Vogel, 1983). The SEC ruled that 
General Motors was required to include two of these “Campaign GM” social resolutions 
on its proxy statement (Vogel, 1983). While each resolution received very low support 
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(less than 3%) at the annual meeting, the campaign paved the way for a new era of 
social shareholder activism via filing resolutions.  
Social shareholder activism has fully utilized the institutional setting when the 
Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR) was formed in 1972 as a voice of 
other religious investors to push corporations divest from South Africa in protest of 
apartheid (Guay, Doh, & Sinclair, 2004; Proffitt & Spicer, 2006). Since the 1970’s, 
social shareholder resolutions have been filed at U.S. corporations related to issues such 
as apartheid, tobacco, nuclear power, labor standards, human rights, discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation, and genocide in Sudan. Figure 1 exhibits a timeline of 
shareholder activism in the U.S. based on a reading of the literature. 
In essence, social shareholder activism is one of the main components of 
socially responsible investing (SRI)—an investment movement which seeks to consider 
social good along with financial return (Guay et al., 2004; Tkac, 2006; Sjostrom, 2008). 
The Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investing, the U. S. membership 
association for professionals, corporations, institutions, and organizations engaged in 
socially responsible investing, describes SRI investment as the following: 
SRI recognizes that corporate responsibility and societal concerns are valid parts 
of investment decisions. SRI considers both the investor's financial needs and an 
investment’s impact on society. SRI investors encourage corporations to 
improve their practices on environmental, social, and governance issues. You 
may also hear SRI like approaches to investing referred to as mission investing, 
responsible investing, double or triple bottom line investing, ethical investing, 
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sustainable investing, or green investing. (Socially Responsible Investing Facts, 
2013, para. 2). 
SRI thus broadly refers to the financial investment that takes account of social, ethical 
(including religious), and environmental criteria. Socially responsible investors 
typically look at a company’s internal operating behavior such as employment policies 
and benefits, and external practices such as effects on the environment and indigenous 
people, and also its product line such as tobacco or defense equipment to determine 
whether they should invest in the firm (Guay et al., 2004). Thus, in addition to financial 
returns, social responsible investors are concerned about their investments’ impact on 
society in the long-term.  
Traditionally, faith-based organizations as well as a few individuals and social 
activists are associated with the social responsibility rationale. Perhaps the best example 
is the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR). The ICCR is a coalition 
that represents 275 faith-based institutional investors that seek to use their investment 
assets according to their values and as a vehicle to pressure corporations to behave 
responsibly. ICCR (2013) describes its mission as “through the lens of faith, ICCR 
builds a more just and sustainable world by integrating social values into investor 
actions” (ICCR, Out Mission, para. 1). Religious Communities Investment Fund 
(RCIF), another faith-based activist organization describes its inspiration for socially 
responsible investing as the following:  
The Fund is a coordinated effort of various Catholic Religious Congregations 
who believe, as Gospel people, that they are called to use their financial 
resources as a ministry to assist in overcoming social and environmental 
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inequities.  The Congregations pool their individual assets to support the mission 
of promoting economic justice through investments in low-income communities 
worldwide. By investing in organizations that address the economic inequalities 
in low-income communities, the Fund seeks to promote an economy of 
solidarity and reflect the Gospel values of economic justice, compassion, human 
dignity and environmental stewardship. (Mission of the Fund, 2013, para. 1). 
Shareholder activists inspired by the socially responsible investing movement thus seek 
to promote their social values and voice their expectations through institutional 
channels such as resolution filing. Shareholder guided by socially responsible investing 
have historically been focused on issues such as labor, human rights, the environment, 
and international relations, as well as varied social and religious concerns (Graves et al., 
2001; Rehbein, Waddock, & Graves, 2004). 
Social Shareholder Activism as a Social Movement 
Recently, social movement literature has been increasingly applied in 
management research to analyze corporate responses to social pressures exerted by 
stakeholders (e.g., den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; Lee & Lounsbury, 2011; Reid & 
Toffel, 2009; Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003; Weber, Rao, & Thomas, 2009). Social 
movement In this dissertation, social shareholder activism is conceptualized as a form 
of social movement. According to Zald and Berg (1978), a social movement is “the 
expression of a preference for change among members of a society” (p. 828). Social 
movements consist of mobilized or activated demands and preferences for change in 
society (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003). Essentially, the purpose of social movement is 
to “do something” about the concern and to promote or resist change in the group, 
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society, or world order of which they are a part” (Zucher & Snow, 1981, p. 447). 
According to Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) social movements are collectivities 
acting with some degree of organization and continuity, partly outside institutional or 
organizational channels, for the purpose of challenging extant systems of authority, or 
resisting change in such a systems, in the organization, society, culture, or world system 
in which they are embedded.  
Social shareholder activism nicely fits with these definitions of social 
movements with few amendments. As mentioned above, shareholder activism is usually 
driven by interested collectives such as religious pension funds (e.g., Interfaith Center 
on Corporate Responsibility, Pension Fund of the Christian Church, Religious 
Communities Investment Fund) and special interest groups (e.g., the Forum for 
Sustainable and Responsible Investment, Ceres) working together with some degree of 
collective organization. For example, a significant part of the shareholder activism on 
social and environmental issues is systematically enacted by the ICCR (Guay et al., 
2004; Logsdon & van Buren, 2008; Proffitt & Spicer, 2006). Shareholder activism also 
shows a degree of continuity. As discussed earlier, the origins of social shareholder 
activism date back to the Quaker tradition (Vogel, 1983). In addition, shareholder 
activism has a suprainstitutional orientation in that it represents various social interests 
and goals. Finally, shareholder activism is change oriented in that members of the 
movement seek changes, in line with their values and beliefs, in corporate social 
behavior and policy.  
Social movements and activists struggle and compete for power through using 
public discourses and framing issues (Burns, 1999; Burns & LaMoyne, 2003; Snow et 
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al., 1986; Zuckher & Snow, 1981). As a form of social movement that occurs inside 
organizations (Zald & Berger, 1978), social shareholder activism utilizes various 
channels to achieve its goals. Filing resolutions at corporations is one of the institutional 
mechanisms through which shareholder activists “voice” their concerns about social 
issues (Gillan & Starks, 2000, p. 276) and draw public attention to these issues.  
Why do shareholder activists take action on social issues? In management 
literature, Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) developed a model of stakeholder group 
action combining two different perspectives: interest- and identity-based perspectives. 
The interest-based perspective of stakeholder action holds that stakeholders are more 
likely to interact with a corporation when they feel that their specific interests are not 
receiving enough attention from a corporation. On the other hand, identity-based 
stakeholder perspective argues that stakeholders may have an incentive to mobilize or 
undertake action to strengthen their solidarity or collective identity. Rowley and 
Moldoveanu (2003) argued that filing shareholder resolutions on social responsibility 
issues is an example of stakeholder action with negligible rational benefits.  
Indeed, social shareholder activists face several challenges in trying to get a 
social resolution passed. First, social shareholder activists target large corporations 
(Rehbein, Waddock, & Graves, 2004). The ownership of large corporations is widely 
distributed and it is hard to garner support from other shareholders to receive majority 
vote on a resolution (Ertimur et al., 2010). Second, from a resource dependency 
perspective (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), which explains how the external resources of 
organizations affect the organizational behavior, corporate managers and board 
members control most of the corporate resources. Third, social shareholder activists 
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often introduce resolutions addressing topics that are little interest to other shareholders 
(Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003). One possible explanation is that social shareholder 
activists perceive that they can still achieve important goals even if the resolution does 
not pass. This point will be discussed further in the outcomes of social shareholder 
resolutions section. 
Shareholder Activism through Filing Resolutions 
In the U.S., shareholders have been actively pressuring corporate managements 
to address social issues through proxy voting process
1
 for many decades. Institutionally, 
shareholder activism largely derives from the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC). U.S. Congress places responsibility with the SEC to regulate the solicitation and 
issuance of proxies for companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges. Under Rule 14a-8 of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Shareholder Proposal Rule), any shareholder who 
continuously holds shares worth $2000 of stock in corporation (or 1% of the market 
value of equity) for at least one year is allowed to include one proposal with a 500-word 
supporting statement in the proxy distributed by the company prior to its general 
shareholder meeting. Each shareholder may submit no more than one proposal to a 
company for a particular shareholders’ meeting. Either the sponsoring shareholder, or a 
representative who is qualified represent the sponsor, must attend the meeting to present 
                                                 
1
 Shareholders have the right to vote on certain corporate matters (e.g., electing directors to the 
board, approving mergers and acquisitions, CSR operations). Since most shareholders cannot 
attend the annual and special meetings at which the voting occurs, by law, corporations provide 
shareholders with the option to cast a proxy vote. Shareholders receive a proxy ballot in the 
mail along with an informational booklet called a proxy statement describing the issues to be 
voted on (including shareholder resolutions). Shareholders return a form by mail agreeing to 
have their vote cast by proxy. Since 2007 with the SEC’s electronic access rule, shareholders 
have been able to cast their votes via online.  
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the proposal. Thus filing a proposal, or a resolution, provides an institutional 
mechanism for shareholders to voice their social concerns. 
With the pervasive use of the Internet and new media technologies in recent 
years, the SEC passed an electronic access rule in 2007. The rule allows shareholders to 
receive a notice in the mail on where they could go online to find annual reports and 
other access materials. Once there, they could cast their votes for or against corporate 
agendas, from a keyboard. The rule was part of a boarder ongoing initiative to 
encourage shareholder participation in corporate affairs (Securities Technology 
Monitor, 2010). Thus, the rule has enabled shareholder activists concerned about 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility issues to receive proxy 
materials over the Internet in their convenience and vote on corporate agenda online, by 
clicking their choices. Another SEC rule that has significantly affected the development 
of social shareholder activism is about communication among shareholders. In 1992, 
the SEC passed rules allowing shareholders to directly communicate with each other. 
Prior to the 1992 changes, if more than ten shareholders as a group discussed a 
company’s business; they were required to send information to the other shareholders. 
By relaxing the restrictions on the disclosure of communications among shareholders, 
the new rules significantly lowered the costs and potential of legal liability associated 
with shareholder activism (Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999: Gillan & Starks, 2000). With 
this change in communication rules, it got less costly to create shareholder coalitions to 
obtain more support for desired changes. As a result, shareholder activists, including 
social shareholder activists, have begun having more direct engagement with corporate 
managements and more capacity to mobilize support for action, increasing the impact of 
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shareholder activism on corporations (Guay et al., 2004; MacLeod, 2009; Proffitt & 
Spicer, 2006). One of the primary formal mechanisms through which shareholder 
activists take action is to file a shareholder resolution.  
Defining a shareholder resolution. Shareholder resolutions are non-binding 
advisory proposals regarding corporate governance or social and environmental issues. 
The SEC (2013) explains the function of a resolution, or a proposal, as the following: 
A shareholder proposal is your recommendation or requirement that the 
company and/or its board of directors take action, which you intend to present at 
a meeting of the company’s shareholders. Your proposal should state as clearly 
as possible the course of action you believe the company should follow. (SEC, 
Shareholder Proposal, para. 1) 
In essence, the shareholder resolution rule is an attempt to provide shareholders with a 
means to inform corporate boards about issues that are important to them. The 
shareholder resolution thus provides a formal tool for social shareholder activists to 
voice their concerns and exert pressures on corporations. A social shareholder 
resolution can ask a company “to adopt a human rights policy, to issue a report on how 
it plans to mitigate risk pertaining to greenhouse gas emissions or to implement ethical 
codes of conducts for its supply chain” (Sjorstorm, 2008, p. 142). Concurrently or 
sequentially with the issue definition, shareholders activists identify the target 
corporations with the regard to the issue (Rehbein et al., 2004) and then make their 
concerns known to the corporate management (Logsdon & van Buren, 2008). Most 
commonly, in the spirit of engagement to communication with the target corporation, 
the shareholder activist may write a letter (enclosing a copy of the resolution) to the 
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corporate management about the issue and seek to engage in a conversation (Carleton et 
al., 1998; Logston & van Buren, 2008). If the shareholder activists get no response or an 
unsatisfactory response to the letter, then a shareholder resolution may officially be 
filed. By law, a corporation is required to include shareholder resolutions in its annual 
proxy statement—a statement required of a corporation when soliciting shareholder 
votes prior to its general shareholder meeting—and shareholder resolutions are voted 
upon by all shareholders. Shareholder resolutions must be under 500 words in length 
and must follow a certain structure. 
Structure of a shareholder resolution. The resolutions must be under five 
hundred words in length, and each one ends with a “resolved” clause requesting the 
target corporation to take a specific action (e.g., to report on CO2 emissions, to adopt a 
policy). In the beginning of the resolution, shareholder activists provide some evidence 
(e.g., statistics, examples) to warrant their arguments and justify their positions. After 
the change is requested, supporting statements are provided to bolster the proponent’s 
position. In these arguments, shareholder activists strategically emphasize that the 
proposed changes not only serve to the specific cause, but also contribute to creating 
shareholder value overall.  
As mentioned earlier, after institutional shareholder activists clearly define and 
frame the issue and draft the resolution and identify the target corporation (Rehbein et 
al., 2004), in the next process they write a letter to the corporation about the issue 
enclosing a draft of the resolution. Appendix A presents an example of a shareholder 
letter accompanied by a shareholder resolution sponsored by California State Teachers’ 
Retirement Systems targeted to Chesapeake Energy. Shareholder letters are designed to 
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engage the corporation in a conversation about the issue under consideration (Carleton, 
Nelson, & Weisbach, 1998; Logson & van Buren, 2008; Proffitt & Spicer, 2006). In a 
case study of the process of private negotiations that consisted of correspondence 
between TIAA-CREF and 45 targeted companies, Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach 
(1998) described the step of engaging the targeted corporation, what they called of 
“jawboning” (p. 1339), as the following: 
Often this step begins with a formal letter or telephone call to the targeted firm 
explaining why the firm was targeted and what action the institution desires 
from the targeted firm. In more adversarial institutions, the institution will 
publish the letter; however, most institutions seek a quiet and friendly dialogue. 
With many activist funds, including TIAA-CREF, a proxy resolution is sent to 
the targeted firm simultaneously with the effort to initiate dialogue. (p. 1339) 
Logson and van Buren (2008) explained that concurrently or sequentially 
shareholder activists write a letter to the corporation seeking for an engagement on the 
issue. If the shareholder activists get no response or an unsatisfactory response to the 
letter, the shareholder resolution may be filed with several outcomes that will be 
discussed in the next section. However, even if the sponsors officially filed the 
resolution, target corporations can still seek to have a conversation with sponsors before 
the annual meeting. 
Types of Social Issues Raised in Shareholder Resolutions 
Prior research indicated that shareholder resolutions generally ask the target 
corporations to take action on one of two broad topics: corporate governance or social 
responsibility (including environmental responsibility) (Gillan & Starks, 2000, 2007; 
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Sjorström, 2008; Thomas & Cotter, 2007). Corporate governance defined as a set of 
mechanisms through which shareholders can limit managerial discretion to pursue ends 
other than shareholder value (Fama & Jensen, 1980). Corporate governance resolutions 
ask such things as the removal of the company’s anti-takeover defenses, changes in the 
way directors are elected to the board, or reductions in the level of executive 
compensation. Corporate governance resolutions are thus concerned with maximizing 
shareholder value and limiting expenses on non-shareholding stakeholders. In contrast, 
social responsibility shareholder resolutions focus on the interests of non-shareholding 
stakeholders. They cover a wide variety of possible actions such as disclosing data on a 
corporation’s operation’s environmental impact, labeling gene-engineered foods, 
production methods, adopting sexual orientation anti-bias policies, or implementing 
ethical codes of conduct for overseas operations.  
In their analysis shareholder resolutions filed over the period of 2002 and 2004, 
Thomas and Cotter (2007) categorized resolution types into two groups: corporate 
governance and social responsibility resolutions. The governance resolutions included 
shareholder resolutions auditor independence, and compensations. The social 
responsibility resolutions included a wide range of social and environmental issues 
ranging from reporting on gene-engineered food, to labeling gene-engineered foods, 
reporting on greenhouse gas emissions and FSC,
2
 reporting on/reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions, reporting on waste storage at nuclear plants, obtaining power supplies from 
                                                 
2
 The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) sets standards, monitors certificated operations and 
issues and protects the FSC trademark to allow customers to choose from socially and 
environmentally responsible forestry.  See Forest Stewardship Council at http://ic.fsc.org/about-
us.1.htm 
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clean, renewable sources, implementing ILO standards
3
 and third-party monitors, 
reporting on political donations and policies, adopting a code of conduct for China 
operations, implementing the MacBride principles,
4
 or adopting sexual orientation anti-
bias polices. The researchers found that, over the period of 2002-2004, there were more 
governance resolutions (more than twice in number) that reached at annual meetings for 
vote than social resolutions, and the corporate governance resolutions were approved on 
average by 34.14% of the votes cast, while social resolutions average only 10.75% of 
the vote cast (Thomas & Cotter, 2007). However, researchers noted a growing 
shareholder support for social resolutions. 
Social issues addressed in shareholder resolutions have varied over time 
(Graves, Rehbein, & Waddock, 2001: Vogel, 1983), reflecting the dynamic nature of 
society. Vogel (1983) examined trends in social shareholder resolutions during 1970 
and 1982 and identified an emerging social issue activism mostly led by individual 
shareholders. In a descriptive study of shareholder resolutions filed at U.S. corporations 
for the time period of 1988-1998, Graves, Rehbein, and Waddock (2001) found that 
social topics addressed in shareholder resolutions ranged widely. Moreover, by counting 
the number of resolutions on a given subject during any given year and total resolutions 
over time, the researchers demonstrated that issues vary greatly in the intensity of 
                                                 
3
 International Labor Organization (ILO) is a United Nations agency that sets standards and 
shape policies for decent a work experience.  See http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/lang--
en/index.htm 
4
 The MacBride Principles consist of nine fair employment principles that feature a corporate 
code of conduct for United States companies doing business in Northern Ireland. Some of the 
principles include increasing the representation of individuals from under-represented religious 
groups in the workforce including managerial, supervisory, administrative, clerical, and 
technical jobs; and the establishment of procedures to assess, identify, and actively recruit 
minority employees with the potential for further advancement.  For more information see 
Booth, H. E., & Bertsch, K. A. (1989). The MacBride Principles and US Companies in 
Northern Ireland. Investor Responsibility Research Center (http://www.irrcinstitute.org/).  
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attention they received by shareholder activists. The researchers found that the most 
prominent topics during the study time period (1988-1998), in decreasing order of 
frequency were: South Africa, environment, human rights, diversity, tobacco, and labor.  
Descriptive studies of shareholder resolutions suggested that social shareholder 
resolutions mirrored the compelling social issues at the time. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
shareholders pressured corporations on issues such as black rights and equal 
opportunities (e.g., the FIGHT group challenged Eastman Kodak on black employment 
issues) and on anti-Vietnam war protests against companies such as Dow Chemical for 
the production of napalm and Honeywell for producing weapons. In the 1990s 
international conduct vaulted at the top of social shareholder agenda. For example, in a 
descriptive study that spans 1990-2003, Proffitt and Spicer (2006) detected a trend that 
shareholders asked for general codes for human rights and labor standard issues. 
Similarly, Tkac (2006) examined shareholder resolutions over a 10-year period (1992-
2002) and found that the three most common issues for shareholder resolutions were 
international conduct, environmental issues, and antidiscrimination; the least common 
issues were media/TV and animal rights. Tkac speculated that the emphasis on 
international operations reflected the passage of NAFTA and rising concerns over 
globalization in the 1990s. The aforementioned studies called for new studies that 
analyze the recent trends in shareholder resolutions. Indeed, there is no recent study that 
examines the social issues addressed in the shareholder resolutions in the last decade. 
Types of Changes Requested in Social Shareholder Resolutions 
As discussed earlier, a shareholder resolution is a recommendation or a 
requirement that the company take action (SEC, Shareholder Proposal, 2013). The SEC 
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advised shareholders that “the proposal should state as clearly as possible the course of 
action you believe the company should follow” (para. 1). Therefore, a specific action 
word that well defines a change is a key for resolution’s success.  
Some of the specific actions social shareholder activists can ask in the 
resolutions include: make a contribution, disclose information or issue a report, change 
a corporate policy (unrelated to production or main business), fundamentally change 
operations, production, or marketing practices, or research or review an issue (Tkac, 
2006). Examples of a requested change in corporate policy are the endorsement of the 
MacBride Principles (nondiscrimination in North Ireland plants), the creation of criteria 
for corporate political contributions, or a call to increase board diversity (Rehbein et al., 
2004). Under SEC rules, a shareholder resolution cannot ask a change that is related to 
ordinary business. Policy changes in the examples request for solid action but do not 
relate directly to the corporation’s operations or the selling of its products as opposed to 
changes such as closing a plant or exiting a line of business (e.g., asking Philip Morris 
to stop selling tobacco products). Examples of procedural changes requested in social 
resolutions include reducing greenhouse gas emissions or to changing the pricing policy 
to make drugs available in developing countries (Graves et al., 2001).  
Research also suggests that certain types of investor organizations have 
established a social issue agenda by consistently filing resolutions asking for a specific 
change.  For example, religious investors have been traditionally concerned with 
improving international human rights and labor standards (Proffitt & Spicer, 2006). 
Being a prominent leader of corporate governance resolutions since 1985 (Del Guercio 
& Hawkins, 1999; Gillan & Starks, 1998), public pension funds have recently entered 
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the field of social issue activism filing resolutions that request target corporations to 
adopt sexual orientation anti-discrimination policy. As such, there exists a close 
relationship between the social issues raised in the resolutions and the sponsors of these 
resolutions. 
Types of Sponsors who File Social Shareholder Resolutions 
Social shareholder activists consist of different types of sponsors. Studies in the 
management literature tend to broadly categorize social shareholder activists into two 
groups: individual and institutional. Individual shareholder activists, often called 
“corporate gadflies” (Guay et al., 2004, p. 125), have been traditionally the prominent 
proponents social shareholder resolutions (Gillan & Starks, 1998; Vogel, 1983). In fact, 
early social shareholder activism via filing resolutions was led by two individual 
investors, the Gilbert brothers, who actively pursued to make corporate management 
more accountable to their shareholders and stakeholders (Gillan & Starks, 1998). 
Behind the “Campaign GM,” a successful campaign against General Motors launched 
in 1970, was Ralph Nader—another individual shareholder activist. Nader demanded 
that the company should be more responsible to society’s needs in the areas such as 
environmental pollution and discrimination. The campaign was instrumental for the 
progress of social shareholder activism because it successfully pressured the company 
by gaining high profile media interest (Logsdon & van Buren, 2008). However, while 
individual shareholders are highly active in social responsibility issues, their influence 
over corporate managements is often questioned (Tkac, 2008; Proffitt & Spicer, 2006). 
This dissertation focuses on social shareholder activism enacted by institutional 
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shareholders—organizations that trade securities in large quantities. The next section 
discusses types of institutional shareholder activists who file social resolutions. 
Types of institutional social shareholder activists. Institutional shareholders 
have been highly engaged with shareholder activism since the formation of Council of 
Institutional Investors in 1985 (Gillan & Starks, 1998). Because institutional investors, 
such as pension funds and mutual funds, own large portions of a corporation’s shares, 
when they are dissatisfied with the corporation, they tend to avoid the exit option, which 
means selling their holding in the corporation (Gillan & Stark, 2007). Instead, they hold 
their shares and attempt to influence corporate-decision making processes. Such large 
shares also mean that institutional shareholder activists have more legitimacy, power, 
and urgency than the individual shareholder activists in the eyes of corporations 
(Mitchell et al., 1999). Indeed, particularly in the post-Enron era, the size and influence 
of institutional shareholder activism has grown over the last decade (Gillan & Starks, 
2007; Lee & Lounsbury, 2011; Proffitt & Spicer, 2006; Smith, 2012; Thomas & Cotter, 
2007).  
 The institutional shareholder activists who voice their discontent with the 
corporate management cover a wide range of spectrum of organizations, from socially 
responsible investment (SRI) pension fund managers, religious groups, churches, to 
trust funds and endowments. The next sections briefly discuss the major sponsors of 
social shareholder resolutions. 
Religious shareholder groups. Churches and religious groups have been highly 
active with shareholder activism for the last two decades. In particular, religious groups 
play a leading role in social shareholder activism. For example, in their study of 
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shareholder activism on global social issues in the last decade, Proffitt and Spicer 
(2006) found that religious groups first framed the agenda and then reached out to other 
types of investors, such as public pension funds, forming large coalitions to file 
shareholder resolutions. Profitt and Spicer (2006) argued that religious groups have 
played an instrumental role in the development of the social issues for corporate agenda, 
by generating campaign ideas, framing the issues in consistent with societal rationales, 
and forming coalitions.  
Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR) is the leader of religious 
organizations engaged in social shareholder activism in the U.S. ICCR is a coalition of 
275 faith-based institutional investor members including churches (Episcopal Church), 
pensions (the United Methodist Church pension), orders (the Sisters of Charity), faith-
based health care corporations (the Advocate health Care System), and religious 
foundations (the Catholic Foundation). The organization describes its mission as 
“utilizing religious investments and other resources to change unjust or harmful 
corporate policies, working for peace, economic justice and stewardship of the Earth” 
(ICCR, 2013, para. 1). Another religious group, the Benedictine Sisters, the Sisters of 
Humility of Mary and Trillium Assets Management asked Citigroup that “the company 
incorporate in its project its impact on the environment and human rights” (O’Rourke, 
2002, p. 7). Essentially, social shareholder activism enacted by religious shareholders is 
driven from religious values, and the goals center on social good.  
Public pension funds. As pension funds have become larger players in the stock 
market, their involvement with shareholder activism (Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999; 
Gillan & Starks, 2007; Smith, 2012) has increased. Public pension funds include large 
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institutional investors that pool large sums of money and invest in securities and assets 
in firms. Major public pension funds in the U. S. include the California Public 
Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), New York City Public Pension Fund, and 
New York State Common Retirement Fund. In recent years the public pension funds 
have become active filers of environmental and social shareholder resolutions issues 
(Sjorstrom, 2008; Smith, 2012). For example, in 2012, New York State Common 
Retirement Fund took the lead in the campaign to get corporations to include sexual 
orientation as a protected category in their Equal Employee Opportunity (EEO) 
statements (Mathiasen, Mell, & Gallimore, 2012).  
Gillan and Starks (1998) noted a change of tactic over the course of public 
pension activism in the late 1990s that the funds submitted fewer resolutions while 
trying harder to initiate an engagement with targeted corporations. In consistent with 
Gillan and Starks’s observations, Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) found that, between 
1987 through 1993, public pension funds increasingly became more successful at 
monitoring and promoting changes in target corporations through private engagements 
than previously recognized. Discussing some motivations for public pension 
shareholder activism, Del Guercio and Hawkins noted that a pension fund might pursue 
activism “to affect the behavior and management not only of the companies it targets, 
but also of many other companies that proactively make changes to avoid conflict and 
public scrutiny” (p. 294).  In a case study of TIAA-CREF shareholder activism, 
Carleton et al. (1998) found that the pension fund was able lead the targeted 
corporations to implement proposed changes. Given that public pension funds can 
effectively pressure companies on corporate governance issues (Ertimur et al., 2010; 
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Thomas & Cotter, 2007; Smith, 2012), the engagement of pension funds in corporate 
social responsibility issues is encouraging for positive social change.  
 Socially responsible investing funds. Socially responsible investing (SRI) 
organizations manage mutual funds for investors who want to invest their money 
according to ethical guidelines. Some of the leading SRI funds in the U.S. include 
Calvert Asset Management, Walden Asset Management, and Domini Social Investment. 
These funds engage in shareholder activism as a business. SRI funds usually follow two 
strategies: screening out investments that are not social responsible and investing in 
socially responsible stocks while targeting them with shareholder resolutions (Tkac, 
2006). For these funds, social activism is an asset to attract their clientele (Tkac, 2006; 
Sjorstrom, 2008). SRI mutual funds tend to disclose detailed information on investment 
policies, activities, shareholder activism engagements, and result. For example, Calvert 
Investments, a SRI shareholder activist fund, publishes on its organizational website a 
list of its record of recent shareholder resolution activities and publicly discloses the 
names and progresses of targeted corporations (www.calvert.com). The fund explained 
its need for socially responsible investing as the following: 
In an uncertain world, we invest as an act of faith in the future, with the belief 
that we can shape it. When headlines consistently reflect seemingly 
insurmountable challenges—volatile global markets, nuclear scares, oil wars, 
water shortages, and famine—smart investments requires vision that extends 
well beyond balance sheets and stock prices.(Sustainable and Responsible 
Investing, Calvert, 2013, para. 1). 
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SRI funds emphasize the need for responsible investing and the viability of aligning 
personal values with performance. In addition to screening out on the grounds of social 
and environmental performance, SRI mutual funds have been actively involved with 
creating greater awareness among companies of the environment and social aspects of 
their business operations. Indeed, SRI mutual funds and the amounts invested in SRI 
have been on the rise in recent years. Social Investment Forum reported that assets in 
socially responsible investment portfolios in the U.S. reached close to $4 trillion at the 
end of 2011 (out of total $33.3 trillion investment assets). In other words, socially 
responsible investing accounts for 11.23 percent of all assets in the United States by the 
year 2011 (U.S. Socially Investing Forum, 2013).   
Union pension funds. Labor union funds such as the American Federation of 
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations and International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters have been involved with shareholder activism since 1990s (Gillan & Straks, 
2000). Union pension funds traditional have been active in filing resolutions on 
corporate governance issues (Schwab & Thomas, 1998). Especially in recent years, 
union funds have withdrawn from social shareholder activism and focused largely on 
corporate governance resolutions (Tkac, 2006). Union shareholder activism features a 
unique realignment of interests for corporate managers as unions represent workers’ 
interests through using the shareholder-voting mechanism. Union pension funds have 
pursue social shareholder activism among the corporations that employ their members. 
However, recently union shareholder activism has been criticized by the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce, accusing unions of “politicizing the boardroom” and “promoting 
unrelated narrow interests” (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 2013, para. 2). 
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Special interest groups. Special interest shareholder activist groups are based 
upon on a narrowly defined agenda that is perceived to be of important to their 
members. For example, the mission of Rainforest Action Network is “to campaign for 
the forest, their inhabitants and the natural systems that sustain life by transforming the 
global marketplace through educations, grassroots organizing and non-violent direct 
action” (Rainforest Action Network, 2013), while the mission of Human Rights 
Campaign is “to achieve lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender equality” (Human 
Rights Campaign, 2013). Special interest shareholder groups are somewhat different 
than the other social shareholder activist sponsors. First of all, special interests groups 
are not necessarily motivated by creating and maintain shareholder value. These 
organizations may want to cause financial harm to a corporation, such as encouraging 
consumer boycotts, to achieve their goals. Other institutional shareholder activists, such 
as public pension funds and SRI funds, advocate for improving corporate social 
performance while maintaining a positive financial return at the same time. Second, 
special interest activist groups largely rely on confrontation with corporations and 
publicity as a tool of facilitating desired changes (Tkac, 2006). However, other 
institutional shareholder activists initiate private engagements with corporate managers. 
For special interest groups, filing resolutions is yet another way to pursue their 
issue agenda. For example the People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) 
described its involvement with shareholder activism as the following: In our unending 
quest to find new and innovative ways to help animals, PETA now owns stock in more 
than 80 meat producers, clothing, retailers, fast food and grocery chains, and 
pharmaceutical companies” (PETA, Investing in Animals: PETA’s Shareholder 
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Resolution Campaign, para. 2, 2013). Nevertheless, shareholder activism is a slightly 
less common strategy for special groups; compared to religious organizations and 
pension funds, as these groups may not have a large sum of investment assets 
(O’Rourke, 2002).  
An emerging trend in the social shareholder activism is that special interest 
groups seek for institutional investor collaborations (particularly public pension and SRI 
fund collaborations) to facilitate their issue agenda. The goal of these collaborations is 
to make their demands more salient and legitimate in the eyes of corporate 
managements and other stakeholders (Guay, Doh, & Sinclair, 2004; McLeod, 2002). 
For example, the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), a special interest group, sends out 
an annual letter to large U.S. and international corporations on behalf of over 722 
institutional investors holding $87 trillion in assets. The letter requests that firms 
disclose all of their greenhouse gas emissions (CDP, 2013). Through leveraging 
shareholder pressure, the organization gathers self-reported environmental information 
from the target corporations. CDP then makes this data collection available to 
investment managers and advisors, asset owners, data and index providers, banks and 
brokers. 
Process of Filing and Outcomes of Social Shareholder Resolutions 
When the sponsor files the resolution at corporation, the target corporation may 
decide to accept or reject it based on its relevance to the corporation’s mission and 
goals, and the feasibility of implementing the suggestion. If accepted, the issue raised in 
the resolution has to be included in the proxy reports of the corporation and is voted 
upon all shareholders in the corporation’s next general meeting. Corporate 
42 
managements oppose to almost all shareholder resolutions that go to a vote, and the 
corporation recommends a “no” vote on resolutions in their proxy statement (Lee & 
Lounsbury, 2011; Rehbein et al., 2004). A resolution which receives a majority vote is 
still non-binding, and may be implemented subject to the approval of management and 
the board of directors. As such, company can ignore the resolution and allow all 
shareholders to vote on its merits. At the annual meeting, if the issue gains sufficient 
shareholder votes that go over the threshold of 3% in the first year, 6% in the second, 
and 10% thereafter (SEC, 2012), the resolution can be re-submitted in the following 
years. The shareholder resolution process is usually undertaken in the hope that 
management will be willing to engage with proponents and make substantial changes in 
practice as a result of the engagement process (Guay et al., 2004; O’Rourke, 2003; 
Proffitt & Spicer, 2006).  
When a target corporation receives a resolution from shareholder activists, the 
corporation can respond to the shareholder activist request in three ways: a) petition the 
SEC for the omission of the resolution from the proxy; b) ignore the resolution and 
allow all shareholders vote on its merits at the general meeting; and c) engage with the 
shareholder activists who sponsored the resolution to discuss the proposed changes. In 
the next sections, each outcome will be briefly explained.  
Omitted resolutions. Target corporations can petition the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) to exclude a shareholder resolution from the proxy ballot 
by writing a no-action letter to the SEC. In the no-action letter, the company describes 
the background and put forward its arguments against the inclusion of the resolution in 
the proxy ballot. In the no-action requests, corporations often assert that a resolution 
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should be excluded under one or more parts of the SEC Rule 14a-8. More specifically, 
the rule states that corporations can request the exclusion of proposals that are not a 
proper action for shareholders under the corporation’s state law, proposals that address 
ordinary business matters, proposals that would result in the violation of state or federal 
laws, proposals related to personal claim or grievance, proposals that are false or 
misleading, an proposals that the corporation has no authority to implement (SEC, Rule 
14a-8 and the no-action process, 2013, para. 1). At the SEC, the Division of Corporate 
Finance processes rule 14a-8 no-action letters submitted by corporations. The SEC 
analyzes prior no-action requests that the corporations cite in the letters and may do 
their own research to decide. In fact, on its website the SEC (2013) explains how they 
base their determinations on the no-action letters submitted by corporations: 
We consider the specific arguments asserted by the corporation and the 
shareholder, the way in which the proposal is drafted and how the arguments 
and out prior no-action responses apply to the specific proposal and company at 
issue. Based on these considerations, we may determine that company X may 
exclude a proposal but company Y cannot exclude a proposal that addresses the 
same or similar subject matter. (SEC, Rule 14a-8 and the no-action process, 
para. 4) 
As such, writing shareholder resolutions is a strategic process. The language that is used 
and the ways arguments are presented is important for the outcome of a shareholder 
resolution. The SEC can permit the company to omit a resolution if it rules the issue to 
be a personal grievance or part of ordinary business.  More specifically, Rule 14a-8(i) 
states that companies can request the exclusion of proposals that are not a proper action 
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for shareholders under the company’s state law, proposals that address ordinary 
business matters, proposals that would result in the violation of state or federal laws, 
proposals related to personal claim or grievance, proposals that are false or misleading, 
and proposals that the company has no authority to implement. O’Rourke (2003) noted 
that the most common reasons for exclusion of social shareholder resolutions include 
claiming that the corporation is already implementing what the resolution asks for, or 
stating that is simply part of ordinary business.  
Social shareholder activists often support their case with supplementary 
materials such as research results and clippings from media coverage. If the SEC 
disqualifies a resolution, it suggests that the target company’s argument against the 
resolution succeeded on technical grounds (Tkac, 2006), which is regarded as a failure 
for the sponsoring activist because omitted resolutions are ineffective for social 
shareholder activism. In a sense, omitted resolutions indicate lack of expertise in 
submitting shareholder resolutions and choosing right targets for advancing social 
activism. 
Voted resolutions. Alternatively, the corporation can ignore the resolution and 
its filers and does not send it to the SEC for exclusion either. The resolution will then be 
included in the proxy ballot that discloses important information about the issues to be 
discussed at the corporation’s annual meeting. The proxy along with a statement of the 
board explaining its opposition will be voted upon at the general meeting by 
shareholders of record as of a given date indicated in the proxy materials. If the 
shareholder activists stand by their resolution and the resolution reaches at the proxy 
voting stage, the sponsor is then provided with an opportunity to speak about the 
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resolution issue. O’Rourke (2003) observed that at this stage shareholder activists solicit 
support to get votes for their resolution through various ways including contacting a 
targeted list of shareholders who vote on the proxy, campaigning for the issue in the 
media, generating endorsements from major shareholder groups or proxy advice groups, 
notifying proxy voting services, and finally reaching out to NGOs for collaboration on 
the issue. In the last decade, proxy solicitation activities are accelerated with the use of 
the Internet for shareholder involvement such as providing web-based voting 
mechanism to voters.  
At the general shareholder meeting, the sponsor who filed the resolution must 
present the issue to other shareholders present at the meeting. After the voting, the 
interpretation of the results is difficult to assess for the activist success. Prior research 
shows that environmental and social resolutions typically receive low level of support 
from shareholders compared to governance resolutions (Rehbein et al., 2004). Thomas 
and Cotter (2007) noted that shareholder resolutions on social and environmental issues 
have rarely received more than 10 percent of votes. If the resolution receives a certain 
number of votes, and is not dealt with by the target corporation, it can be re-submitted 
the next year. However, as discussed earlier, even if resolutions receive a majority vote 
of shareholders, these resolutions are precatory, or nonbinding, on corporate 
managements (Gillan & Starks, 2007). Therefore, leading a resolution through to a vote 
and even garnering support for the issue are not guarantees of corporate action. 
Corporate managers and board of directors oppose almost all shareholder resolutions 
either because the demands in the resolutions are not feasible, or because managers are 
reluctant to yield decision-making power to activist shareholders (Rehbein et al., 2004). 
46 
For example, in the Exxon Mobil-shareholder activist case in 2007, the Exxon Mobile 
Chief Executive Rex Tillerson then challenged the shareholder activists and 
environmentalists’ demands on the climate change issue saying that “I am not going to 
just adopt a slogan. If that makes me public enemy number one, so be it” (Hargreaves, 
2007, p. 1). In this case, the corporate management challenged the validity of the 
climate change claim.      
Withdrawn resolutions. The target corporation can also choose to engage in a 
conversation with the activist shareholders who sponsored the resolution. Shareholders 
generally withdraw resolutions from the ballot if they have interactions with corporate 
managers who then agree to take actions on the issue outlined in the resolution 
(Carleton et al., 1998; Lee & Lounsbury, 2011; Logsdon & van Buren, 2009; O’Rourke, 
2003; Rehbein et al., 2004). Academic and business as well as shareholder activist 
circles tend to describe these ongoing interactions as dialogue
5
 (e.g., Investment 
Network on Climate Risk, 2012; Logsdon & van Buren, 2009; Weber, Rao, & Thomas, 
2009). For the purpose of this dissertation, this formal process in which shareholder 
activist groups and corporate management agree to ongoing communications to deal 
with a social/environmental issue raised in the resolution as engagement
6
. The 




 Business literature tends to describe this process of communication between a shareholder 
activist and a target corporation as dialogue. However, in public relations literature, dialogue 
refers to a “relational interaction” on an equal stand (Kent & Taylor, 1998, p. 323). For dialogue 
to exists “parties must view communicating with each other as the goal of a relationship” (p. 
324).  Clearly, the concept of dialogue in public relations literature does not refer to the formal 
interactions between shareholder activists and target corporations. To identify the difference, 
this dissertation proposes to use the term engagement instead of dialogue. Shareholder activist-
corporate engagement refers to the communication process between a social shareholder activist 
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engagement process starts with initial communication with corporations to inform the 
social concerns held by shareholder activists. Such communication may work well in 
facilitating the exchange of information on the social issue between shareholder 
activists and corporations and may last for a number of months (Carleton et al., 1997; 
Logsdon & van Buren, 2008; Rehbein et al., 2004). The subsequent withdrawal of a 
resolution resulting from a shareholder activist-corporate engagement generally 
indicates that agreement has been reached on corporate actions to deal with the social 
issue under consideration prior to proxy vote. Graves et al. (2001) observed that 
shareholder activists view withdrawal of their resolutions as victories because “they 
typically only withdraw when management shows sincerity and legitimate commitment 
and progress to implement the requested change” (p. 296). Likewise, O’Rourke (2003) 
noted, “the best possible outcome from a shareholder dialogue is that the company 
agrees to substantial changes in practice” (p. 234). Indeed, previous research regarding 
the influence of shareholder activism indicates that the mere filing of a resolution often 
signals the failure of shareholder activist-corporate engagement to reach agreement on 
the disputed issue (Guay et al., 2004; Logsdon & van Buren, 2008).  
It is clear that these three outcomes—omissions, voting, and withdrawals—are 
different with respect to assessing activist success. The withdrawn resolutions suggest a 
sense of agreement through dialogue whereas SEC disqualification and proxy voting 
present more hostile forms of engagement. Tkac (2006) explained that “an omitted 
resolution is one that has been actively challenged by the company. Moreover, the 
corporation’s opinion that this resolution is concerned with a matter that is not within 
                                                                                                                                               
who filed the resolution and a target corporation regarding an issue addressed in a social 
shareholder resolution. 
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the shareholders’ purview is officially confirmed by the SEC” (p. 12). Tkac (2006) 
further explained: 
Effectively, omitted proposals are dead proposals and a clear instance of activist 
failure at using a proxy proposal to prompt social change. In contrast, a 
withdrawn resolution usually signals some type of action on the part of the 
corporation—dialogue, agreement to resolution, or some other compromise. 
Withdrawal can be viewed as indicating some level of success. (p. 13) 
Furthermore, the low cost of the shareholder activist’s continuing a proposal through to 
a vote strengthens this view. The sponsoring shareholder activist needs only to show up 
at the annual meeting. Thus, there seems to be no obvious reason for an activist 
shareholder to withdraw a resolution other than to believe that the target corporation is 
committed to take some action.  As such, the simple fact that those resolutions were 
withdrawn—not having been sent to SEC for omission or ignored by the target 
company—prior to the general vote implies that the corporation is willing to engage 
with the sponsoring shareholder activists and possibly agree on the proposed changes 
(Carleton et al., 1998; Logsdon & van Buren, 2009; O’Rourke, 2003; Tkac, 2006; 
Sjostrom, 2008; Smith, 2012).  Indeed, in her case studies of BP Amoco and World 
Resources Institute, O’Rourke (2003) observed that shareholder activist successes were 
achieved not only through the official process of filing proposals, rather engagement 
with corporation played a significant role. Thus, social shareholder activists view the 
resolution mechanism as opening “a window of opportunity” to engage the companies 
in a serious discussion over social issues (p. 21).  
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For example, Investment Network on Climate Risk (INCR), a nonprofit 
organization of investor coalition of 100 members that manages nearly $11 trillion in 
assets (Ceres, 2012), describes one of its main functions as initiating dialogue with 
corporations through resolution filing: 
In recent years, INCR has supported company dialogues on investor concerns 
ranging from sustainable homebuilding practices to disposal of coal ash, 
enabling change in corporate practices that once threatened long-term 
profitability and social or human health. INCR helps coordinate investor filing – 
and often successful withdrawal – of proxy proposals asking companies to better 
disclose material risks of climate change, water scarcity and energy use as well 
as ask companies to set aggressive goals to minimize risk from sustainability-
related issues. (INCR, Ceres, 2012, para. 2) 
Social shareholder activists thus play a key role in reaching out other shareholders and 
forming collaborations with them to engage corporations with the social issue at hand 
(Guay et al., 2004; MacLeod, 2009). Regardless of whether a resolution is withdrawn 
through engagement or not, the process requires repeated communication and 
interactions between corporate managers and shareholder activists, making it interesting 
for public relations and communication research.  
Social Shareholder Activist-Corporate Engagement 
The process of shareholder activist-corporate engagement opens up with the 
activist group’s request to engage in a conversation with the targeted corporation to 
discuss the social issue at hand. Some corporations are willing to engage in a 
conversation with the shareholder activists in an effort to reach at an agreement on how 
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to address the issue immediately if possible, or at least show their sincere commitment 
to continue to engage in ongoing communication about the issue (Carleton et al., 1998; 
Del & Guercio, 1999; Guay et al., 2004; Logsdon & Van Buren, 2008). For example, in 
their case study of the dialogue between TIAA-CREF and 45 corporations it contacted 
about corporate governance issues between 1992 and 1996, Carleton et al. (1998) found 
that TIAA-CREF was able to reach agreements with targeted companies more than 95 
percent of the time. Carleton et al. further explained the withdrawal process: 
This step involves an agreement between the institution and the targeted firm. 
The agreement between the institution and the targeted firm can entail the 
targeted firm adopting the resolution verbatim, or a common ground agreement 
that meets the goals of the activists. If the agreement comes prior to the 
distribution of the firm’s proxy statement, the institution can withdraw the 
resolution and keep the entire process confidential. In some cases no agreement 
will be reached, and the institution will target the firm subsequently in the future 
years. (p.1339). 
In the case of TIAA-CREF, Carleton et al. (1998) found that an agreement was reached 
before the resolution went to a vote at the annual meeting. When the agreement was 
reached, TIAA-CREF withdrew the resolution. Furthermore, by analyzing the 
correspondence (i.e., letters, faxes, and memos) pertaining to the negotiations between 
TIAA-CREF and the target companies and measures taken by the target companies, the 
researchers verified that at least 87 percent of the targets subsequently took actions to 
comply with the agreements. For example, some of TIAA-CREF’s resolutions called 
for a change in the corporate policy regarding the composition of the target’s board of 
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directors, specifically to include female and minority members. In a number of these 
cases, the company was unwilling to change its official policy but effectively made an 
effort to recruit women or minorities onto their board (Carleton et al., 1998). Such an 
action was promising enough to induce TIAA-CREF to withdraw the proxy resolution.  
Similarly, in his study of the engagement between CalPERS and the 51 targeted 
corporations over the 1987-1993 period, Smith (2012) found that 72 percent of 
corporations targeted after 1988 adopted proposed changes or make changes resulting in 
a withdrawal settlement with CalPERS. 
In elsewhere, Rehbein et al. (2004) noted that Walden Asset Management, a 
socially responsive investment company, withdrew more than a dozen resolutions in 
2001 because “the target corporation was willing to disclose information or change 
policies” (p. 242). Similarly, Hoffman (1996) observed that Amoco Corporation, later 
renamed to BP, resisted calls by nine religious groups that proposed a shareholder 
resolution calling for the company to adopt the Valdez Principles, but eventually 
reached an agreement after engagement. In exchange for the withdrawal of the proposal, 
the corporation agreed to obey one of the principles and to publish an environmental 
progress report. The cases examined in the studies suggested that social shareholder 
activists withdraw resolutions after reaching agreements that entail the targeted 
corporations adopt the resolution verbatim, or a common ground that meets the goals of 
activists. Therefore, a withdrawal outcome signals a shareholder activist-corporate 
engagement. However, these engagements often take place behind the doors, lacking 
publicly available communication (Carleton et al., 1998; Del & Guercio, 1999; 
Hoffman, 1996; Logsdon & van Buren, 2008; Smith, 2012). However, for 
52 
communication researchers, resolutions that were withdrawn before the annual meetings 
provide empirical records of shareholder activist-corporate engagement. 
In particular, many groups and coalitions are being formed with the sole aim of 
raising specific environmental and social responsibility issue through engaging 
corporate managements. These shareholder activists communicate directly with 
corporate managers attempting to engage in a social issue of interest, as well as reach 
out investors and create publicity for their cause. For example, founded in 1992, As 
You Sow “promotes environmental and social corporate responsibility through 
shareholder advocacy, coalition building, and innovative legal strategies. Our efforts 
create large-scale systemic change by establishing sustainable and equitable corporate 
practices” (As You Sow, 2013).  
A withdrawn social shareholder resolution, then, is viewed as a success on the 
shareholder activist side. The aforementioned literature suggests that shareholder 
activists withdraw their resolutions on the condition that the targeted corporation agrees 
to implement the proposed changes, commits to take certain steps to report on its social 
or environmental performance by a certain date, or demonstrates its willingness to 
appoint an engagement team that will regularly meet with the activists about the issue 
and set a timetable. Outcomes of shareholder resolutions also suggest that target 
corporations differ in their responses to social shareholder activism. Several factors 
(e.g., financial state, organizational identity, organization-stakeholder relationships) can 
affect corporate responses to social shareholder resolutions. 
Shareholder activism on social issues provides a context in which the interests of 
stakeholders and shareholders are aligned for the larger good of society. Rehbein et al. 
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(2004) argued that shareholder resolutions can “identify and define problems for firms 
and thereby signal an emerging gap between a corporation’s polices and stakeholder 
demands” (p. 242). Social shareholder activism can thus bridge the legitimacy gap—an 
expectancy gap indicating a discrepancy between an organization’s actions and 
society’s expectations of this organization (Sethi, 1979). Indeed, Sjorstrom (2008) 
viewed shareholder activism as “the canary in the coal mine” (p. 146). That is, social 
shareholder activists can cue corporations on the socially desired actions. Social 
shareholder resolutions can be a leading indicator of overall stakeholder concerns in 
society. Moreover, social shareholder resolutions can elicit changes in corporations by 
initiating shareholder activist-corporate engagement over the social issue under 
consideration. Based on the discussions above, Figure 2 illustrates a simplified 
visualization of the process and outcomes of shareholder resolutions. 
Gaps in the Literature and Research Questions 
While shareholder activism has recently gained increased prominence in the 
management and finance literature, the review of the studies has pointed few gaps for 
further research in social shareholder activism research from a societal perspective. The 
first problem is related to the limited number of research studies that specifically focus 
on social shareholder activism. Not surprisingly, scholarly attention in management 
literature was focused on shareholder activism on corporate governance issues (e.g., 
Ertimur, Ferri, & Stubben, 2010; Gillan & Straks, 2000, 2007; Thomas & Cotter, 2007). 
Tkac (2006) and Sjorstrom (2008) noted that recent empirical work that focuses on 
social shareholder activism via filing resolutions has been largely missing in the 
literature. 
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A second problem is related to conceptualizations of shareholder activism. Not 
surprisingly, management studies have focused on shareholder activism from the 
corporate management perspective attempting to establish a causal link between 
shareholder activism and subsequent changes in corporate financial performance (e.g., 
Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999; Gillan & Starks, 2007). While studies in the 
management literature have provided an overall understanding of the issues raised in the 
shareholder resolutions for a specific time period (e.g., Graves & Waddock, 2001; 
Rehbein et al., 2004), there is no recent study that specifically examines social issues in 
the shareholder resolutions that were withdrawn in the last decade (1997-2011). 
Moreover, these studies interpreted voting outcome as the only measure for shareholder 
activism success, which has been often interpreted as a threat to corporate governance 
(Ertimur et al., 2010; Thomas & Cotter, 2007).  
The review of the literature on shareholder activism in management and finance 
literature indicated a crucial gap—the larger role of social shareholder activism in 
society—which is important for this dissertation. Given that withdrawals signal 
shareholder activist-corporate engagement and an agreement that entails the target 
corporations to take action on the proposed changes (e.g., Carleton et al., 1998; Guay et 
al., 2004; Logsdon & van Buren, 2008), it is important to evaluate withdrawn 
resolutions from a societal perspective. That is, the nature and the scope of the 
withdrawn social resolutions can provide an insight into viability of shareholder 
activism for improving society at large. An examination of the issues, sponsors, and 
outcomes of social resolutions should help to illustrate the state of U.S. social 
shareholder activism enacted via filing resolutions in the last decade. In addition, an 
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extensive analysis of withdrawn social resolutions can provide some insights into the 
conditions under which social shareholder activists elicit positive responses from 
corporations. The following research questions were posed: 
RQ1: What is the landscape of all shareholder resolutions filed between 1997  
 and 2011? 
RQ1a: What types of institutional sponsors filed all shareholder resolutions  
 between 1997 and 2011? 
RQ1b: What were the outcomes of all shareholder resolutions filed between  
1997 and 2011? 
RQ1c: What is the proportion of shareholder resolutions devoted to social issues 
 between 1997 and 2011? 
RQ2: What was the landscape of social shareholder resolutions filed between  
 1997 and 2011?  
RQ3: What was the landscape of withdrawn social shareholder resolutions  
 between 1997 and 2011? 
RQ3a: What types of issues were addressed in the withdrawn social shareholder  
 resolutions filed between 1997 and 2011? 
RQ3b: What was the most common type of issue addressed in the withdrawn  
 social shareholder resolutions filed between 1997 and 2011? 
RQ3c: What types of changes did social shareholder activists demand from  
 corporations in the withdrawn social shareholder resolutions filed  
 between 1997 and 2011?  
RQ3d: What was the most common type of change requested in the withdrawn  
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 social shareholder resolutions filed between 1997 and 2011? 
RQ3e: What were the types of institutional sponsors who withdrew social  
resolutions after shareholder-corporate engagements? 
RQ3f: What was the most common type of institutional sponsor who withdrew  
 social resolutions between 1997 and 2011?  
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CHAPTER THREE: ORGANIZATIONAL LEGITIMACY AND 
CORPORATE RESPONSES TO SOCIAL SHAREHOLDER 
ACTIVISM 
 
This chapter discusses the theoretical lenses through which voluntary 
compliances of corporations to societal expectations and norms can be explained. The 
literature on shareholder activism highlighted that shareholder resolutions are non-
binding advisory proposals. As such, corporations show voluntary compliances if they 
decide to listen to sponsoring shareholders and agree to implement changes proposed in 
the social shareholder resolutions. However, corporations differ in their responses to 
social shareholder resolutions filed by institutional investors. Drawing from 
organizational theory, management, and public relations literature, the current chapter 
proposes the concept of organizational legitimacy as an overarching theme that can 
explain corporate responses to social shareholder activism. The first section explicates 
the concept of legitimacy as it has been discussed in sociology and organizational 
theory. The section then turns to the field of public relations and reviews the recent 
societal approaches to the field to aid the understanding of the broader role of 
corporation, in general, and public relations, in specific, in society. The dissertation 
argues that, guided by the recent cocreational turn in public relations theory, the concept 
of legitimacy can play a central role in the theoretical shift from making organizations 
effective to making society effective.  
Next, the discussion directs the attention to societal approaches to the role of 
corporation in the management literature. As a part of the discussion, this section 
revisits corporate social responsibility and stakeholder theory in the management 
literature. After the link between stakeholder theory and organizational legitimacy is 
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established, it is explained that corporate social performance (CSP), a three-dimensional 
concept that integrates the principles, processes, and activities of social responsibility, is 
a more comprehensive concept than corporate social responsibility (CSR). Given its 
emphasis on stakeholder engagement, it is argued that CSP can be studied as an 
antecedent of organizational legitimacy in the public relations theory development at a 
societal level. 
After outlining the relevant literature in organizational theory, public relations, 
and management fields, the section proposes two theoretical models: 1) likelihood of 
withdrawing a social resolution, and 2) implementation level of a withdrawn social 
shareholder resolution. The effect of corporate-stakeholder commitment—an indicator 
of a target corporation’s social performance (CSP)—is introduced in the theoretical 
models. A set of hypotheses is developed to explore the relationships among corporate 
stakeholder commitment, issue type, sponsor type, industry classification, and corporate 
responses to social shareholder activism.  
The next section discusses the relationship between business and society 21
st
 
century and explicates the concept of legitimacy as it has been discussed in sociology 
and organizational theory. Next, the section discusses the conceptualizations of the 
concept of legitimacy in public relations literature with a focus on societal approaches 
to public relations. Finally, to establish a link, societal approaches in management 
literature are discussed. 
The Role of Business in Society 
The role of business in society has been a central topic of discussion in recent 
years. However, discussions on the role of business in society often focus only on the 
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activities of companies, without considering the society in which the companies 
operate. Indeed, the social context in which business operates in the 21
st
 century is 
complex, volatile, and demanding (Castells, 2009; Valentini, Kruckeberg, & Starck, 
2012; Self, 2010). The maturation of globalization with the help of new media 
technologies has added a new layer of complexity to the relationship between society 
and business. New media technologies with their networking capabilities have allowed 
instant and constant communication around the globe (Castells, 2009; Self, 2009, 2010). 
Castells (2009) explained social actors and individual citizens around the world are 
using the new capacity of communication networking to advance their projects, to 
defend their interests, and to assert their values” (p. 57). Consequently, we are 
witnessing more aware, active, and demanding corporate stakeholders—consumers, 
employees, investors, communities, and activists—who aim to establish a degree of 
control over the institutions of society. For example, in 2010, WikiLeaks, an activist 
organization that largely relies on online networks of volunteers, has challenged Bank 
of America—the third largest company in the world—by releasing the internal 
information of the bank (Uysal & Yang, 2011). 
From the very beginning, corporations have been expected to innovate, deliver 
product and services, to use resources efficiently so that value is created and to conduct 
operations in a way that is accepted by society (Porter & Kramer, 2011). What is 
different today is that the impact of corporations on society has grown at all levels of 
society (Heath, 2010). The rise of corporate social responsibility in recent years can be 
partly linked to the growing impact of corporations on social life and the rise of overall 
corporate stakeholder activism. CSR has thus become a coherent way of thinking about 
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a corporation’s impact and interaction with society (Heath, 2010; Ihlen, 2008; Taylor, 
2011). For publicly traded corporations, the implications of these trends have been 
amplified by two separate views among investors: pressure for short-term financial 
returns, and pressure from the socially responsible investment community to improve 
corporate social responsibility. Indeed, the trend of socially responsible investing, 
which considers corporate responsibility and societal concerns as valid parts of 
investment decisions, has grown in recent years. US Socially Investing Forum (SIF) 
reports that socially responsible investing encompasses an estimated $4 trillion out of 
$33.5 trillion in the U.S. investment marketplace today (US SIF, 2013).  
Several theoretical traditions can shed light on the role of business in society. In 
the management and public relations literature, two normative theoretical paradigms—
the business and societal views—are most relevant to explaining the role of corporation 
in society. The business view (also called a shareholder view) posits that corporations 
create value for society by maximizing shareholder wealth (Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Friedman, 1970). From this perspective, corporations bear no direct responsibility 
toward non-shareholding stakeholders as governments are the only legitimate actors to 
address social problems. The shareholder view suggests that investors should exit if 
they are discontent with management actions.  
In contrast, the societal view, also called stakeholder view, in contrast, argues 
that no one group of stakeholder has a priority over other groups, and that corporations 
must balance the interests of all stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995; Donaldson & Preston, 
1995; Freeman, 1984). In other words, the societal view holds that stakeholder welfare 
is maximized when corporations attend directly to all stakeholders without prioritizing 
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the interests of some over the others. In essence, stakeholder theory emphasizes 
responsibilities of corporations to society and “personalizes societal responsibilities by 
delineating the specific groups or persons” (Carroll, 1999, p. 290). In the similar vein, a 
societal view in public relations emphasizes that corporations exist because the society 
allow them to exist to serve public interests (Kruckeberg & Starks, 1988; Leeper, 2001; 
Starks & Kruckeberg, 2001).   
The concept of legitimacy offers a useful tool to understand the role of 
corporations in society in the 21
st
 century as the concept constitutes the link that 
connects societal systems and institutions (Epstein, 1972). Legitimacy is “the 
generalized perception” that the actions of an organization are acceptable and desirable 
within a social system (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). Drawing on the foundational work of 
Weber (1968) and Parsons (1960), many researchers in sociology, organizational 
theory, and management have used legitimacy as an overarching concept that addresses 
the normative forces that constraint, construct, and empower organizational actors (e.g., 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 1995; Sethi, 1979). This 
line of research has focused on stakeholder perceptions and emphasized the importance 
of communication with the organization’s social environment for building 
organizational legitimacy. 
The public relations literature has recognized the centrality of legitimacy to 
public relations and laid the foundation for future explorations of the concept (e.g., 
Boyd, 2000; Grunig, 1992; Metzler, 2001; Heath, 2001, 2010; Ihlen, van Ruler, & 
Frederickson, 2009). For example, Heath (2001) argued that “legitimacy gap” will be a 
central concept of public relations as the discipline focuses on the organization-public 
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relationships (p. 3). Boyd (2000) suggested that legitimacy should be a “foundational 
concept” of public relations (p. 342). Likewise, Metzler (2001) called for greater 
recognition of the “centrality of organizational legitimacy” to public relations practice 
(2001, p. 231). However, Ihlen and van Ruler (2009) argued that legitimacy has not 
commanded adequate scholarly attention in public relations.  
In public relations, the concept of legitimacy has enjoyed a resurgence in recent 
years with the shift of theoretical approaches to the field. Indeed, an increased emphasis 
on building long-term relationships between organizations and their stakeholders 
through cocreational approaches (Botan & Taylor, 2004) has moved the concept of 
legitimacy at the center of public relations research. In addition, societal views on 
public relations introduced by European scholars have pointed out the importance of 
organization’s legitimation within society and argued that the primary role of public 
relations is preservation of license to operate (van Ruler & Vercic, 2004; Vercic et al., 
2001; Ihlen and van Ruler, 2009). Legitimacy thus is an overarching concept that can 
explain the constructive role of corporation in society in the context of social 
shareholder activism through three main theoretical lenses: organizational theory, public 
relations, and management. The next section discusses the concept of legitimacy as it 
has been discussed in sociology and organizational theory. 
Defining the Concept of Legitimacy 
The concept of legitimacy is rooted in sociology. Parsons (1960) defined 
legitimacy as the “appraisal of action in terms of shared or common values in the 
context of the involvement of the action in the social system” (p. 1975). A central 
element of legitimacy is meeting and adhering to the expectations of a social system’s 
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norms and values (Parsons, 1960). Maurer (1971) defined legitimation as the “process 
whereby an organization justifies to a peer or superordinate system its right to exist that 
is to continue to import, transform, and export energy, material, or information” (p. 
361). Legitimacy is contingent on the perceptions of acceptability and congruence of an 
entity in a given society and a time (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). As such, organizations are 
legitimate to the extent that their activities are congruent with the values and goals of 
the larger societal system and that they are able to justify their existence. The concept of 
legitimacy thus can explain the normative factors that constrain, construct, and 
empower organizations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Suchman, 1995). 
Conceptualizing Legitimacy 
Approaches to the study of legitimacy can be organized into two categories: 
strategic and institutional. These two categories are not mutually exclusive but have 
differences based on the distinct perspective each category adopts. The strategic 
approach focuses on establishing legitimacy externally, while institutional approach 
focuses on the impact of society on an organization internally. The strategic approach is 
that “corporations looking out” and working to secure legitimacy, while the institutional 
approach is that “society looking in” and imposing conditions for legitimacy (Suchman, 
1995, p. 577). Indeed, these two approaches result from the cognitive (constituting 
definitions and meanings) and normative (conforming to valued, socially acceptable 
ends) aspects of legitimacy (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). Scholars noted that, as a 
response to societal pressures, “concrete institutional arrangements combine normative 
and cognitive processes together in varying amounts” (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008, p. 
68). As such, organizations need to adopt both approaches to gain legitimacy. 
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Strategic legitimacy. The strategic legitimacy approach adopts a managerial 
perspective and emphasizes the ways in which organizations instrumentally manipulate 
and deploy symbols in order to garner societal support (e.g., Ashcroft & Gibbs, 1990; 
Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). From this perspective, legitimacy is viewed as a resource on 
which organization is dependent for survival and which “organizations attempt to obtain 
and competing organizations attempt to deny” (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975, p. 125). 
Consistent with the resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), whenever 
managers anticipate that the supply of legitimacy resources is vital to organizational 
survival, they will pursue strategies to ensure the continued supply of legitimacy. As 
such, the strategic approach considers legitimacy as a resource that needs to be managed 
by the organization for its survival. Under this approach, corporate responses to societal 
demands are for strategic reasons, rather than on the basis of any perceived 
responsibilities.   
The strategic approach also assumes that organizations have the ability to alter 
perceptions of legitimacy through communication. As such, the approach to legitimacy 
is closely related to reputation. Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) outlined three strategies in 
which an organization may legitimate its activities when faced with legitimacy threats: 
a) the organization can adapt its output, goals, and methods of operation to conform to 
prevailing definitions of legitimacy; b) the organization can attempt, through 
communication, to alter the definition of social legitimacy so that it conforms to the 
organization’s present practices, output, and values; and c) the organization can attempt 
through communication to become identified with symbols, values or institutions which 
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have a strong base of legitimacy. The strategic approach to legitimacy thus emphasizes 
strategic communication to increase organizational efficiencies.  
Institutional legitimacy. Whereas the strategic approach reflects a managerial 
view to legitimacy, the institutional approach adopts a more detached stance and 
emphasizes the ways in which dynamics in the social environment generate societal 
pressures that transcends any single organization’s purposive control (e.g., DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, Rueff, & Mendel, 2000). Powell and 
DiMaggio (1991), in their work that studied how social choices are shaped by 
institutional arrangements, argued that organizational survival depends not just on 
resources, but also on the organization’s perceived legitimacy. From this perspective, 
organizations will change their structures or operations to conform to external 
expectations about what structures and operations are legitimate. Failure to undertake 
this process that leads to congruence, which is described as isomorphism (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983, p. 149), has direct implications for an organization’s survival. Sethi 
(1979) discussed the concept of legitimacy gap as a consequence of an organization’s 
failure to be congruent with societal expectations. Sethi defined a legitimacy gap as an 
expectancy gap indicating a discrepancy between an organization’s actions and 
society’s expectations of this organization. According to Sethi, legitimacy gaps can 
ultimately threaten an organization’s existence as a legitimate member of the society. 
As such, the institutional approach to legitimacy assumes that organizations are 
expected to conform to norms that are largely imposed by the external factors.  
Legitimacy as a source of organizational change. The institutional view to 
legitimacy emphasizes the incorporation of societal expectations into organizational 
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policies and practices to ensure legitimacy. Under this approach, organizations are 
expected to change their structures or processes to conform to societal expectations 
about what structures and processes are legitimate. Meyer and Rowan (1977) wrote that 
in modern societies organizations are driven to incorporate the practices and procedures 
defined by society.  According to Meyer and Rowan, organizations that do so “increase 
their legitimacy and their survival prospects, independent of the immediate efficacy of 
the acquired practice and procedures” (p. 41). Accordingly, social pressures can create 
structural changes within the organization and thus can shape, mediate, and channel 
institutional arrangements (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, Ruef, & Mendel, 2000). Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
argued, “organizations that incorporate societal legitimated rationalized elements in 
their formal structures maximize their legitimacy and increase their resources and 
survival capabilities” (p. 53). Organizations are thus driven to incorporate the practices 
and procedures defined by prevailing demands and expectations and organizations that 
do so increase their legitimacy and their survival prospects, “regardless of the 
immediate efficacy of the acquired practice and procedures” (p. 41).  
Because social pressures can create structural changes within the organization 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), the changes agreed upon by the 
target corporations are likely to occur in those mechanisms within the corporation 
which are designed to address social objectives. Meyer and Rowan (1991) further 
explained: 
By designing a formal structure that adheres to the prescriptions of myths in the 
institutional environment, an organization demonstrates that it is acting on 
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collectively valued purposes in a proper and adequate manner. The 
incorporation of institutionalized elements provides an account of activities that 
protects the organization from having its conduct questioned. The organization 
becomes, in a word, legitimate, and it uses its legitimacy to strengthen its 
support and secure its survival.  (p. 50) 
A corporation, then, is expected to make institutional arrangements and changes to 
address societal demands to establish and maintain its legitimacy in society. Meyer and 
Rowan (1991) noted, “a most important aspect of isomorphism with environmental 
institutions is the evolution of organizational language” (p. 50). For example, Meyer 
and Rowan discussed how organizations redesign the labels of organization chart as 
well as vocabularies of motive used to describe the activities of individuals as a 
response to societal pressures. Thus, these institutional arrangements can create both 
horizontal complexities, such as growing number of job titles, occupational specialties, 
and increasing number of departments, and vertical complexities, such as increasing 
number of levels of authority within an organizational structure highlighting the 
importance of communication (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Galaskiewicz, 1991; 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott et al., 2000).  
Organizations develop boundary roles to sense the social environment and to 
implement changes in order to conform to the societal expectations and norms (Aldrich 
& Herker, 1977). Boundary spanning roles (e.g., affirmative action officers) are 
considered as “an organization’s response to environmental influence” and  help the 
organization maintain the legitimacy of organization (Aldrich & Herker, 1977, p. 219). 
Boundary spanning roles and structures signal the commitment of the organization to 
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the accepted beliefs and values and represent the organization to valued constituencies 
(Rao & Sivakumar, 1999). Research showed that pressure groups can impose 
organizations to demonstrate their commitment to a cause by establishing boundary 
spanning units (Rao & Sivakumar, 1999; Scott et al., 2000). Thus, societal pressures 
exerted by social shareholder activists are expected to induce changes, such as creating 
new boundary spanning roles and structures within the organization to maintain 
legitimacy. 
Organizational legitimacy. Arguing that organizations can achieve both types of 
legitimacy—strategic and institutional, Suchman (1995) provided an integrative 
legitimacy framework that extends the literature on legitimacy. Under this approach, 
organizational legitimacy is a summative reflection of the relationship between an 
organization and its social environment that includes both strategic and institutional 
elements. Suchman defined organizational legitimacy as “a generalized perspective or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (p. 574). There 
are several important points worth to note in this definition. Suchman described 
legitimacy as dynamic and perceptual and emphasized the generalized character rather 
than static condition of legitimacy. Suchman also pointed out the socially constructed 
domain within which values and norms are created and against which an organization’s 
behaviors are evaluated. That is, the public’s values, norms and beliefs against which 
organization actions are evaluated are the result of the social construction of these 
norms by and with the referent publics, and between different publics. Thus, Suchman 
(1995) implied the importance of public perception of legitimacy and its dynamic 
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nature. An organization might not be perceived as legitimate because public 
expectations have changed with the implication that what was once acceptable 
corporate behavior is no longer deemed acceptable. As such, legitimacy is a moving 
target. The definition of legitimacy is determined by interaction and debate between 
participants in the dynamics. This reflects the constructive nature of legitimacy and 
highlights the importance of public relations for building and maintaining 
organizational legitimacy.  
This dissertation adopts Suchman’s (1995) integrative approach to legitimacy of 
organizations in society. To maintain clarity and consistency, the dissertation will use 
the term organizational legitimacy hitherto to refer to this integrative approach. This 
approach recognizes organizations’ legitimatization efforts, including communication 
strategies and organizational adjustments, to meet societal expectations. 
The concept of organizational legitimacy thus provides a useful theoretical lens to the 
understanding of corporate responses to social shareholder resolutions—which are non-
binding advisory proposals on social and environmental issues voiced by shareholders. 
The concept of organizational legitimacy highlights the importance of societal 
legitimacy for an organization’s survival. Further, organizational legitimacy considers 
public as the legitimacy-determining power (e.g., Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Suchman, 
1999).  
The concept of organizational legitimacy is thus relevant for understanding the 
function of public relations in the context of business and society relationships as an 
organization is connected to its social environment through publics (Heath, 2006; Ihlen 
& van Ruler, 2009; Kruckeberg & Starks, 1988; Suchman, 1995) and public relations 
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connects the organization to its publics through communication. The next section 
outlines the conceptual approaches to legitimacy in the public relations literature.  
Discussing different conceptual treatments of legitimacy in public relations theory, the 
section points the link between legitimacy and public relations. It is argued that the 
expanded role of public relations in society is to keep organizations fully cognizant of 
the societal norms and expectations and to ensure that organizations conduct socially 
desired actions in return for legitimacy. It is highlighted that the only way to achieve 
this role is through listening to and engaging with organizational stakeholders. 
Organizational Legitimacy in Public Relations 
The increasing scholarly interest in the societal role of public relations in recent 
years has transformed the conceptualization of organization as a bounded entity into an 
interdependent part of a larger social system (Heath, 2006, 2011; Valentini, 
Kruckeberg, & Starck, 2012). Theories such as institutionalism (Powell & DiMaggio, 
1983, 1991) and resource dependency (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) have often informed 
this line of public relations research proposing that that many dynamics in the 
organizational environment stem not from technological or material imperatives, but 
rather from cultural norms, symbols, beliefs, and rituals; and that organizations pursue 
strategies to ensure that they can remain congruent with their societal expectations. 
Accordingly, organizations strive to avoid conflicts and ensure that they operate within 
the boundaries and norms of their respective societies. This line of public relations 
theory and research at a societal level reflects a significant theoretical departure (Botan 
& Taylor, 2004) from functional or operational approaches that place the organization, 
which is often conceptualized as “bombarded by demands from stakeholders” and needs 
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to deal with “threats in its environment” (Grunig, Grunig, & Dozier, 2002, pp. 1-2), at 
the center of public relations research and theory. The cocreational approach 
emphasizes the importance of building long-term relationships with publics (Taylor, 
2011).  At the core of this theoretical shift is the concept of organizational legitimacy. 
In the context of public relations, organizational is “a measure of the extent to which the 
public and the public sphere at a given time and place find the organization sensible and 
morally justifiable” (Nielsen, 2001 as cited in Ihlen & van Ruler, 2009, p. 6). In other 
words, organizational legitimacy exists when there is congruence between 
organizational activities and social values and norms of the society.  
While legitimacy has been explicitly or implicitly studied in public relations to a 
certain extent (e.g., Boyd, 2000; Coombs, 1992; Metzler, 2001), the concept plays a 
more important role in public relations theory and research due to the increased 
emphasis on building long-term relationships between organizations and their 
stakeholders through cocreational approaches (Botan & Taylor, 2004).  The next section 
briefly discusses the cocreational approach to public relations to further the 
understanding of how this approach fits with organizational legitimacy that highlights 
the role of publics who “control” the “conferred status” of organizational legitimacy 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 193–194). 
Cocreational Approach to Public Relations 
For some time, a managerial perspective that pertains to the use of public 
relations strategies to achieve organizational goals has dominated public relations 
theory and research (Curtin & Gaither, 2005; Holtzhausen, 2012; Pal & Dutta, 2008). 
Recently, public relations scholars have noted a theoretical shift in the public relations 
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field from its functional roots to a cocreational approach (Botan & Taylor, 2004). The 
cocreationalist approach challenged the prevalent managerial perspective that considers 
the role of public relations as advancing organizational goals through strategic 
communication programs. Botan and Taylor (2004) noted that under the functional 
approach researchers focus on the use of public relations as an instrument to accomplish 
specific organizational goals rather than on relationships. From this perspective, the role 
of public relations is to create and disseminate messages that help the organization 
accomplish its goals (Taylor, 2011).  
The recent theories under the cocreational perspective—such as a dialogic 
theory (Kent & Taylor, 1998, 2002) and a fully functioning society theory (Heath, 
2006)—have challenged the functional approach that postulates publics are a means to 
reach strategic goals of the organizations. The cocreational approach studies the 
formation of meaning through communication and the development of relationships 
between groups and organizations (Botan & Taylor, 2004). The cocreational approach 
considers communication as a tool that allows both groups and organizations to 
negotiate and change relationships with others. The main strength of the cocreational 
approach is its stance that “publics are not just a means to an end. Publics are not 
instrumentalized but instead are partners in the meaning-making process” (Botan & 
Taylor, 2004, p. 652). Taylor (2011) emphasized that the role of public relations from 
the cocreational perspective is to use communication to help groups to negotiate 
meaning and build relationships and noted some of the cocreation theories, including 
relational theory (Broom, Casey, & Ritchey, 1997; Ferguson, 1984; Ledingham & 
Bruning, 1998, 2000), dialogic theory (Kent & Taylor, 1998, 2002; Pearson, 1989), the 
73 
communitarian view (Leeper, 2001; Kruckeberg & Starck, 1988; Starck & Kruckeberg, 
2001), and fully functioning society theory (Heath, 2006). Grounded in several 
sociological and socio-psychological paradigms, such as symbolic interactionism 
framework and the social construction of reality, the cocreational theories view 
communication, relationships, and co-construction of meaning as core assumptions of 
how public relations functions in society (Botan & Taylor, 2004).  
The cocreational approach has thus charted a larger role for public relations in 
society that corroborates the main assumption of organizational legitimacy that 
organizations will change their structures and processes to conform to environmental 
expectations in society (Boyd, 2000; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Kruckeberg & Starks, 
1988; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 1995). The cocreational theories recognize that 
an organization is connected to its environment through publics. The cocreational 
perspective then elevates the role of public in the organization–public dyad, 
emphasizing the need for a constant dialogue with publics and the importance of 
building long-term relationships. This perspective conceptualizes publics as partners 
that are necessary for decision-making at different levels of society. Likewise, 
organizational legitimacy perspective is based on the organization’s perceived 
competence and responsibility to public’s interests, which requires the organization to 
continuously listen to and engage in conversations with publics.  
Societal Approaches to Public Relations Theory 
The cocreational approach fits with the concept of organizational legitimacy as 
it helps to understand the broader role of public relations and the relationships that it 
builds at a societal level. There are three public relations approaches that can serve as 
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foundation to further understand the larger role of public relations in society: the 
communitarian view (Leeper, 1986; Kruckeberg & Starck, 1988; Starck & Kruckeberg, 
2001), fully functioning society (Heath, 2006), and public sphere (Bentele & Nothhaft, 
2010; Vercic, van Ruler, Butschi, & Flodin, 2001; Holmström, 2005; 2009; Ihlen & van 
Ruler, 2009; Raupp, 2004; van Ruler & Verčič, 2004). The next section briefly 
discusses these approaches in public relations in order to advance an understanding of 
the relationship between business and society and of the larger role that public relations 
assumes in this relationship. 
The communitarian view. The communitarian view to public relations is 
essential to understand the relationships between business and society. The 
communitarian view in public relations is often considered as the start of the 
cocreational turn (Botan & Taylor, 2004; Taylor, 2011). Kruckeberg and Strack (1988), 
Starck and Kruckeberg (2001, 2004), Kruckeberg and Tsetsura (2008), and more 
recently Valentini, Kruckeberg, and Starck (2012) emphasized the main tenet of the 
communitarian view that “the most important stakeholders of public relations is society 
itself.” The communitarian view is anchored in the concept of community—the basic 
social unit of society that provides a moral environment for individuals (Etzioni, 1999). 
However, community is a “value-driven” concept (Kruckeberg & Tsetsura, 2008, p. 
2008). In each community, there are certain characteristics, which may not necessarily 
serve the good of society. In this context, Kruckeberg and Tsetsura (2008) discussed 
two types of communities—functional and dysfunctional— and explained that “a 
community may manifest itself through inclusivity or its obverse exclusivity” but also 
“divisiveness and enmity through exclusivity regarding who may or may not join this 
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social group” (p. 10). According to Kruckeberg and Starck (2008), some of the core 
values of a functional community are:  
A basic concern for individual human rights; a sense of and mechanism for 
justice; institutionalized compassion; egalitarian concern about the welfare of all 
members of society, including women, children, and animals: and an emphasis 
on the humane protection of the weak and powerless. (p. 27). 
As such, the functional community manifests inclusiveness and harmony and it has 
certain ethics and moral values that are congruent with the society. 
Shifting the focus from organization to community, the communitarian view in 
public relations has emphasized the larger role of public relations in society. According 
to Leeper (2001), “community provides the context for organizations, and problems 
within the community affect organizations” (p. 101). As such, improving the welfare of 
society is one of the main tenets of the communitarian view (Leeper, 2001). Expanding 
on the original work of Kruckeberg and Starck (1988), Vujnovic and Kruckeberg 
(2011) argued that the primary goal of public relations: 
…should be to encourage and promote an understanding of its organizational 
goals through an interaction with citizens, whose sense of active contribution 
should be recognized by the organization through implementation and 
innovation resulting from citizens’ contributions, including the organization’s 
acts of social responsibility. (p. 221) 
In their critical interrogation of prior assumptions and paradigms in public relations 
scholarship, Valentini et al. (2012) argued that the community-building theory 
originally espoused by Kruckeberg and Starck (1988), and modified in the subsequent 
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research, can provide a useful departure point toward developing societal approaches to 
public relations research and practice in a dynamic environment. Indeed, Kruckeberg 
and Tsetsura (2008) argued that community-building must be the primary role of and 
function of a successful public relations practice in the 21
st
 Century characterized by a 
global yet multicultural and fragmented society.  
Public relations scholars that advocated a communitarian approach argued that 
all of the public relations efforts should address the society at large to build and restore 
a sense of community, and that organizations inherently have responsibilities for their 
local and global communities. The communitarian view thus considers the relationships 
with community and socially responsible action at the heart of public relations theory 
and research. Consistent with the institutional approach to legitimacy (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 1995), the communitarian view 
suggests that the role of public relations is to understand community and to adjust the 
organization based on the values and ideas of the community—not the other way 
around. Leeper (2001) argued that public relations function needs to place general 
public “at the center of activity, directing the actions of institutions, which become its 
object and not the other way around” (p. 101). Thus, the communitarian view initiated a 
reversal of thinking in the dynamics of organization–public relationships. 
 The communitarian view to public relations thus provides a foundation to 
understand the important relationship between publics and organizational legitimacy. 
Under the communitarian approach, to create and maintain legitimacy, an organization 
needs to be engaged in its community and orient its internal and external operations 
according to the norms and expectations rooted in the community (Leeper, 2001; Starck 
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& Kruckeberg, 2001). Particularly, in today’s fast-changing, global yet multicultural 
society, the role of public relations is to further the understanding between 
organizations and community (Kruckeberg & Tsetsura, 2008; Valentini et al., 2012), 
which is essential for establishing and maintaining organizational legitimacy. Thus, the 
communitarian view suggests an implicit role for public relations to create and maintain 
legitimacy of organizations through socially responsible engagement with community.  
Fully functioning society theory. One of the public relations theories that can 
help understand the relationship between business and society at a macro level is 
Heath’s (2006) fully functioning society theory (FFST). In essence, the theory proposes 
that public relations can contribute to a fully functioning society by building 
relationships, shaping meaning, and collectively managing risk and uncertainty. FFST 
largely builds on the systems theory (Parsons, 1960), which assumes that an 
organization is influenced by, and in turn has influence upon, the society in which it 
operates. From the FFST perspective, society is negotiated and co-defined as stakes—
rewards and risks—exchanged through discourse, social construction of reality through 
shared meaning and coordination that leads to enlightened choice. Heath argued “the 
role of public relations is to be a steward of multiple interests in harmony and 
collaboration” (p. 97). Thus, according to FFST, societal legitimacy is a key and it 
changes and coproduced by society.  
FFST considers corporate responsibility, a self-regulating mechanism whereby 
an organization monitors and ensures its compliance with societal norms and 
expectations (Carroll, 1999) as a means to achieve legitimacy. Heath (2006) argued, 
“sound principles of corporate responsibility, effectively implemented, constitute the 
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essence of each organization’s legitimacy by meeting or exceeding the normative 
expectations of stakeholders and stateseekers” (p. 103). As such, from this view, 
corporate social responsibility is the main antecedent of organizational legitimacy. 
Indeed, FFST is premised on the idea that “sound principles of CR (corporate 
responsibility) constitute the essence of each organization’s legitimacy by meeting or 
exceeding the normative expectations of stakeholders and stateseekers” (p. 103). In a 
sense, the organization achieves the legitimacy status when the organization helps make 
society more fully functional.  
Heath (2006) discussed two types of corporate responsibility: instrumental and 
strategic. The instrumental corporate responsibility is demonstrated attributions that the 
organization is good; whereas the symbolic one fosters the attributions that the 
organization wants to convey to seem to be good (pp. 103-104). Highlighting the 
instrumental role of corporate responsibility rather than its symbolic role, Heath argued 
that corporate responsibility should lead the organization to be a good member and 
therefore legitimate. According to Heath, instrumental corporate social responsibility 
that leads to legitimacy hinges on an organization’s positive engagement with its 
publics to make society better through polices and on its activities that favor public 
interests. Heath further explained that for a fully functioning society to develop: 
CR (corporate responsibility) must entail choices and actions that go well 
beyond the organization’s narrow self-interest. CR requires proactive planning 
and management to make the organization good by meeting or exceeding the 
expectations of its stakeholders and stateseekers. To this end, the organization 
becomes worthy of respect and happiness achieved by advancing interlocking, 
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often conflicting, and guiding interest and principles of each society, whether 
local or global. (p. 103)  
Corporate responsibility is then a means for organizations to gain legitimacy. Corporate 
responsibility does not only mean meeting the expectations of stakeholders and 
stateseekers, but it also means exceeding them. To achieve this, organizations need to 
develop mechanisms to discover stakeholder thoughts and interests and initiate 
collaborative communication.  
Heath’s fully functioning theory of public relations resonates with Suchman’s 
(1995) integrative approach to organizational legitimacy that emphasizes organizations’ 
legitimatization efforts, including communication and organizational adjustments, to 
meet societal expectations. Indeed, Heath and Waymer (2009) posited that all public 
relations efforts should help organizations be more reflective and work for legitimacy 
through voicing various perspectives that contribute to more fully functioning society.  
 It is clear from FFST that in order to receive publics’ respect and support, corporate 
attention should be on the good of society instead of mere good of the organization. In 
other words, what is good for society is good for the organization (Heath, 2010). As 
Heath (2006) put it, “the goal is to make the organization deserving of others’ support 
because it can think from the inside out and the outside in to know and aspire to 
standards of moral rectitude” (p. 103). This goal can only be achieved through 
developing a reflective mechanism to engage in the social environment of the 
organization. The concept of public sphere as discussed by Jurgen Habermas (1989) and 
developed by several public relations scholars (e.g., Bentele & Nothhaft, 2010; Raupp, 
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2004) can provide a framework to think from the outside in and from inside out. Next 
section discussed the concept of public sphere. 
Public sphere. Recently, several European scholars (e.g., Holmstrom, 2004; 
Ihlen & van Ruler, 2009; Raupp, 2004; van Ruler & Vercic, 2004; Vercic, van Ruler, 
Butschi, & Flodin, 2001) have introduced a reflective approach to public relations 
theory and practice. Grounded in a late modern social theory of Luhman (1995, 1997), 
the reflective approach attributes a societal role for public relations, placing 
organizational legitimacy at the locus of the inquiry. The concept of reflective differs 
from the concept of reflexivity discussed by Giddens (1991). In fact, Holmstrom (2004, 
2009) discussed reflectivity as opposed to reflexivity. In his structuration theory, 
Giddens described reflexivity as an act of self-reference and self-awareness. 
Accordingly, organizations actively shape and construct self-identity through self-
monitoring. Thus, the concept of reflexivity emphasizes a mono contextual perspective 
(Holmstrom, 2004). Whereas reflection becomes the production of self-understanding 
in relation to the environment (Holmstrom, 2004, 2009; Vercic et al., 2001). The 
reflective approach is based on a specific social capability of organizations to see itself 
as a part of the larger societal context. Holmstrom (2004) explained that through a 
reflective approach “the organization finds its specific identity, acting independently, 
and learns how to develop restrictions and coordinating mechanisms in its decision-
making process in recognition of the interdependence between society’s differentiated 
rationalities—such as politics, economics, law, science, religion and mass media” (p. 
122). The reflective approach thus implies self-regulation of organizations within a 
multiple social rationalities in a given society. 
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At the heart of the reflective approach is the concept of public sphere. In the 
European view to public relations, the term public refers to public sphere—a figurative 
space that exists between individuals, organizations, and the government where issues 
related to public discussed and public opinion is generated (Habermas, 1989). From a 
normative perspective, Habermas (1989, 2006) viewed public sphere as social domain 
where ideal communication among actors develops, resulting in a consensus among 
participants. Habermas (1989) further explained:  
In complex societies, the public sphere consists of an intermediary structure 
between the political system, on the one hand, and private sectors of the life 
world and functional systems, on the other…It is accessible to publics concerned 
with health-care issues, social welfare, or environmental policy. (p. 373) 
Thus, although public sphere was originally conceptualized as being an assembly of 
citizens at a certain location, it is not so today (Bentele & Nothhaft, 2010; Self, 2010). 
The public sphere is not a set of common values, norms or opinions and cannot come to 
an agreement or a decision; however it can influence decisions by individuals and 
institutionalized social structures (Jensen, 2002).  Unlike Habermas’s (1989) 
understanding of public sphere as a consensus-building discourse, Self (2010) discussed 
public sphere in today’s world as a process that constantly evolves and generates 
conflicts: 
The emergence of new communication technologies—social networks of 
interactive media with murky sourcing—reveal public to be a process, a flow, 




communicator will be required to join the conversation of particulars asserted 
and reasserted as constantly evolving visions and re-readings of universals.  
(p. 90) 
Similarly, Bentele and Nothhaft (2010) argued that with new communication 
technologies the structural constraints on public sphere (e.g., time, distance, and 
technical limitations) have collapsed. According to Bentele and Nothhaft (2010),  
The public sphere is not a place of gathering as the tingstead anymore. Neither is 
it a force field of media attention constituted by a limited amount for actors. It is 
a network of points of interest. An issue is in the public sphere because 
communicators, who are points in the network of communications, 
communicate about it. (p. 112) 
Thus, the public sphere is dynamic because public is an evolving process (Bentele & 
Nothhaft, 2010: Self, 2010). The conceptualization of public sphere as a dynamic 
process that evolves through communication of social actors has implications for 
understanding organizational legitimacy and the role of public relations in achieving it. 
This conceptualization emphasizes vitality and complexity of public sphere as it 
constantly evolves with the interactions of connected social actors. Therefore, 
traditional conceptualizations of publics as a stable entity based on consensus have been 
challenged. Given that organizational legitimacy is a conferred status granted by publics 
(Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Heath, 2006; Kruckeberg & Stark, 1988; Sethi, 1979; 
Suchman, 1995), engagement with the public sphere whereby public perceptions about 
organizations are constantly shaped is essential for ensuring organizational legitimacy.  
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Public relations competences and processes can play a central role in navigating 
organizations anchored in a complex and volatile society and installing the necessary 
lenses for organizational decision-making through engagement with public sphere. 
These lenses will enable organizations to consider a wide variety of society’s rationales 
and to participate in public conversations through engagement. The reflective 
organizational practice of public relations then involves constantly adjusting the 
organization to the changing values and norms generated within the public sphere.  
To summarize, public relations theories from a societal perspective are anchored 
in the concept of organizational legitimacy that suggests the survival of an organization 
largely depends on the organization’s perceived legitimacy. In line with the 
organizational theory literature on organizational legitimacy (e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), the societal approach public relations contends that 
organizations will change their policies, structures or operations to conform to societal 
expectations about what structures and operations are legitimate. Failure to undertake 
this process that leads to congruence can cause a legitimacy gap between the 
organization and its publics. Finally, the concept of public sphere emphasized the 
fluidity and complexity of publics in the 21
st
 century, highlighting the need for a 
constant engagement with public sphere, which is composed of local and global social 
actors, to achieve organizational legitimacy.  Thus, the societal approach to public 
relations views the main role of public relations as to legitimize the organization in 
society. This approach views legitimacy not as a resource to be managed by the 
organization through strategic communication messages, rather as a status conferred by 
publics based on their constitutive beliefs about the organization. From the societal 
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perspective, then, the organization should remain cognizant of the importance of public 
support and confidence for the organizational survival. Public relations can help 
organization to remain congruent with societal expectations and values through a 
constant engagement with publics.  
Organizational legitimacy vs. organizational reputation. To understand the role 
of public relations in establishing, maintaining, and reestablishing organizational 
legitimacy, one needs to understand the differences and similarities between 
organizational legitimacy and organizational reputation. Organizational legitimacy and 
organizational reputation are interrelated concepts. Indeed, some scholars argue for a 
multidimensional conceptualization of organizational legitimacy that subsumes 
organizational reputation (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). Nevertheless, it is important 
to point out the differences. 
As the aforementioned literature suggests legitimacy refers to the state of 
meeting and adhering to the norms and expectations of a social system (Suchman, 
1995). Reputation is defined as the relative standing and desirability of an organization 
among its counterparts (Fombrun & van Riel, 2004; Tsetsura & Kruckeberg, 2009). As 
such, both organizational legitimacy and organizational reputation result from social 
construction of publics. That is, publics evaluate whether an organization deserves 
legitimacy and have a good reputation based on various variables such as organizational 
size and responsibility. Furthermore, organizational legitimacy and organizational 
reputation share similar antecedents and consequences (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; 
Galaskiewicz, 1991). Factors such as organizational size and social responsibility affect 
organizational legitimacy and reputation. One of the most common consequences of the 
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both concepts is improved access to resources (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). However, 
organizational legitimacy and organizational reputation there have important 
differences. 
In their examination of differences between organizational legitimacy and 
organizational reputation, Deephouse and Carter (2005) wrote that legitimacy indicates 
“social acceptance resulting from adherence to social norms and expectations” (p. 329), 
whereas reputation involves “image, esteem, prestige, and goodwill” (p. 331). More 
specifically, reputation is “a social comparison among organizations on a variety of 
attributes” (p. 332). Because organizational reputation largely relies on comparison, 
reputation requires differentiation to stand out among other organizations. 
Organizational legitimacy builds on conformity to external pressures in the social 
environment if an organization (Deephouse & Suhcman, 2008; DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). Another point that distinguishes organizational legitimacy from organization 
reputation is related to the absence of these concepts.  Building on organizational theory 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Meyer & Scott, 1983; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), Deephouse 
and Carter (2005) argued that “a corporation can have its legitimacy questioned and 
channeled, and, in extreme cases, be judged illegitimate,” whereas negative 
consequences of threats to organizational reputation are less serious (Deephouse & 
Carter, p. 351). That is, having less reputation than another organization does not 
threaten the organization’s continued existence as long as the organization’s legitimacy 
remains unchallenged (Boyd, 2000). It appears that organizational legitimacy is not a 
commodity to be possessed or to be managed but a condition, granted by public, 
reflecting an organization’s alignment with societal expectations and norms while 
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organizational reputation is based on familiarity of the organization and beliefs about 
what to expect from the organization in the future. Organizational reputation contributes 
to organizational legitimacy. Thus, the two terms are different even though they are 
interdependent. 
Role of Public Relations in Building Organizational Legitimacy 
The field of public relations is central to building organizational legitimacy. 
Indeed, van Ruler and Vercic (2004) argued that public relations is primarily a 
“strategic process of viewing an organization from the outside, or public view…The 
primary concerns of communication management from a reflective approach are an 
organization’s inclusiveness and preservation of the license to operate” (p. 7). Studies in 
organizational theory established that organizational legitimacy requires both strategic 
and institutional practices (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Suchman, 1995). As such, the 
role of public relations encompasses both strategic and institutional accounts of 
organizational legitimacy.  
An integrative approach. This dissertation adopts an integrative approach to the 
function of public relations in building and maintaining organizational legitimacy. The 
societal role of public relations is interdependent to its public communication role. 
However, both roles of public relations are linked with each other through public 
sphere. Thus, the field of public relations plays an important role in achieving 
legitimacy through its societal and day-to-day public communication functions. 
Several public relations scholars have recently discussed the viability of an integrative 
approach to an integrative approach to public relations theory and practice (Boyd, 2000; 
Falkhaimer, 2007; Taylor, 2011; Raupp, 2004). For example, Raupp (2004) discussed 
87 
the difference between society-oriented and organization-oriented dimensions and 
argued that these two dimensions can coexist to engage corporations and publics. 
Similarly, Taylor (2011) discussed a reconciliation of functional and cocreational 
approaches as a “third way.” In the specific context or organizational legitimacy, Both 
(2000) discussed that both institutional (e.g., facilitating changes) and actional (day-to-
day strategic communication activities) public relations can help build organizational 
legitimacy. Therefore, this dissertation envisions two central roles for public relations in 
building organizational legitimacy: facilitating organizational changes in tandem with 
public sphere, and advancing transparency through corporate communication with 
publics. 
Facilitating organizational changes. Public relations function is instrumental to 
build organizational legitimacy in three major areas. First, public relations function can 
help organizations sense the social environment of an organization to understand 
societal expectations and demands. By initiating communication and marinating an 
ongoing engagement with publics, public relations can create a platform for debate. 
Second, in the light of the societal expectations, public relations help the organization to 
implement changes (e.g., procedural, structural) into the organization. Third, public 
relations communicate these changes to publics to maintain organizational legitimacy.  
Suchman (1995) argued that organizations can build legitimacy through frequent 
and intense communication with the organization’s social environment. As such, the 
field of public relations plays a prominent role in building legitimacy as an organization 
is connected to its social environment through publics (Heath, 2006; Ihlen & van Ruler, 
2009: Kruckeberg & Starck, 1988). Public relations function keeps the organization 
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cognizant of the societal expectations and to help orient the corporation according to 
these expectations (Holmström, 2009). The process of learning societal expectations 
largely relies on engagement with publics.  
Through engagements, the type of change—procedural/policy or structural—
that society expects from an organization can be determined (Everett, 2001). Structural 
changes concern “what the system is” and procedural changes concern “what the system 
does” (Cutlip et al., 2000, p. 234).  For example, a structural change could result from 
creating a department on human resources and diversity; and procedural change could 
be new employee supporting programs. The organization then can adjust its structures 
and processes in response to societal expectations. These changes can keep the 
organization abreast with the society and maintain a working organization-public 
relationship (Everett, 2001). Structural and procedural changes help organizations 
maintain legitimacy in society (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). As previously discussed, by designing formal structures that reflect an 
organization’s congruence with societal norms and expectations, an organization 
demonstrates that it is acting in accordance with societal values and norms in an 
effective way (Scott et al., 2000). Establishing of boundary spanning structures can 
signal commitment to societal norms and expectations and represent the organization to 
stakeholders (Rao & Sivakumar, 1999).  
Finally, one of the public relations functions is to communicate the implemented 
changes to public, assuring that the organization have met the expectations to the best of 
its capability. Publics constantly define and redefine the conditions through which the 
organization is understood and evaluated (Heath, 2010; Taylor, 2010: Self, 2010). 
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Therefore, public communication penetrates at all levels of structural and procedural 
changes implemented within an organization. In a sense, public relations plays both as 
“a reproductive and a transforming social instrument” (Falkheimer, 2007, p. 292). As 
such, public relations communication creates positive social impact (Zoller, 2009) by a 
continuous adjustment of organizational decision processes to society’s norms and 
expectations. This is the most meaningful way public relations can improve society by 
making it “a good place to live” (Ihlen, 2011, p. 455). 
A broader view to issues management in public relations literature (Heath & 
Palenchar, 2009; Kent, Taylor, & Veil, 2011) can also inform the role of public 
relations in adjusting the corporation to societal norms and expectations. Heath (1998) 
defined issues management as “the management of organizational and community 
resources through the public policy process to advance organizational interests and 
rights by striking a mutual balance with those of stakeholders” (p. 274). Essentially, 
issues management is a public relations function that focuses on helping organizations 
to understand and strategically adapt to their social environment through environmental 
scanning and issue monitoring. Heath (1998) noted that one of the main goals of issues 
management is to detect as early as possible an emerging issue that is promoted by one 
or more stakeholders.  Most recently, Kent, Taylor, and Veil (2011) envisioned an 
expanded role for issues management that views environmental scanning and issue 
monitoring through a more societal, long term approach than a short-term orientation. 
From this perspective, the role of public relations is to act as “organizational 
consciences” and guide organizations through many complexities of society by using 
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ethical communication (p. 534). This perspective resonates with the societal role of 
public relations. 
Advancing transparency through corporate communication. The concept of 
transparency has recently attracted growing attention in both public relations and 
management area (e.g., Barttlet & Golob, 2007; Guay et al., 2004; Ihlen, Bartlett, & 
May, 2011; Rawlins, 2009). Rawlins (2009) further explained: 
Transparency is present when organizations have “information that is truthful, 
substantial, and useful; participation of stakeholders in identifying the 
information they need; and objective, balanced reporting of an organization’s 
activities and policies that holds the organization accountable. (p. 74). 
Gower (2006) discussed that transparency as making available information to interested 
parties in “accurate and balanced” ways (p. 95). Rawlins (2009) emphasized that 
transparency involves active participation “in acquiring, distributing, and creating 
knowledge” (p. 74) and argued that transparency increases trust. 
Indeed, trust is essential for organizational legitimacy (e.g., Heath, 2006; 
Holmstrom, 2009).  Meyer and Rowan (1977) posited that publics have good faith and 
confidence in organizations. Accordingly, this taken-for-granted nature of 
organizational legitimacy shields the organization from external pressures. The 
underlying assumption is that organizational legitimacy protects the organization from 
public questioning resulting from stakeholder dissatisfactions with technical 
performance as well as social responsibility performance. As such, organizational 
legitimacy is closely related to the extent of public questioning. That is, the greater the 
organizational legitimacy, the less public questioning and scrutiny the organization 
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commands. Deephouse and Suchman (2008) expanded on this link suggesting that 
questioning is likely to arise when a familiar organization proves to be unsatisfactory. 
The organization is then challenged on the grounds of its performance and the values it 
represents and questioned on its continued existence. In a sense, publics evaluate 
organizational legitimacy when the organization is subject to judgment. Likewise, 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argued “legitimacy is known more readily when it is absent 
than when it is present. When activities of an organization are illegitimate, comments 
and attacks occur” (p. 194).  
Meyer and Rowan (1977) pointed out the importance of taken-for-granted nature 
of organizational legitimacy. They argued, “what legitimates institutionalized 
organizations, enabling them to appear useful in spite of the last of technical validation, 
is the confidence and good faith of their internal participants and their external 
constitutes” (p. 357-358).  In other words, stakeholders have confidence and good faith 
that a given corporation has competence and responsibility, the main antecedents of 
organizational legitimacy (Epstein, 1972). This point emphasizes the importance of 
communication and transparency for maintaining public confidence and good faith for 
organizations. 
Accordingly, public relations practitioners need to understand the environmental 
influences that affect the organization and reflect this understanding in organizational 
structures and operations (Holmström, 2005; Vercic, van Ruler, Butschi, & Flodin, 
2001) to establish and maintain mutually beneficial relationships with its publics 
through communication and dialogue (Ledingham & Bruning, 1998; Kent & Taylor, 
1998, 2002). Given that legitimacy is a status conferred by publics (Dowling & Pfeffer, 
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1975; Suchman, 1995), the nature of these relationships between an organization and its 
publics, in turn, determines legitimacy of the organization. In a sense, organizational 
legitimacy affects the relationships between an organization and its social environment; 
and it is largely affected by these relationships. 
So far, the strategic view of legitimacy in public relations seemed to focus on 
the rhetorical processes developed after organizational legitimacy of a corporation 
having been challenged by publics. Indeed, Boyd (2000) lamented that legitimacy is 
often linked to crisis communication research with a focus on the aftermath of a crisis to 
reestablish legitimacy, when the damage is already been done. Research suggests that 
public relations efforts increase when trust is in decline (Kruckeberg & Starck, 1988). 
When the environmental threats to organizational legitimacy increase, organizations are 
more likely to rely on public relations strategies. Grounded in a managerial perspective, 
this view assumes that organizations have the ability to alter public perceptions of 
legitimacy through public relations strategies. For example, Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) 
argued that the organization can attempt, through communication, to gain legitimacy 
even if it fails to adhere societal norms and expectations. 
However, in line with Boyd (2002) and the reflective management perspective 
(Holmström, 2005; Verčič et al., 2001), this dissertation envisions a role for public 
relations to maintain organizational legitimacy before an act that threatens its state of 
congruence with societal norms and expectations rather than after it takes place. From a 
societal perspective, by identifying the legitimacy gap (Sethi, 1979) and initiating a 
dialogue to narrow the gap, public relations can indeed contribute to the betterment of 
society (Heath, 2010). Heath and Waymer (2009) argued that “the dialogue of society is 
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best when it helps organizations be more reflective and work for legitimacy; it voices 
perspectives to help society be more fully functional” (p. 201). These scholars argued 
that dialogue will create benefits for both organizations and stakeholders. Once 
stakeholders engage in dialogue with organizations they are likely to experience 
increased organizational accountability, a greater say in organizational operations, and 
increased stakeholder satisfaction (Kent & Taylor, 2002). Nevertheless, public relations 
opportunities and challenges largely extend to what organizations do and do not (Heath, 
2010). Therefore, it is important to understand the lenses through which a corporation 
views its role in society. The next section discusses the approaches in management 
literature toward the role of business in society with a focus on societal approaches. 
Societal Approaches to Business: Corporate Social Responsibility 
From the very beginning, corporations have been expected to innovate, deliver 
product and services, and to use resources efficiently (Porter & Kramer, 2006). What is 
different today is that their impact on society has increased at all levels (Heath, 2010; 
Valentini et al., 2012). As such, the interdependence of business and society has grown 
leading corporations to be more mindful about societal expectations and norms. One 
way to understand whether corporate organizations reflectively remain cognizant of 
their interdependence to the society of which they are a part is to evaluate corporations’ 
commitment to their social and environmental responsibilities. Epstein (1972) argued 
that an organization is regarded as legitimate if publics perceive it to be useful and 
socially responsible. In the same vein, Wood (1991) argued that the degree to which 
principles of social responsibility put into actions can be an indicator to assess whether 
a corporation meets society’s expectations. As such, organizations’ level of 
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commitment to social responsibility affects the dynamics of societal legitimacy (Sethi, 
1979; Vogel, 2005). Building on this link, there has been indeed a deepening interest in 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) since the early 1990s (Carroll, 1999; Ihlen, 2008; 
Porter & Kramer, 2010; Taylor, 2013). The underlying assumption of CSR is that 
corporations have certain responsibilities to society that extend beyond economic and 
legal obligations. Carroll (1979) explained that the social responsibility of business 
“encompasses the economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary expectations that society 
has of organizations at a given point in time” (p. 500). From this definition, it is clear 
that a corporation must meet its responsibilities in the markets toward its shareholders, 
employees, and customers. Legally, it is expected that the corporation conducts its 
business within the framework of the law. Furthermore, the corporation is expected to 
behave ethically and use its discretion to improve society. In a sense, CSR has become a 
coherent way of understanding the role of corporations in society today, with important 
implications organizational legitimacy (Heath, 2006; Ihlen, 2008; Ihlen et al., 2011; 
Taylor, 2013). CSR helps a corporation to gain organizational legitimacy.  
Two opposing perspectives to CSR have emerged resulting from different 
interpretations of the role of corporations in society discussed earlier—business view 
and societal view. In the narrow business view (or economic view), corporations 
contribute to society by making a profit, which supports employment, wages, purchase, 
investments, and taxes. Milton Friedman (1970), one of the forerunners of the business 
view, started a heated debate when he argued that the social responsibility of a business 
is to increase its profits. Friedman noted: 
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There is one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources 
and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within 
the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition 
without deception or fraud. (p. 6) 
From this perspective, society falls outside the zone of business; governments and non-
profit organizations should be responsible for improving society. Friedman (1970) 
further made the point that CSR can be a major threat to the capitalist view as the 
profits belong to the shareholders, not to the corporations. Along these lines, 
Williamson (1993), in his theory of transaction-cost analysis, argued that agency 
problems increase when managers act on behalf of non-shareholding stakeholders, and 
added that the central relationship between shareholders and managers will be distorted 
when the additional concern for stakeholders added into the relationship. Similarly, 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argued that shareholder value maximization should be priority 
for corporate managers—not the stakeholder welfare. However, the business view has 
been increasingly challenged by many circles in recent years, leading management 
scholars to develop theories that reconcile the business view with societal approaches 
(e.g., Porter & Kramer, 2006, 2010).  
This dissertation argues that the concept of organizational legitimacy offers a 
valuable perspective to understand the constructive role of corporation in society. The 
emphasis on the interdependencies of organization and society in organizational 
legitimacy resonates with the societal view in management that emphasizes the 
responsibilities of organizations to stakeholders (e.g., Clarkson, 1995; Freeman, 1984; 
Wood, 1991) as well as the societal perspectives in public relations that view the role of 
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organization to contribute to the betterment of society (Kruckeberg & Starck, 1998; 
Holmström, 2005, 2009; Heath, 2006, 2010; Starck & Kruckeberg, 2001). The next 
sections discussed the relationship between organizational legitimacy and stakeholders 
and corporate social responsibility. 
Organizational Legitimacy, Stakeholders, and Corporate Social Performance 
In sharp contrast to business view discussed in the precious section, the societal 
view argues that corporations should serve the interests of all stakeholders (Clarkson, 
1995; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984). In the business literature, the 
societal view is commonly characterized by Edward Freeman’s (1984) stakeholder 
theory (e.g., Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Hillman & Keim, 2001; Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 
1997). Stakeholder theory posits that corporate managers should make decisions taking 
account of the interests of all stakeholders in a firm—including, not only shareholding 
stakeholders, but also employees, customers, communities, governmental agencies, and 
under some interpretations the natural environment.  
The stakeholder theory indicates that corporations should conform to the 
stakeholders’ expectations and act in the interest of their stakeholders. There is a clear 
link between the stakeholder perspective and organizational legitimacy. The stakeholder 
perspective provides a lens to understand how society grants and takes away corporate 
legitimacy. If stakeholders lose trust in the firm’s performance, legitimacy may be 
withdrawn as “the stakeholders refuse to provide their share of reciprocal benefits” 
(Wood, 1991, p. 697) and lose “good faith and confidence” in organizations (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977, p. 58). Shareholders sell their stock, customers stop buying products, 
employees refuse to give their loyalty and best performance, governments stop 
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subsidies, and environmental groups sue firms. In other words, if the corporation 
becomes illegitimate in the eyes of its stakeholders, it will lose its license to operate and 
eventually die. Wood (1991) explains that society has right to establish and enforce a 
balance of power among its institutions and to grant their legitimacy. This perspective 
has an implicit view that business has obligations as a social institution, and it implies 
that society has certain sanctions that can be used when these obligations are not met.  
Whereas classical notions of an organization’s social responsibilities centered on 
short-term profit making (Friedman, 1970; Fama & Jensen, 1983), the stakeholder 
theory focuses on the reciprocal responsibilities between business and society consisted 
of multiple stakeholders. As such, there is conceptual relationship between 
organizational legitimacy, corporate social responsibility, and stakeholder theory. In 
essence stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) posits that an organization can affect a 
wide range of stakeholders in its social environment and that these groups have 
legitimate claims on the organization. The theory also acknowledges that there are types 
of stakeholder groups with varying needs and interests.   
Categorizing stakeholder groups. Studies in management literature tended to 
group stakeholders in dichotomous categories, such as primary vs. secondary 
stakeholder, internal vs. external stakeholders, legitimate vs. illegitimate stakeholders. 
For example, Clarkson (1995) discussed two types of stakeholders, primary and 
secondary, and defined a primary stakeholder group as the “one without whose 
continuing participation the corporation cannot survive as a going concern” such as 
shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, governments, and communities (p. 106). 
Secondary stakeholder groups are “those who influence or affect, or are influenced or 
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affected by, the corporation (Clarkson, 1995, p. 107) such as the media, special interests 
groups, and activists. According to Clarkson, even though they are not engaged in 
transactions with the corporation and are not essential for its survival, these groups have 
the capacity to mobilize public opinion in favor of, or in opposition to, a corporation’s 
performance.  
Another approach to distinguish one type of stakeholder from another is 
technical or institutional stakeholder framework (Jones, 1995; Reid & Toffel, 2009). 
Accordingly, technical stakeholders are those who have a direct and active economic 
relationship with the organizational and dependent upon the organization’s output such 
as employees, customers, and shareholders. The organization is directly dependent upon 
technical stakeholders for its immediate survival. While institutional stakeholders are 
those who have no direct economic relationship with the organization, yet they are 
affected by the activities. Institutional stakeholders include communities, neighbors, and 
the natural environment, and largely affect social legitimacy of an organization. 
However, recent research has offered ample evidence that a dichotomous 
approach to differentiate organizational stakeholders limits the understanding of the 
organization-stakeholders dynamics (Agle et al., 1999; Mitchell et al., 1997). 
Furthermore, several scholars in the field of business ethics criticized the past attempt 
that ascribe stakeholder status to only human element and argued that natural 
environment should be considered as one of the primary stakeholders of a company 
(e.g., Driscoll & Starik, 2004; Phillips & Reichart, 2000; Starik, 1995). These scholars 
argued that the natural environment is one type of institutional stakeholder that affects 
organizational legitimacy. The aforementioned discussion suggests that the role of 
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stakeholders is contingent on the situation and dependent on a set of complex variables. 
Nevertheless, regardless of the scope of stakeholders, stakeholder theory shares the 
main assumption of institutional legitimacy that the organization influences and, in turn, 
is influenced by the society in which it operates (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). The 
stakeholder theory contends that managers should balance the interest of all 
stakeholders, including shareholders (Clarkson, 1995; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; 
Freeman, 1984; Jones, 1995).  
Shareholders as stakeholders. This dissertation focuses on one type of 
stakeholders—shareholders. Being one of the primary stakeholder groups and owners of 
the company (Clarkson, 1995; Freeman, 1984), shareholders posses a dual role for 
corporate organizations. In their typology of stakeholder attributes and salience (power, 
legitimacy, and urgency), Mitchell, Agle, and Wood (1997) categorized shareholders as 
dominant stakeholders who posses both power and legitimacy, and thus their 
expectations will “matter” to corporations (p. 876). As such, shareholders can improve 
corporate social behavior by demanding the company to be more socially responsible. 
Indeed, the growing movement of socially responsible investing suggests that 
shareholders increasingly merge social values with their investment decisions, 
demanding more than an acceptable financial return (Guay, Doh, & Sinclair, 2004; 
Rehbein, Waddock, & Graves, 2004).  For example, one-third of shareholder 
resolutions filed in 2012 asked corporations to adopt a sexual orientation non-
discrimination policy (Hamburger & Dennis, 2012). However, to date, there has been 
little scholarly attention, if any, on the larger impact of shareholders on society in the 
public relations literature. In the next sections, research hypotheses are developed based 
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the societal views in organizational theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1997; Scott et al., 2002; Suchman, 1995), public relations literature (e.g., 
Heath, 2006, 2010; Holmstrom, 2005, 2009; Ihlen et al., 2009; Starck & Kruckeberg, 
1988, 2001) and management literature (Clarkson, 1995; Freeman, 1984).  
Corporate Social Performance Model 
Building on the work of Carroll (1979) and Wartick and Cochran (1985), Wood 
(1991) defined corporate social performance (CSP) as “a business organization’s 
configuration of principles of social responsibility, processes of social responsiveness, 
and policies, programs, and observable outcomes as they relate to the corporation’s 
societal relationships (p. 693). The CSP model views stakeholder theory as the key to 
understanding the structure and dimensions of the corporation’s societal relationships 
(Clarkson, 1995; Wood, 1991). In the CSP model, corporate policies, programs, and 
outcomes are directly affected by stakeholders. As such, stakeholders set the norms for 
corporate behavior, experience that behavior, and also evaluate it (Clarkson, 1995). 
Subsequent studies in management literature have used CSP as a toolkit to understand a 
corporation’s attention to its stakeholders (e.g., Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Kacperczyk, 
2009; Sharfman, 1996; Waddock & Graves, 1997). At the heart of CSP is “the 
interaction among the principles of social responsibility, the processes of social 
responsiveness, and the policies and programs designed by corporations to address 
social issues” (Wartick & Cochran, 1985, p. 758). Thus, CSP is a useful model for this 
dissertation as it subsumes corporate social responsibility and emphasizes the 
importance of stakeholders for linking the corporation to its social environment. The 
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next section develops research hypotheses based on the review of the literature and 
presents theoretical models of the study. 
Hypotheses Development and Theoretical Models 
Studies on organizational legitimacy in organizational theory, public relations, 
and management suggest that corporations, as an integral part of societal systems, must 
respond to social pressures exerted by their stakeholders to continue to exist in society. 
Earlier in this dissertation, it was established that a corporation targeted by a social 
shareholder resolution can respond in three ways: a) the corporation can simply ignore 
the social resolution and wait until it reaches at the proxy voting stage; b) the 
corporation can send the resolution to the SEC and request for the omission of the 
resolution from the proxy ballot; and c) the corporation can communicate with the 
activist shareholder group, who sponsored the resolution, to discuss and eventually 
implement the requested changes. Only if the corporation responds in the third way, the 
activist group agrees to withdraw the resolution. Literature on shareholder activism 
suggests that the first two outcomes—omissions and proxy votes —are different from 
the third outcome—withdrawals with respect to assessing shareholder activist success 
and corporate responsiveness (e.g., Carleton et al., 1998; Guay, Doh, & Sinclair, 2004; 
Logsdon & van Buren, 2009; Sjostrom, 2008; Tkac, 2006). It is also important to note 
that shareholder resolutions are non-binding recommendations—there are no legal 
consequences for the target corporations if they do not respond to the demands voiced 
in social shareholder resolutions (Gillan & Starks, 1998; Vogel, 1983). Furthermore, 
prior research documented that, even if included in the proxy, social shareholder 
resolutions receive low support vote from other shareholders at the corporation’s 
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general meeting (Ertimur et al., 2010; Thomas & Cotter, 2007). Then the underlying 
question is why some corporations are willing to engage in a conversation with the 
social shareholder activists to reach withdrawal agreements while others simply ignore 
them. Furthermore, why some corporations implement the proposed changes in the 
withdrawn shareholder resolutions, while others avoid implementing these changes after 
reaching withdrawal agreements with social shareholder activists. Inquiring this 
question is important for public relations research because corporations are the main 
social actors that public relations provide its service (Heath, 2010; Valentini et al., 
2006). An organization’s tangible actions in the social realm are deeply rooted in how 
the organization perceives its role in society. 
 To explain the variations in corporate responses to social shareholder 
resolutions, the researcher turns to management literature. Gower (2006) emphasized 
the need to utilize management literature in public relations research to further the 
understanding of organizations. McKie (2001) and Toth (2010) encouraged the 
applications of concepts and constructs from management models to public relations 
research. The next sections develop a set of research hypotheses concerning the 
likelihood of reaching a withdrawal agreement on a social resolution and the 
implementation level of a social shareholder resolution after the withdrawal outcome. 
Following Eesley and Lenox (2006), the factors are discussed at three levels: corporate, 
issue, and sponsor. 
Withdrawal Probability of a Social Shareholder Resolution 
The aforementioned literature on shareholder activism suggests that shareholder 
activists withdrew their resolution when a) the targeted corporation agreed to implement 
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the proposed changes (structural or procedural); b) gave a commitment to take certain 
steps to report on its social or environmental performance by a certain date; or c) 
demonstrated its willingness to appoint a team that will maintain an ongoing 
communication through regular meetings with the shareholder activists about the issue 
and set a timetable (Carleton et al., 1998; Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999; Guay et al., 
2004; Lee & Lounsbury, 2011; Logsdon & van Buren, 2008). A withdrawn social 
shareholder resolution, then, involves shareholder activist-corporate engagement, and it 
can be regarded as a success on the shareholder activist side. However, the literature 
noted that not all corporations respond to shareholders’ requests for engagement to 
reach at a withdrawal agreement on the resolution. There can be many factors that affect 
corporate responses to social shareholder resolutions. At the corporate level, as an 
indicator of how a corporation considers its role in society, its commitment to its 
stakeholders can determine the way a target corporation responds to a social shareholder 
resolution.  
Corporate-level: corporate stakeholder commitment. The pressure of social 
resolutions is not equally felt by all corporations. For example, Lee and Lounsbury 
(2011) examined the effects of environmental shareholder activism on corporate 
pollution management practices through using 13-year panel data of 58 public 
corporations. The researchers found that certain corporations were more likely to 
respond positively to the shareholder demands than others. In particular, their findings 
showed that corporations that were more dependent on organizational reputation (larger 
corporations and corporations that are closer to end-user consumers) were more likely 
to address the demands from shareholder activists. Lee and Lounsbury concluded that 
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corporate-level characteristics could generate corporate heterogeneity in responses to 
shareholder activism.  
This dissertation argues that the level of commitment that corporations have for 
their institutional stakeholders will affect corporate responses to social shareholder 
activism. Commitment is an important consideration in public relations theory. Indeed, 
commitment is one of the measures of organization–public relationship theory (Bruning 
& Ledignham, 1999; Ledignham & Bruning, 1998). Hon and Grunig (1999) defined 
commitment as the “extent to which each party believes and feels that the relationship is 
worth spending energy to maintain and promote” (p. 3). As such, commitment to 
stakeholders involves some tangible efforts that involve corporate resources at 
maintaining a meaningful relationship with stakeholders.  
As discussed earlier, in the management literature, corporate stakeholder 
commitment has been associated with corporate social performance (CSP). 
Emphasizing the link between CSP and stakeholder commitment, Wood (1991) argued 
that the concept of stakeholder is the key to understanding the structure and dimensions 
of a company’s societal relationships. Similarly, Clarkson (1995) proposed a framework 
that corporate social performance can indicate stakeholder commitment of a 
corporation. Clarkson highlighted that a corporation’s survival depends on its ability to 
create value and satisfaction for each stakeholder group. In line with Freeman’s (1984) 
stakeholder theory, Clarkson (1995) argued that corporations engage in relationships 
with stakeholder groups rather than the society as a whole.  
 Building upon the link between stakeholder theory and CSP, many studies in 
the management literature used CSP as an indicator of stakeholder commitment (e.g., 
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Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Hillman & Keim, 2001; Kacperczyk, 2009; Waddock & Graves, 
1997). However, advocating for a business case of stakeholder engagement, majority of 
these studies examined corporate stakeholder commitment in relation to financial 
performance (e.g., Hillman & Keim, 2001; Waddock & Graves, 1997). The underlying 
assumption was that by generating value for the different stakeholders, corporations can 
also create value for the shareholder (Freeman et al., 2004; Porter & Kramer, 2006, 
2011). With the increasing applications of social movement theory in the management 
research in recent years (e.g., den Hond & Bakker, 2007; Lee & Lounsbury, 2011; Reid 
& Toffel, 2009), corporate stakeholder commitment has been studied in the context of 
corporate responses to social activism. For example, analyzing stakeholder actions in 
United States concerning environmental issues over the period 1988 to 2003, Eesley 
and Lenox (2006) tested a set of hypotheses on which corporations are likely to be more 
engaged with secondary stakeholder groups (e.g., NGOs, activist organizations) on 
these issues. Using CSP as an indicator for corporate stakeholder commitment to 
consumers, the researchers found that corporations with high stakeholder commitment, 
financially well performing, and heavier polluters were more likely to be engaged with 
secondary stakeholders on environmentally-oriented actions. 
It seems clear that both public relations and management literature have pointed 
out the importance of stakeholder commitment as a factor that can affect a target 
corporation’s level of engagement with the social activists. As the literature on social 
shareholder activism suggests social shareholder activists file resolutions at a wide 
range of corporations across a number of sectors. Corporations that became target of 
social resolutions have varying levels of commitment to their stakeholders. The CSP 
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model emphasizes that stakeholders set norms for corporate behavior, experience that 
behavior, and also evaluate it (Clarkson, 1995; Wood, 1991). This view also argues that 
corporations engage in relationships with stakeholder groups rather than the society as a 
whole. As such corporations are linked to society through stakeholders (Heath, 2006; 
Suchman, 1995). Based upon their view toward the role of business in society, these 
corporations might evaluate the pressure exerted by social shareholders through 
different lenses. Thus targeted corporations likely to respond to a social shareholder 
resolution in one of the ways mentioned above: petitioning the SEC for omission, 
sending to a vote, or engaging with the sponsoring shareholder activist to reach at 
withdrawal agreements. The dissertation focuses on corporate commitment to 
community and environment as an indicator of corporations’ efforts for building 
organizational legitimacy.  
Corporate commitment to community. Community, a basic social unit of society 
(Etzioni, 1999), is a legitimate organizational stakeholder with increasing power, 
legitimacy, and urgency due, in part, to the new communication technologies and 
globalization (Castells, 2008; Self, 2009, 2010). The literature on stakeholder theory in 
management considers community as one of the primary and institutional stakeholders 
of a company (Clarkson, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Mitchell et al., 1997). As such, 
according to the stakeholder theory (Clarkson, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Mitchell et al., 
1997), corporations have an obligation to consider the needs, interests, and concerns of 
their local (and global) communities. Furthermore, studies in the management literature 
consistently found that attending the community, among other stakeholders of a 
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corporation, is most relevant to creating organizational legitimacy (e.g., Hillman & 
Keim, 2001; Kacperczyk, 2009).  
Community is an important concept in the public relations literature as well. 
Anchored in the concept of community, the communitarian view to public relations has 
long argued that the most important stakeholder of an organization should be its 
community (Kruckeberg & Starck, 1988). In particular, in the past decade, community 
has been a focal concept in public relations with the theoretical shift from making 
organizations effective to making society effective.  Studies grounded in this societal 
approach have advocated for the integration of community interests in the 
organizational decision-making process (e.g., Hallahan, 2004; Heath, 2011; Holmström, 
2009; Leeper, 2001; Luoma-aho, 2009; Kruckeberg & Tsetsura, 2008; Starck & 
Kruckeberg, 2001; Valentini et al., 2012). Accordingly, an organization’s commitment 
to its community largely determines its legitimacy in a given society. Heath and Ni 
(2010) highlighted the importance of community relations and argued that the practice 
of community relations is “a companion topic to corporate social responsibility” (p. 
558). Building on the literature, this dissertation contends that commitment to 
community can contribute to organizational legitimacy. 
In the management literature, community is one of the primary and institutional 
stakeholder groups with legitimate claims (Clarkson, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Mitchell et 
al., 1997; Wood, 191). Accordingly, corporations have an obligation to consider the 
needs, interests, and expectations of their local and global communities. Furthermore, 
several studies in the management research showed that attending the community, 
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among other stakeholders of a corporation, is most relevant to creating intangible assets 
such as organizational reputation (Deephouse & Carter, 2005; Kacperczyk, 2009). 
Despite its paramount importance for organizational legitimacy, corporations 
differ in their levels of commitment to the community (Hallahan, 2004; Heath, 2010). 
This can be explained by the old-age debate on the two perspectives—
communitarianism versus libertarianism. Leeper (2001) discussed the dual concepts of 
communitarianism and libertarianism. The communitarian perspective values social 
cohesion, citizen empowerment and acceptance of responsibility (Etzioni, 1999, Bellah, 
2008). In contrast, libertarianism values competition for the purpose of fulfilling self-
interest. Leeper (2001) argued that the key to this dualism between communitarianism 
and libertarianism is a matter of positioning one’s philosophy, accepting its inherent 
assumptions, and then conducting action based upon that perspective. If a corporation 
has a strong commitment to community, it is likely to view the organization as part of a 
larger society, assume a role to connect it to a larger whole, and aim to maximize the 
welfare of the larger group. Conversely, if a corporation has a low commitment to 
community, it is not likely to assume a role for the larger good of the society. Because 
of their stronger concerns for larger good of society and their belief that they have 
responsibilities to the society, corporations with higher levels of commitment to their 
community will be more likely to engage in a conversation with social shareholder 
activists over the social issues address in the resolutions as opposed to the corporations 
with lower levels of community commitment. The first research hypothesis is proposed 
as the following: 
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H1: Social resolutions filed at corporations with high levels of community 
commitment will be more likely to be withdrawn than the ones filed at 
corporations low levels of community commitment.  
 
Corporate commitment to the environment. A corporation’s orientation toward 
its natural environment is closely relevant to organizational legitimacy. Corporations 
interact with ecological systems in their local or global environments. Corporate 
operations can directly or indirectly create some long-term or short-term implications 
for the environment. As a result, corporations can affect and be affected by the natural 
environment. The early management literature did not consider the natural environment 
as one of the stakeholders of a corporation because stakeholder status has been 
restricted to humans only (e.g., Agle et al., 1999; Clarkson, 1995; Freeman, 1984; 
Mitchell et al., 1997).  
However, recently there is a growing literature that argues the natural 
environment is one of the most important stakeholders of an organization (Driscoll & 
Starik, 2004; Driscoll & Crombie, 2001; Jacobs, 1997; Mobus, 2005; Starik, 2002). For 
example, Jocobs (1997) focused on the term “stakeholding” at philosophical level and 
argued that corporations both affect and are affected by the environment. He further 
explained that, 
The natural environment supplies as with raw materials, it assimilates the wastes 
that are inevitably produced in economic activity and it provides various life-
support services such as climate regulation and the maintenance of genetic 
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diversity. The environment is affected by the decision of companies and by the 
economy as a whole. (p. 26).  
From this perspective, the stakeholder status can be expanded to include the 
environment. However, it is difficult to apply the stakeholder status to the environment 
in practice. Environment has no voice or agency to carry out a will (Phillips & Reichart, 
2000). However specific individuals and groups can be assigned to advocate for the 
environment at multiple levels (Burns, 2012). To some extent, environmental activist 
organizations or government agencies dedicated to the environmental protection play 
this role. In addition, there is a growing pressure on corporations to create a committee 
with in organizational structure that is solely responsible for environmental 
sustainability (Reid & Toffel, 2009).    
 This dissertation ascribes the natural environment a quasi-stakeholder status. 
Despite the environment has no agency to act as the other stakeholders have, corporate 
environmental responsibility can affect organizational legitimacy through the agency 
organizational stakeholders (e.g., community, employees). Indeed, environmental 
responsibility is central to organizational legitimacy. Negative externalities like 
pollution impose social costs onto communities uninvolved in the business transactions. 
Incidents such as BP Oil Spill and Exxon Valdez Oil Spill can pose threats to 
legitimacy of these corporations, often forcing them to reestablish their legitimacy 
through image restoration strategies (Harlow, Brantley, & Harlow, 2011; Muralidharan, 
Dillistone, & Shin, 2011). Corporate environmental responsibility performance can 
have an impact on organizational legitimacy of a corporation (Mobus, 2005; Vogel, 
2005). Indeed, in a study of environmental performance disclosures, Mobus (2005) 
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found that environmental responsibility performance is a strong predictor of overall 
organizational legitimacy. Golob and Bartlett (2007) found that, as a response to 
societal demands, many corporations have recently increased their environmental 
responsibility performance disclosures to establish and maintain organizational 
legitimacy.  
The importance of environmental responsibility is implicit in the public relations 
literature as well. Most notably, the communitarian view in public relations suggests 
that since communities depend on the natural environment for their survival and well-
being, the corporation has also an obligation to protect the natural environment and 
engage in environmentally responsible behaviors (Leeper, 2001; Starck & Kruckeberg, 
1988). Collectively, it is predicted that a corporation’s level of commitment to the 
natural environmental can determine its likelihood of reaching a withdrawal agreement 
on a social shareholder resolution.  
H2: Resolutions filed at corporations with high levels of environmental 
commitment will be more likely to be withdrawn than the ones filed at 
corporations with low levels of environmental commitment. 
 
In addition to corporate level characteristics such as corporate stakeholder commitment, 
other factors at the issue-level can affect the outcome of social shareholder activism. In 
their study of corporate responses to secondary stakeholder activism (e.g., NGOs, 
special interest groups) on environmental issues, Eesley and Lenox (2006) emphasized 
the importance of the content of stakeholder requests for predicting the outcomes. Next, 
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the discussion directs the attention to the content of the social shareholder activist 
resolutions. 
Issue level: Types of issues in social shareholder resolutions 
The scope of social issues that are raised and addressed through shareholder 
resolutions continues to expand. Sethi (1979) argued that social expectations are 
dynamic. The interests and concerns of shareholder activists are influenced by time and 
societal context in which they are located (Graves, Rehbein, & Waddock, 2001; Tkac, 
2006).Thus, the social issues and demands raised in the shareholder resolutions can be 
very heterogonous.  
The scope of the social or environmental issues raised in a shareholder 
resolution is likely to affect the target corporation’s willingness to engage in a 
conversation with the sponsors and reach at withdrawal agreements. Environmental 
issues such as climate change and global warming have started to play a central role in 
the relationships between corporations and stakeholders such as activist, NGOs, and 
governmental agencies. A relevant example is a business and environmental coalition 
called the United States Climate Action Partnership (USCAP), which includes 
corporations such as DuPont, Shell Oil, and the American Electric Power. The 
corporation played a significant role in the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 
2009 climate bill (Bloomberg, 2009). Being a major component of corporate social 
responsibility (Mobus, 2005; Vogel, 2005), corporate environmental policies receive 
close scrutiny by both public and private entities, and environmental practices elicit 
extensive reporting and attention from the media. Corporate environmental successes 
and failures attract extensive media coverage (e.g., BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico), 
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and major news outlets release rankings based on corporate environmental performance 
(e.g., Newsweek’s Green Rankings). Therefore, corporations have the pressure to be 
vigilant about their environmental behaviors as they are under close scrutiny.  
While companies have no discretion over some social factors such as being in 
tobacco industry (other than exiting the industry), companies have substantial discretion 
over the environmental factors that drive social investing (Rehbein et al., 2004). Even in 
industries such as power generation, petroleum, and chemicals, companies have the 
ability to engage in environmentally responsible behaviors that are easily measurable 
(e.g., adopt clean technologies, use renewable energy sources, etc.) (Eesley & Lenox, 
2006). As such, corporations might find it more feasible to address an environmental 
issue requested in a shareholder resolution as opposed to a social one (e.g., human 
rights, diversity). Thus the following hypothesis was posed: 
H3: Social resolutions that raised an environmental issue will be more likely to 
be withdrawn than the resolutions that raised other social issues (e.g., 
community, diversity, human rights). 
 
Sponsor level: Types of institutional social shareholder activists 
Institutional shareholder activists who file resolutions are not a homogenous 
group. Research has showed that the profile of institutional shareholders who voiced 
their concerns through filing resolutions has diversified significantly since the 1990s 
(Ertimur et al., 2010; Rehbein et al., 2004; Waddock & Graves, 2004). Historically, 
institutional shareholder activists include public pension funds, religious groups, 
environmental groups, socially responsible investing funds, and special interest groups. 
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Following the Enron scandal in 2001 and continuing through the recent financial crisis, 
particularly, public pension funds have increased their pressures on the corporate 
governance and social responsibility issues (Gillan & Stark, 2007; Smith, 2012). The 
type of organization (religious, public pension funds, activist organization) can create 
different levels of pressures on target corporations. 
Public pension funds play a decisive role in shareholder activism. Because of 
their importance, public pension activism on corporate governance issues has found 
extensive scholarly attention in management literature (e.g., Carleton, Nelson, & 
Weisbach, 1998; Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999; Gillan & Starks, 2007; Smith, 1996). 
Studied suggested that public pension funds have been successful in reaching 
withdrawal agreements with the target corporations on corporate governance issues. 
Notably, in a study on shareholder activism enacted by California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System (CalPERS) between 1987 and 1993, Smith (1996) found that 
shareholder wealth increased for corporations that settled with CalPERS and decreased 
for corporations that resisted. This finding emphasizes the role of public pension fund 
for corporate managers.  
Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) examined the motivation and impact of public 
pension fund activism by focusing on five public pension funds, —California Public 
Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), California State Teachers’ Retirement 
System (CalSTRS), New York City Funds, College Retirement Equities Fund (CREF), 
and State of Wisconsin Investment Board Fund (SWIB).  The researchers analyzed 266 
shareholder resolutions filed by these public pension funds at 125 corporations between 
1987 and 1993. Del Guercio and Hawkins found that corporations receiving public 
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pension fund resolutions subsequently experience a higher frequency of governance 
events such as shareholder lawsuits and responsive corporate policies such as asset 
sales. In particular, resolutions sponsored by CalPERS, which had the largest ownership 
stakes among the externally managed indexed funds by that time, had the broadest and 
most substantial impact on subsequent events at target corporations. The researchers 
also found that corporations that received resolutions sponsored public pension funds 
and garnered enough votes to pass had a significantly higher probability of a takeover 
attempt. Del and Guercio (1999) concluded that, 
Shareholder resolutions are low-cost mechanisms that can be fruitfully used to 
further a number of goals, such as putting pressure on management, signaling to 
the market the views of the fund regarding target management, and building 
shareholder support for more costly governance activity such as takeovers.  
(p. 295).  
While Del Guercio and Hawkins’ study (1999) focused on public pension fund 
resolutions that received passed at the annual vote, Carleton et al.’s study (1998) 
focused on public pension fund resolutions that were withdrawal. More specifically, the 
researchers examined 62 resolutions filed at 146 corporations by TIAA-CREF between 
1987 and 1993. Carleton et al. (1998) found that the public pension fund withdrew their 
resolutions upon the target corporation’s commitment to take steps toward the proposed 
change. Moreover, the researches documented that, in a majority of the cases (87%), 
corporations took actions to implement the changes requested by TIAA-CREF.  
Prior research has thus consistently documented that overall resolutions 
sponsored by public pension funds receive much higher votes and more positive 
116 
responses from targeted corporations (e.g., Ertimur et al., 2010; Del Guercio & 
Hawkins, 1999; Gillan & Straks, 2007). The research has also suggested that public 
pension funds were generally able to reach agreements with targeted corporations 
(Carleton et al., 1998; Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999; Smith, 2012). While there is 
mounting evidence that public pension fund activism has been influential in corporate 
governance issues, there is relatively little evidence on the impact of public pension 
fund on shareholder-corporate engagements on social issues. Considering 
organizational type as a source of stakeholder pressure, it is predicted that social 
resolutions sponsored by public pension funds will be more likely to be withdrawn than 
those sponsored by other institutional activists (e.g., unions, religious organizations). 
H4: Social resolutions sponsored by public pension funds will be more likely to 
be withdrawn than those sponsored by other institutional shareholder activists 
(e.g., religious organizations, special interests groups, SRI funds). 
 
Thus far, the discussion has focused on the factors that predict withdrawal of 
resolutions as one of the outcome of social shareholder activism. However, withdrawals 
alone cannot demonstrate whether social shareholder resolutions can indeed create 
changes with the targeted corporation. The next section addresses the important 
question whether target corporations implement the proposed changes in social 
shareholder resolutions. 
Implementation Level of a Withdrawn Social Shareholder Resolution 
One of the main objectives of this dissertation is to further the understanding of 
the factors that affect corporate responsiveness to social shareholder activism. In this 
117 
section, I will focus on one issue, corporate sustainability reporting, to explore whether 
and to what extent target corporations respond to social expectations and demands, 
raised in the shareholder resolutions, to increase their organizational legitimacy. 
Corporate sustainability reporting was chosen to examine the implementation level of a 
social shareholder resolution mainly because three reasons. First, several public 
relations scholars documented that corporations produced sustainability reporting at 
different levels (e.g., Golob & Barttlett, 2007; Ihlen, Barttlett, & May, 2011; Signitzer 
& Prexl, 2008; Weber & Marley, 2012). Second, shareholder request for corporate 
sustainability reporting provides a clear example of social shareholder activism for a 
balance of economic, social, and environmental goals and values, challenging the 
Friedman’s (1970) economic view of short-term shareholder wealth maximization. 
Finally, third, there are reliable externally verified and global guidelines (e.g., Global 
Reporting Initiative’s Sustainability Reporting Guidelines and Application Levels) for 
determining the implementation level of corporate sustainability reporting, which will 
briefly be discussed below and later in the Methodology Chapter in more detail.  
The next section revisits the concept of stakeholder commitment and discusses 
the impact of the target corporation’s stakeholder commitment on the level of 
implementation of a sustainability-reporting request made by social shareholder 
activists through resolutions. Furthermore, the section discusses the potential impact of 
corporate industry classification and types of sponsors on the implementation of a 
sustainability-reporting request. The researcher develops a set of hypotheses guided by 
the concept of organizational legitimacy, which is an overarching theme that can 
explain corporate responses to societal pressures (e.g., Clarkson, 1995; DiMaggio & 
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Powell, 1983; Galaskiewicz, 1991; Heath, 2006, 2010; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott et 
al., 2000; Ihlen & van Ruler, 2009; Starck & Kruckeberg, 1988, 2001; Wood, 1991). 
Before proceeding with the hypotheses, the scope and use of corporate sustainability 
reporting is explained from a societal perspective. 
Corporate Sustainability Reporting. Societal expectations about the responsible 
role of business in society have led to developments of mechanisms that aim to 
improve, evaluate, and communicate socially responsible practices. The research on 
corporate social responsibility communication in public relations shows that large 
corporations have increasingly adopted global standards for reporting on their 
sustainability programs as a response to growing public pressure (Golob & Bartlett, 
2007; Ihlen & Roper, 2011; Ihlen & Bartlett, & May, 2011; Signitzer & Prexl, 2008).  
Sustainability reporting is premised on the triple bottom line approach in which 
three elements—economic growth, environmental protection, and social welfare—are 
equally considered (Ihlen & Roper, 2011, Kolk, 2003). In essence, sustainability 
reporting is a consequence of the definition of sustainable development. In 1987, the 
Word Commission on Economic Development (WCED) popularized the term 
“sustainability development” defining it as “development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” 
(WCED Brundtland Report, 1987, p. 43). Signitzer and Prexl (2008) discussed 
corporate sustainability as a concept that “describes the planned and strategic, 
management processes of working towards a balance of economic, social, and 
environmental goals and values” (p. 3). With its emphasis on the triple bottom 
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approach, the notion of sustainability poses an alternative to Friedman’s (1970) 
traditional models of short-term wealth maximization.  
Corporate sustainability reporting (or corporate sustainability communication) 
underpins the increasing social demands on corporations to conform to expectations of 
societal legitimacy. At the heart of corporate sustainability reporting is public demand 
for transparency, which enhances the ethical nature of organizations (Rawlins, 2008). In 
principle, corporate sustainability reporting aims at informing stakeholders on corporate 
actions, measures, and plans to meet “the needs and aspirations of both current and 
future societies” (Signitzer & Prexl, 2008, p. 9). Sustainability reporting communication 
allows forming a public sphere in which public needs, interests, and expectations are 
discussed (Ihlen et al., 2011). From a reflective management view (Holstrom, 2007; van 
Ruler & Vercic, 2004), corporate sustainability communication allows corporations to 
become cognizant of public needs and expectations. It allows them to maintain a 
continuous adjustment of corporate decision processes to society’s norms and 
expectations, leading corporations to make structural and procedural changes. 
Implementation of sustainability reports in corporations. A central discussion in 
the study of sustainability reporting is whether companies have really implemented and 
internalized the items they include in their report. Kolk (2004) introduced the concept of 
implementation likelihood arguing that a sustainability report can be judged for the 
likelihood that its contents have indeed been implemented within an organization. 
Sustainability reporting requires a coherent approach that integrates the strategic 
management process of the organization, from definition of its mission to the 
measurement and reporting of the results achieved as a consequence of that process 
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(Signitzer & Prexl, 2008). In a sense, by providing knowledge about environmental, 
social, and economic performance measurements and results, by standardization of 
reporting and accounting, and external verification, the companies increase the 
likelihood of implementation of socially responsible behaviors.  
Societal approaches to the role of corporation reviewed in the earlier sections 
suggest that social pressures can create certain changes within the organization and can 
shape, mediate, and channel institutional arrangements (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Scott et al. (2000) observed that organizations design formal 
structures and procedures to demonstrate that they are acting on societal expectations 
and values. Accordingly, organizations are driven to incorporate the practices and 
procedures defined by prevailing demands and expectations and organizations that do 
so increase their legitimacy and their survival prospects, “regardless of the immediate 
efficacy of the acquired practice and procedures” (p. 41). Because social pressures can 
create structural changes within the organization (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977), the changes agreed upon by the target corporations are likely to occur in 
those mechanisms within the corporation which are designed to address social 
objectives. Meyer and Rowan (1991) further explained: 
By designing a formal structure that adheres to the prescriptions of myths in the 
institutional environment, an organization demonstrates that it is acting on 
collectively valued purposes in a proper and adequate manner. The 
incorporation of institutionalized elements provides an account of activities that 
protects the organization from having its conduct questioned. The organization 
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becomes, in a word, legitimate, and it uses its legitimacy to strengthen its 
support and secure its survival.  (p. 50) 
A corporation, then, is expected to make institutional arrangements and changes to 
address societal demands to establish and maintain its legitimacy in society. Meyer and 
Rowan (1991) noted, “a most important aspect of isomorphism with environmental 
institutions is the evolution of organizational language” (p. 50). For example, Meyer 
and Rowan discussed how organizations redesign the labels of organization chart as 
well as vocabularies of motive used to describe the activities of individuals as a 
response to societal pressures. Similarly, Galaskiewicz (1991) observed that societal 
demands can be implemented in the organization by change agents even though these 
changes may contradict with the corporation’s short-term goals. Faced with a 
shareholder request on sustainability reporting, a corporation is then expected to make 
institutional arrangements and changes to maintain its organizational legitimacy. 
However, not all corporations produce sustainability reports and not all of them 
produce sustainability reports at the same level. In other words, there are different levels 
of how corporations produce sustainability reporting (Golob & Barttlet, 2007; Ihlen et 
al., 2011; Kolk, 2003, 2004). As mentioned earlier, corporate sustainability reporting is 
voluntary—there are no legal requirements or guidelines for corporate sustainability 
reporting. As such, corporations have discretionary over the quality of their 
sustainability reports. Prior research showed that corporations adopted the sustainability 
reporting practice at different levels ranging from a basic level to an advanced one 
(Golob & Barttlet, 2007; Kolk, 2004; Signitzer & Prexl, 2008; Weber & Marley, 2012). 
Indeed, Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) has designed three application levels for 
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organizational sustainability reporting (www.globalreporting.org). The three levels (A, 
B, C) are a measure of the extent of application or coverage of the GRI Reporting 
Framework—a globally recognized framework for sustainability reporting (Kolk, 2003, 
2004). The levels show the variations of corporate sustainability reporting from 
“beginner to advanced, and somewhere in between” (GRI Application Levels, 2013, 
para. 2). Thus the variations discussed above highlight some factors that might affect 
the implementation level of sustainability reporting. Given that sustainability reporting 
is a voluntary practice that helps contribute to organizational legitimacy (Ihlen et al., 
2011; Signitzer & Prexl, 2008), it possible that target corporations that received a 
sustainability-reporting shareholder resolution and later reached at an agreement with 
sponsoring shareholder activists will implement this request at various levels. The next 
sections focus on corporate level and sponsor level factors that might affect the 
implementation level of sustainability reporting request. 
Corporate-level: corporate stakeholder commitment. Corporate sustainability 
reporting is widespread among corporations, but it is not practiced at same level. For 
example, content analysis on sustainability reporting of large corporations showed that 
the extent of corporate sustainability reporting varied from not reporting at all to full 
compliance with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines—globally accepted 
high standards of sustainability reporting standards (Golob & Bartlett, 2007; Ihlen, 
Bartlett, & May, 2011; Kolk, 2004; Weber & Marley, 2012). Similarly, Ihlen and Roper 
(2011) observed that although the term sustainability was commonly used in corporate 
discourse, the actual of reporting of parameters on social and environmental issues were 
rather shallow. Kolk (2004) explained some of the reasons for not reporting such as 
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doubts about the advantages it would bring to the organization, increasing costs, the 
danger of damaging the reputation of the corporation and having legal implications. 
Corporations might feel, for example, that providing a sustainability report might make 
them “vulnerable to public pressures” and constrain their activities by slowing down the 
completion of tasks or limiting their use of particular inputs and outputs (Kolk, 2004, p. 
54). As Signitzer and Prexl (2008) put it, corporations face “the risk of waking sleeping 
dogs” when they issue sustainability reports. In addition, producing sustainability 
reports can be costly and time consuming, and often requires personnel employed to 
oversee the practice (Kolk, 2004; Weber & Marley, 2012). The better the quality of a 
sustainability report, the more company resources vested in the practice. Building on the 
resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1983), the availability of funding and 
resources for gathering such a report might also affect a company’s likelihood of 
adopting the practice of sustainability reporting.  
Based on the factors discussed above, corporations have adopted sustainability 
reporting at different levels. For example, GRI has three levels of reporting ranging 
from A (advanced level), B (medium level), and C (basic level). Den Hond and de 
Bakker (2007) argued that the level of corporate changes in the social realm could be 
understood as an expression of what that corporation believes to be its social 
responsibilities. The application level of sustainability reporting can be closely related 
to the organization’s overall commitment to its stakeholders. In essence, sustainability 
reporting is a communicative function of corporations reflect its “concern for social 
justice” and “environmental awareness” (Signitzer & Prexl, 2008). Thus it is predicted 
that a target corporation’s stakeholder commitment to community and the natural 
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environment will affect its implementation level of a social request (in this case 
sustainability reporting). 
H5: Withdrawn social resolutions filed at corporations with high levels of 
community commitment will be more likely to be implemented at a greater level 
than the ones filed at corporations with low levels of community commitment.  
H6: Withdrawn Social resolutions filed at corporations with high levels of 
environmental commitment are more likely to be implemented at a greater level 
than the ones filed at corporations with low levels of community commitment. 
 
Industrial classification. In addition to the extent of corporate stakeholder 
commitment, industry classification of the target corporation can have an impact on the 
implementation level of the sustainability-reporting request raised in shareholder 
resolutions. Prior research on the corporate social responsibility practices has indicated 
some difference across industries on the implementation and communication of these 
policies and principles (e.g., Golob & Bartlett, 2007; Signitzer & Prexl, 2008; Waddock 
& Graves, 1997; Weber & Marley, 2012). The line of business that corporations are 
engaged within an industry can explain these variations.  
Corporations in the energy, oil and gas, and utility industries are dependent on 
the natural resources existing in the natural environment for their survival. Indeed, 
corporations in the petro-chemical industry—that involves petroleum products and 
chemical products derived from petroleum—are historically more prone to cause 
negative externalities to the natural environment (e.g., BP Oil Spill, Exxon Valdez Oil 
Spill) that threaten social legitimacy of the entire industry (Harlow et al., 2011; 
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Muralidharan et al., 2011). Therefore, corporations in this industry are in the spotlight 
and under scrutiny by the media, environmental activists, and government agencies. As 
a result, these corporations may be more inclined to provide information on 
environmental responsibility activities to their stakeholders. Indeed, Jose and Lee 
(2007) found that corporations in the environmentally sensitive industries, such as oil 
and gas, are more likely to disclose environmental performance information than 
companies in finance and other service industries. Likewise, Reid and Toffel (2009) 
found that corporations in the integrated oil, gas, utilities, and energy sectors are more 
likely to have greater level of corporate disclosures of climate change that other sectors 
such as financial services and health care. Given that social responsibility is one of the 
main antecedents of organizational legitimacy (Epstein, 1972) and organizational 
reputation (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990), and specifically environmental responsibility is 
predictive of overall legitimacy of an organization in a society (Driscoll & Starik, 2004; 
Mobus, 2005), petro-chemical corporations are more likely to have greater vigilance 
and concerns about corporate social responsibility issues than corporations in other 
industries. To corroborate their organizational legitimacy, corporations in the petro-
chemical industry likely implement sustainability reporting request at a greater level 
than corporations in other industries such as financial services.  
H7: Withdrawn social resolutions filed at corporations within the petro-
chemical industry are more likely to be implemented at a greater level than the 
ones filed at corporations within other industries.   
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Sponsor level: Types of institutional social shareholder activists  
Having traced the relationships among corporate social performance, 
stakeholder commitment, industry classification, and corporate responses to social 
shareholder resolutions in the previous sections, the focus of the discussion is directed 
at the link between shareholder pressure—shareholder activists who have filed social 
resolutions—and the implementation level of sustainability reporting requests. As 
discussed earlier, this dissertation focuses only on institutional shareholders—
organizations that pool large sums of money and invest those sums in various assets. 
Having large holdings, institutional shareholders have more influence on corporate 
managements compared to individual shareholders (Ertimuer et al., 2010; Thomas & 
Cotter, 2007) and are widely regarded as the leader of shareholder activism—
particularly on corporate governance issues (Carleton et al., 1998; Del Guercio & 
Hawkins, 1999; Gillan & Starks, 2007; Smith, 1996, 2012).  
Public pension funds (e.g., CalPERS, New York City Public Pension Fund) have 
been actively involved with corporate governance issues through filing resolutions. 
Prior research has suggested that target corporations were willing to implement the 
proposed changes requested by public pension funds (e.g., Carleton et al., 1998; Del 
Guercio & Hawkins, 1999; Smith, 1996). For example, Del Guercio and Hawkins 
(1999) found that resolutions sponsored by CalPERS, which had the largest ownership 
stakes among the externally managed indexed funds by that time, had the broadest and 
most substantial impact on subsequent events at target corporations. The researchers 
also found that corporations that received resolutions sponsored public pension funds 
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and garnered enough votes to pass had a significantly higher probability of a takeover 
attempt. Del and Guercio (1999) concluded that, 
Shareholder resolutions are low-cost mechanisms that can be fruitfully used to 
further a number of goals, such as putting pressure on management, signaling to 
the market the views of the fund regarding target management, and building 
shareholder support for more costly governance activity such as takeovers.  
(p. 295).  
Similarly, in a case study Carleton, Nelson, & Weisbach (1998) examined 62 
resolutions filed at 146 corporations by TIAA-CREF between 1987 and 1993 found that 
at least 87 percent of the targets subsequently took actions after reaching withdrawal 
agreements with he pension fund.  
Social movement literature in sociology can provide some insights into the 
understanding of corporations’ implementation of a social request made by different 
types of institutional shareholder activists. For example, Rowley and Moldoveanu 
(2003) studied the antecedents of corporate social responsibility activities. Building on 
social movement theory, the researchers found that both the interest and the identity of 
stakeholder groups matter in pressuring companies. Applying social movement theory 
in management research, den Hond and de Bakker (2007) found that corporations 
responded to activist demands in varying degrees based on the perceived ideology of 
the activist groups.  
In their framework of stakeholder salience, Mitchell, Agle, and Wood (1997) 
argued that stakeholders who possess power, legitimacy, and urgency are more salient 
to corporations. As discussed earlier in this dissertation, legitimacy is the “assumptions 
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that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, and appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). 
Even though, all of the institutional shareholder activists have assets in the corporation 
to the varying extent, and thus they possess legitimacy; because of their different 
organizational identity, mission, and values, these shareholder activists may pose 
different levels of saliency for corporations. For example, in their study of corporate 
responses to stakeholder activism, Eesley and Lenox (2006) found the influence of 
stakeholder legitimacy on the outcomes. The researchers argued that, because of their 
standing in society, some stakeholder groups such as religious groups are able to elicit 
positive corporate changes despite using less confrontational tactics than more 
controversial stakeholder groups like environmental activists. Eesley and Lenox 
emphasized the importance of stakeholder type in estimating corporate responses to 
stakeholder activism on corporate social responsibility.  
Several studies in finance examined sponsor saliency as an explanatory variable 
to estimate voting outcomes of shareholder proposals on corporate governance issues at 
the annual meetings and showed that sponsor type did indeed affect the voting 
outcomes of these proposals (e.g., Ertimur et al., 2010; Gillan & Starks, 2000, 2007; 
Thomas & Cotter, 2007). For example, Gillan and Starks (2000) examined shareholder 
proposals over a seven-year period to assess success of shareholder activism. 
Categorizing sponsors who filed corporate governance resolutions into three groups 
(institutions, coordinated investor groups, and individual investors), the researchers 
found that sponsor identity was an important determinant for the voting outcome.  
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Similarly, in a study of shareholder proposals from the 2002-2004 proxy 
seasons, Thomas and Cotter (2007) found that the type of sponsoring groups has an 
impact on the ability of proposals to attract shareholder votes. The researchers showed 
that private institutions, unions, and public pension institutions received much higher 
levels of support than individuals, religious groups, and social activists. Consistent with 
findings, in their analysis of board of directors’ responsiveness to shareholders 
proposals over the period of 1997-2004, Ertimur et al. (2010) found that proposals filed 
by public pension funds received the majority of vote followed by unions and 
individuals. Ertimur et al. (2010) concluded that corporations were more likely to 
implement proposals that are brought to a vote or supported by shareholders with higher 
ownership, such as public pension funds, or with greater ability to exert pressures, such 
as unions.  
In particular, the rise of public pension fund activism has attracted scholarly 
attention in the literature on shareholder activism on corporate governance issues 
(Gillan & Starks, 2007; Smith, 1996, 2007). Most notably, several studied examined 
(e.g., Smith, 1996; Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999) California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System (CalPERS) and Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association – 
College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA–CREF) as these funds have been regarded as 
a leader of shareholder activism on corporate governance issues since 1990s (Gillan & 
Starks, 2007). However, studies that specifically examine the role of public pension 
fund in social shareholder activism are absent in the literature.  
Overall, studies have noticed that the increasing involvement of public pension 
funds in social issues in the last decade (Sparkes & Cowton, 2004; Sjostrom, 2008; 
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Tkac, 2006). According to Sparkes and Cowton (2004), the growing shareholder social 
activism enacted by public pension funds via filing resolutions in recent years has 
moved socially responsible investing from margin to mainstream (p. 49). Sparkes and 
Cowton (2004) further argued that, 
The growth in pension funds adopting SRI techniques and analysis is of the 
greatest importance for CSR, as they are the majority owners of most quoted 
business. As such they have the power to request, and if necessary instruct, 
corporate executives to include social and environmental guidelines in their 
business objectives. (p. 49). 
Building on the existing literature, it is likely that public pension funds, which have the 
largest ownership stakes among the externally managed funds (Del Guercio & Hawkins, 
1999), will generate more substantial influence on the target corporation than other 
shareholder activists groups such as religious groups (e.g., Interfaith Center on 
Corporate Responsibility, Sisters of Charity of Blessed Virgin Mary), SRI funds (e.g., 
Domini, Walden Asset Management), and special interest groups (e.g., PETA, Human 
Rights Campaign), and Unions (e.g., International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-
CIO). 
H8: Withdrawn social resolutions sponsored by public pension funds will be 






CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY 
 
The previous chapters have explained social shareholder activism and discussed 
organizational legitimacy as an overarching theme used to understand corporate 
stakeholder commitment and corporate responses to social pressures exerted by 
shareholders—a powerful stakeholder group with legitimate claims (Agle et al., 1999; 
Mitchell et al., 1997). In this chapter, the methodology of the research project is 
outlined, including the sample, procedures, and analyses. 
The purpose of this dissertation to investigate the nature and scope of social 
shareholder activism via filing resolutions and to develop and test models that explain 
the conditions under which social shareholder activists elicit positive responses to their 
requests. Public relations research has been often criticized for its dearth of 
methodological approaches (McKie, 2001; Smith & Ferguson, 2010; van Ruler, 2009). 
Stacks (2002) argued, “it is wrong to believe that one methodology is better than the 
other. Each methodology has advantages and disadvantages” (p. 5). Stacks called for 
applications of diverse methods in public relations research. Similarly, Ihlen and van 
Ruler (2007) emphasized that a broad range of research methods contributes to the 
growth of knowledge in the field of public relations. Specifically, Smith and Ferguson 
(2010) highlighted the need for large-scale studies and “greater methodological 
diversity” in studying the interaction between activists and organizations (p. 404). This 
dissertation answers calls from these public relations scholars by analyzing corporate 
responses to social shareholder activism over a fourteen-year period of time through a 
multi-methodological approach.   
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Study Design Overview 
This dissertation conducted a large-scale study of social shareholder activism 
directed at U.S. publicly traded corporations through analysis of resolutions filed 
between 1997 and 2011. The research design consists of three studies: 1) a descriptive 
analysis of all shareholder resolutions filed at U.S. corporations between 1997 and 2011 
as well as a quantitative content analysis of withdrawn social shareholder resolutions; 2) 
theoretical model testing on the probability of withdrawing a social resolution and on 
the implementation level of a withdrawn social shareholder resolution; and 3) an 
illustrative case study on the implementation of a withdrawn social resolution. By 
employing a multimethod approach (McKie, 2001), the dissertation aims to explore the 
scope and nature of social shareholder activism via filing resolutions and the conditions 
under which social shareholder activists are likely to elicit positive responses from 
corporations on the social issues raised in resolutions. 
Study 1 provides a descriptive analysis of all shareholder resolutions and social 
shareholder resolutions submitted at U.S. corporations between 1997 and 2011 to lay a 
foundation for further analysis. A quantitative content analysis of withdrawn social 
shareholder resolutions was conducted to explore the nature and scope of the social 
issues raised in these resolutions. Study 2 tested two theoretical models on the effects of 
corporate stakeholder commitment, issue type, and sponsor type on the outcomes of 
social shareholder resolutions. Finally, Study 3 included a case study of CONSOL 
Energy, a target corporation of a social shareholder resolution, to illustrate a structural 
change resulting from implementation of a shareholder request made in a withdrawn 
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social resolution. The next section describes the sample and datasets used in this 
dissertation.  
Study Datasets 
To address the research questions and hypotheses of the dissertation, several 
large datasets were used.  
Shareholder resolutions data.  Research questions and hypotheses were 
addressed through using shareholder resolutions. The data on social shareholder 
resolutions was obtained from Risk Metrics—an independent financial risk 
management and proxy research organization. The dataset provides information on 
shareholder resolutions (governance and social responsibility) submitted each year to all 
Standard & Poor’s 1500 companies from 1993 through 2012. This dissertation analyzed 
shareholder resolutions filed between 1997 and 2011 (the latest year available by the 
start date of this research project) to study social shareholder activism enacted over the 
last decade. The dataset includes information such as the company name, the lead filer 
of the resolutions (sponsors), the annual meeting date, resolution content, and outcome. 
The shareholder resolution dataset is updated annually (WRDS, 2013).  
The current study uses the data that were last updated on September 13, 2012. 
The dataset is available through WRDS—Wharton Research Data Services at the 
Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania 
(http://wrdsweb.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/ds/riskmetrics/inc). University of Oklahoma 
has a paid electronic access to this data source. Recently, several studies in management 
and public relations have used the Risk Metrics dataset to study shareholder resolutions 
(e.g., Ertimur et al., 2010; Reid & Toffel, 2009; Thomas & Cotter, 2007; Ragas, 2012).  
134 
Corporate social performance data. To address H1-H2 and H5-H6 regarding the 
effects of corporate community and environmental stakeholder commitment on the 
probability of withdrawing a social resolution and the implementation level of a 
withdrawn social resolution, corporate social performance measures were used. The 
corporate social performance data was obtained from the Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini 
Research & Analytics (KLD) social performance database. Access to the KLD data was 
obtained from WRDS available through the University of Oklahoma libraries. The KLD 
index of corporate social performance is compiled by an independent rating service that 
focuses on ranking based on environment, social, and governance factors for the period 
of 1991-2012 (WRDS, 2013). KLD employs independent analysts who conduct 
research on corporations to provide investment advice to socially responsible investors. 
KLD analysts use a variety of data sources (e.g., SEC filings, media coverage) to screen 
corporations and compile a rating on corporate social performance. KLD covers 
approximately 80 indicators and provides strengths and weaknesses of corporations that 
comprise the Domini 400 Social Index and S&P 500 in seven major issue areas 
including Community, Corporate Governance, Diversity, Employee Relations, 
Environment, Human Rights, and Product.  
Corporate-level financial data. In this dissertation, corporate-level financial 
indicators were controlled in the research models because financial state of a 
corporation affects its responses to stakeholder activism in general (Eesley & Lenox, 
2006; Reid & Toffel, 2009). The corporate-level financial data included in this study 
were company size, financial performance, growth opportunities, debt, stock return, 
and financial slack.  Financial data was gathered from COMPUSTAT and CRSP 
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(University of Chicago’s Center for Research in Securities Prices) databases. More 
specifically, accounting measures (company size, financial performance, growth 
opportunities, debt, and financial slack) were obtained from the COMPUSTAT database 
that provides financial, statistical, and market information on active and inactive global 
companies, covering 99% of world’s total market capitalization (www.compustat.com). 
The COMPUSTAT database is regarded as the world’s leading database providing 
objective financial information and commonly used in the management and finance 
literatures (Ertimur et al., 2010; Rehbein et al., 2004). Information on stock price was 
obtained from the CRSP database (http://www.crsp.com/). CRSP maintains one of the 
largest and most comprehensive databases in stock market research (Kacperczyk, 2009). 
This dataset provides historical stock market information and is publicly available. 
Study Sample 
This dissertation studied shareholder resolutions filed at publicly traded 
corporations in the United States between 1997 and 2011. There were 14, 271 
resolutions filed by shareholders at various corporations over the studied time period. 
These shareholder resolutions constituted the sample of the first study on descriptive 
analysis. Specifically, in Study 1, RQ1 and its sub-questions (RQ1a-c) were addressed 
through descriptive statistical analyses of all shareholder resolutions (N = 14,271). This 
sample was broken into two broad categories: corporate governance resolutions (n = 
9,744, 68%) and social resolutions (n = 4,527, 32%). To address RQ2, social 
shareholder resolutions were analyzed. To address RQ3 and its sub-questions (RQ3a-f), 
withdrawn social shareholder resolutions constituted the sample (n = 1,017). 
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In Study 2, to address the first set of research hypotheses (H1-H4) on the 
probability of withdrawal outcome model, the social shareholder resolutions sample 
was further matched with corporate-level financial data. More specifically, for each 
target corporation that received a social shareholder resolution company size, the 
information on its financial performance, growth opportunities, debt, stock return, and 
financial slack was culled from COMPUSTAT and CRSP databases and entered. The 
resulting sample with non-missing data was 3,449 social shareholder resolutions (75%). 
Among these resolutions, 1,017 of them (39%) were withdrawn by sponsoring 
shareholders after reaching agreements with target corporations. To address the second 
set of research hypotheses (H5-H8) on the level of implementation model, all 
resolutions that requested corporations to issue sustainability reports comprised the 
sample (n = 89, 8%). Study 3 included an illustrative case study from the withdrawn 
social shareholder sample.  
After providing the various data sources used to address research questions and 
hypotheses, the reminder of this chapter discusses the three empirical studies in this 
dissertation. 
Study 1: Descriptive and Content Analyses of Shareholder Resolutions, 1997-2011 
RQ1 and its sub-questions focused on all shareholder resolutions. Specifically, 
RQ1 asked about the landscape of all shareholder resolutions filed between 1997 and 
2011. To address this question, the researcher conducted a descriptive statistical 
analysis of total number of shareholder resolutions filed at U.S. corporations over the 
time period of 1997-2011 (N = 14, 271). RQ1a further inquired about the types of 
institutional sponsors who filed shareholder resolutions at corporations over the study 
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time period. To address the question, resolutions were coded based upon sponsor types. 
Because this study is focused only on institutional shareholders—organizations that 
manage large sums of money on behalf of others—individual shareholders were 
excluded from the analysis. The Risk Metrics data provides information on 
organizational types of sponsors (public pension, foundation, company, unions). 
However, there were some missing data for the sponsor type category (13%). The 
research entered the information whenever possible (for example, if Sisters of St. 
Francis did not have sponsor type information, the researcher undertook additional 
research, such as organizational website check, to identify sponsor type). Through this 
additional research, nearly half of the missing data was filled in (6%). Based on the 
shareholder activism literature (e.g., Del Guercio, 1999; Ertimur et al., 2010; Gillan & 
Starks, 2007; Thomas & Cotter, 2007), the resulting data on sponsor types were further 
organized under six categories: public pension funds, religious organizations, socially 
responsible investing funds, unions, special interest groups, and other (e.g., company, 
family foundations).  A public pension sponsor is a fund that provides retirement 
income and is regulated under public sector law (e.g., California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System, New York City Public Pension Fund). A religious shareholder 
sponsor is a faith-based organization that seeks to invest for improving corporate social 
impact and to divest from “sinful” companies associated with guns, liquor, and tobacco 
(e.g., Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, Sisters of St. Francis). A socially 
responsible investing fund (SRI) is a private fund that consciously practices shareholder 
advocacy for improving environmental social and governance (ESG) issues (e.g., 
Calvert Asset Management, Domini Social Investments). A union sponsor is a pension 
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fund for workers (e.g., The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations, International Brotherhood of Teamsters). A special interest sponsor is an 
activist organization or public policy organization with a specific issue agenda (e.g., 
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Pro Vita Advisors). Other sponsors 
included foundations, and company. Sponsor types obtained from Risk Metrics were 
coded to address the question.  
RQ1b inquired about the outcomes of shareholder resolutions. Risk Metrics 
dataset provides outcome information for the shareholder resolutions. As discussed in 
the literature review (e.g., Ertimur et al., 2010; Thomas & Cotter, 2007; Tkac, 2006), 
there are four outcomes of shareholder resolutions: withdrawn, omitted, voted, and 
rejected. A withdrawn outcome is a resolution that was taken off from the ballot as a 
result of some type of engagement between the filing shareholder activists and target 
corporations (Carleton et al., 1998; Logsdon & van Buren, 2009; O’Rourke, 2003; 
Rehbein et al., 2004). An omitted outcome is a shareholder resolution that was excluded 
from the proxy ballot upon the target corporation’s petition to the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). A voted (passed) outcome is a resolution that was 
included in the proxy ballot and voted upon at the general meeting by shareholders at 
the corporate annual meeting. However, a voted outcome does not guarantee that the 
corporation will implement the resolution (Ertimur et al., 2010). Finally, a rejected 
outcome is a resolution that was voted and rejected by the Board and other 
shareholders.  
RQ1c asked about the proportion of shareholder resolutions devoted to social 
issues between 1997 and 2011. Prior research (e.g., Ertimur et al., 2010; Graves et al., 
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2001; Thomas & Cotter, 2007) broadly categorized the issues raised in the shareholder 
resolutions under two categories: corporate governance and corporate social 
responsibility (social resolutions, hereafter). Social resolutions (n = 4,527) included 
issues concerning non-shareholding stakeholders such as community, diversity, 
employee relations, human rights, environment, and product responsibility. While 
corporate governance resolutions (n = 9,744) included issues concerning to shareholder 
profits and rights such as executive compensation, board size, ownership structure, 
mergers and acquisitions, and director accountability. The Risk Metrics dataset 
provided the information about resolution type as corporate governance versus social 
responsibility (SRI). The researcher organized the data to further analyze. 
RQ2 directed the focus on social shareholder resolutions. Specifically, the 
question asked about the landscape of social shareholder resolutions filed between 1997 
and 2011. To address this question, the researcher conducted a set of descriptive 
analyses of the shareholder resolutions regarding social and environmental issues. 
Types of institutional sponsors who filed social shareholder resolutions and outcomes of 
these resolutions were identified.  
RQ3 and its sub-questions inquired about withdrawn social shareholder 
resolutions with a focus on the content and sponsors of withdrawn social resolutions 
submitted between 1997 and 2011. Specifically, RQ3a-b asked about types of issues 
addressed in the withdrawn social resolutions, RQ3c-d asked about types of changes 
requested in the withdrawn social resolutions, and RQ3e-f inquired about types of 
sponsors who withdrew social shareholder resolutions. Prior research documented that 
shareholder activists agreed to withdraw a resolution when they were convinced, in 
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private meetings, that target corporations were committed to take steps toward the issue 
raised in the resolution (e.g., Carleton et al., 1998; Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999; Guay 
et al., 2004). A majority of withdrawn resolutions thus involves some type of 
engagement between the shareholder sponsors and target corporations. However, since 
the communication content of this engagement is not available, withdrawn resolutions 
provide records for researchers that signal shareholder activist-corporate engagement. 
Therefore, the main focus of the analysis was directed to the withdrawn resolutions that 
addressed social issues. The next section explains the procedures for analyzing the 
content of the withdrawn social resolutions. 
Content Analysis of Social Shareholder Resolutions 
After analyzing the scope of social shareholder resolutions in general, the next 
research questions focused the attention on the withdrawn social resolutions (n = 1, 
017). Specifically, RQ3a-b and RQ3c-d were designed to explore the content of social 
shareholder resolutions that were withdrawn by sponsors after shareholder activist-
corporate engagements. As previously described, shareholder resolutions are proposals 
submitted by shareholder for a vote at the corporation’s annual meeting (Guay et al., 
2004). Through filing resolutions, shareholders aim to increase public awareness, to 
engage, and to pressure the target corporation about the issue of concern. This 
dissertation considered each shareholder resolution a communicative document that 
communicated the shareholder’s views and demands in a persuasive way.  
Justification of content analysis methodology. To address RQ3a-b and RQ3c-d, 
two quantitative content analyses were conducted on the withdrawn social resolutions 
(n = 1,017). The quantitative content analysis method is a valuable research technique 
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to gain an objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of 
communication (Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 2005). More recently, Berg (2006) defined 
content analysis as “a careful, detailed, systematic examination and interpretation of a 
particular body of material in an effort to identify patterns, themes, biases, and 
meanings” (p. 304). Some of the common uses of content analysis are describing 
communication content, testing hypotheses of message characteristics, and comparing 
media content to the real world (Wimmer and Dominick, 2006). Content analyses are 
unobtrusive, cost effective, and they can reflect trends in societies (Riffe et al., 2005). 
The content analysis method is central to research in communication (Lombard, 
Snyder-Duch, & Bracken, 2002). Conducting a content analysis of content analyses in 
communication research, Riffe and Freitag (1997) reported an increasing use of content 
analysis due in part to improved access to media content. In public relations research in 
corporate contexts, content analysis is often applied to mediated communication 
between stakeholders and organizations (e.g., Golob & Bartlett, 2007; Hou & Reber, 
2011; Signitzer & Prexl, 2008). Considering shareholder resolutions as one type of 
communication document, this study applies content analysis technique to social 
shareholder resolutions.  
The content analysis methodology, as applied to shareholder resolutions, is 
guided by Kaid and Wadsworth’s (1989) outline. The researchers wrote that any content 
analysis investigation should include at least the following seven steps: 1) Formulate the 
hypotheses or research questions to be answered; 2) Select the sample to be analyzed; 3) 
Define the categories to be applied; 4) Outline the coding process and train the coders 
who will implement it; 5) Implement the coding process; 6) Determine reliability and 
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validity; and 7) Analyze the results of the coding process (pp. 198-199). These steps 
were further discussed for each content analysis. 
Coding and analyzing types of social issues. RQ3a-b inquired about the types of 
issues addressed in withdrawn social resolutions. As previously mentioned, the Risk 
Metrics dataset provides the content of shareholder resolutions and categorize them 
either as corporate governance or as corporate social responsibility. To address RQ3a 
and RQ3b, the researcher first identified all social shareholder resolutions regarding 
corporate social and environmental responsibility issues that were withdrawn between 
1997 and 2011. Then, to determine types of social issues (including environment), the 
researcher manually content analyzed each withdrawn social resolution in the sample (n 
=1,017). A coding sheet was created to ensure “replicability and reliability” of the 
coding procedure (Krippendorff, 2012, p. 366). KLD’s corporate social performance 
dimensions (community, environment, employee relations, human rights, diversity, and 
product responsibility) were used to create the categories for the coding sheet. Because 
KLD evaluates large cap corporations based on their social performance and provides 
ratings for socially responsible investors (Kacperczyk, 2009; Mattingly & Berman, 
2006; Sharfman, 1996; Waddock & Graves, 1997), the KLD corporate social 
performance categories guided the schema for coding types of issues addressed by 
social shareholder activists. In addition, the KLD corporate social performance 
dimensions largely overlap with the Global Reporting Initiative’s (GRI) guidelines for 
social performance (commitment to employment, customer health safety, commitment 
to community, commitment to diversity). The only difference is that the GRI has a 
different environment category that subsumes product/packing responsibility. Based on 
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the coding sheet, withdrawn social resolutions were coded under six categories: 
community, environment, employee relations, human rights, diversity, and product 
responsibility The community category included issues that pertain to the well being of 
a general community, e.g., tobacco use/smoking, violent media content, and political 
donations. The environmental category included issues that pertain to the preservation, 
restoration, and/or improvement of the natural environment, e.g., pollution prevention, 
recycling, and efficient use of energy. The employee category included issues that 
pertain to the well being of employees, e.g., work place safety and MacBride Principles. 
The human rights category included issues, e.g., human rights violations in countries of 
operations. The diversity category mainly included issues about sexual orientation anti-
bias policies and equality principles. Finally, the product responsibility category 
included issues such as product safety and packaging (see Appendix B).  
Coding and analyzing types of requested changes. RQ3c and RQ3d inquired 
about types of changes requested by shareholder activists in the withdrawn social 
resolutions. The literature reviewed in this dissertation suggests that organizations will 
adopt their structures, policies, and operations to conform to societal expectations about 
what structures, policies, and operations are socially acceptable (e.g., DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott et al., 2000; Suchman, 1995). This 
dissertation considered shareholder resolutions as an expression of an expectancy gap 
(Sethi, 1979) between social shareholders and corporations. 
To understand what kinds of social expectations shareholders had from the 
target corporations, it was important to identify specific changes requested in the 
resolutions. To address this question, social shareholder resolutions in the withdrawn 
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sample were coded based on the specific action words and contexts of the resolutions. 
Building on the literature on shareholder activism (Graves et al., 2001; Tkac, 2006), 
organizational conformity (e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Everett, 2001; Scott et al., 
2000), and a preliminary analysis of the shareholder resolutions sample, three categories 
were created: a) structural changes; b) policy/procedural changes; and c) 
communication-based changes. In this context, a structural change request refers to a 
shareholder demand for a long-term shift in the fundamental structure of a target 
corporation. A procedural change request refers to a shareholder demand for a shift in 
the ways a target corporation operates. A communication-based change request refers to 
a shareholder demand for increased corporate social responsibility communication. For 
example, did the resolution ask for establishing a new Board Committee on a social 
issue (structural change), adopting an anti-discrimination policy (policy change), or 
disclosure of information on a certain topic (communication-based)? (For full details, 
see Appendix C: Code Sheet for Types of Requested Changes). 
Intercoder reliability. Communication researchers emphasized the importance of 
establishing and reporting intercoder reliability in content analysis (Lacy & Riffe, 1996; 
Lombard, Synder-Duch, & Bracken, 2002; Riffe & Freitag, 1997; Wimmer & 
Dominick, 2006). In its most simplistic definition, intercoder reliability is the extent to 
which independent coders evaluate a characteristic of a message and reach the same 
conclusion. Tinsley and Weiss (2000) noted that “intercoder agreement” is foundational 
to content analysis, and argued that if coding is not reliable, the analysis cannot be 
trusted (p. 96). A separate pilot test was used to evaluate reliability during coder 
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training before a final test to establish reliability levels for the coding of the full sample 
(Lombard et al., 2002).  
Lacy and Riffe (1996) noted that although 10% of the full sample is acceptable, 
larger reliability samples are required when the full sample is large such as the study 
sample in this dissertation. Because the sample is large in this study, two coders 
independently analyzed 20% of the research sample in order to assess the reliability of 
the coding schemes, (Tinsley & Weiss, 2000, p. 98). The intercoder reliability measure 
was assessed using Krippendorff’s alpha statistic (Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007). The 
intercoder reliability value for coding types of social issues addressed in the withdrawn 
social resolution was .83. The intercoder reliability value for coding types of requested 
changes in the withdrawn social resolution while it was .77. These intercoder reliability 
values were above the acceptable value for this type of test in the communication 
research (α >.70) (Wimmer & Dominick, 2006).  
Study 2: Theoretical Model Testing 
Study 2 further focused the attention on the social shareholder resolutions that 
were withdrawn after shareholder activist-corporate engagements. The study tested two 
theoretical models. The first model tests how corporate stakeholder commitment, issue 
type, and sponsor type affected the probability of withdrawal outcomes. The second 
model used a sample of all withdrawn social shareholder resolutions that requested 
corporations to issue a sustainability report and examines the factors that affect the 
implementation level of these requests by corporations. In the following sections, 
operationalizations of the variables and statistical methods used to address the research 
hypotheses in the models are described. 
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Operationalization of the Variables 
This section describes the variables used in the hypotheses testing. More 
specifically, the section defines the variables and explains how they are operationalized 
in the research models. First, independent (explanatory) variables are described 
followed by control variables. Then dependent variables are described. 
Explanatory variables. Explanatory variables explain the dependent variables of 
the research models:  likelihood of withdrawing of a social shareholder resolution and 
implementation level of a sustainability reporting shareholder resolutions. Advancing 
Mitchell et al.’s (1997) stakeholder saliency theory, Eesley and Lenox (2006) suggested 
that corporate responses to stakeholder activism should be analyzed at three levels—
corporate-level, stakeholder-level, and request-level. To gain a multidimensional 
understanding on corporate responses to shareholder activists that filed social 
resolutions, Eesley and Lenox (2006) was followed. Explanatory variables were 
analyzed at three levels: corporate-level, sponsor (shareholder)-level, and issue 
(request)-level variables. The following sections describe the analytical procedures to 
operationalize the explanatory variables. 
Corporate-level variables. The theoretical models include stakeholder 
commitment and industry classification variables as the main explanatory variables at 
the corporate-level. Corporate stakeholder commitment was operationalized by 
corporate social performance measures.  
Corporate stakeholder commitment. Guided by the literature in organizational 
legitimacy in public relations (e.g., Boyd, 2000; Heath, 2006; Ihlen, van Ruler, & 
Fredriksson, 2009) and the literature in corporate social performance in management 
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(e.g., Clarkson, 1995; Wood, 1991), the study design considered corporate stakeholder 
commitment as the main factor that can explain corporate responses to social 
shareholder activism. H1 and H2 test corporate stakeholder commitment as an 
explanatory variable for the likelihood of withdrawing a social resolution in the first 
model. And, in the second model, H5 and H6 test corporate stakeholder commitment as 
the main factors that affect the target corporation’s implementation level of a social 
resolution.  It was predicted that corporations that are highly committed to community 
and the environment will be more likely to reach withdrawal agreements and with 
sponsor groups and be more responsive to their requests as opposed to corporations 
with poor commitment to their community and environment.  
In this research, stakeholder commitment was measured by corporate social 
performance (CSP). Methodologies to assess CSP in the management literature include 
surveys or interviews with organizational members (Brickson, 2007). However, these 
methodologies are based on social disclosures and personal accounts, which cannot be 
substituted for social performance without supplementary empirical verification 
(Waddock & Graves, 1997). The alternative method is case studies (e.g., Heugens, 
Bosch, & van Riel, 2002). The common problem with the case study methodology is its 
lack of generalizability (Yin, 2011). Because the aim of this particular study is theory 
testing, a better approach to assess corporate social performance was to analyze 
corporate behavior in many instances rather than to study personal beliefs and 
disclosures that are limited to specific contexts. This type of data is not feasible to 
collect for a large-scale study that spans 14-year of time period. Therefore, this 
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dissertation used the Kinder, Lyedenburg, Domini (KLD) corporate social performance 
data to assess corporate social performance of the targeted corporations in the sample. 
The use of KLD data to operationalize corporate social performance (CSP) is 
pervasive in management literature (e.g., David et al., 2007; Hillman & Keim, 2001; 
Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Waddock & Graves, 1997). The database has been evaluated for 
its validity (Sharfman, 1996) and is considered to be one of the best sources available 
for social and environmental performance data (Waddock & Graves, 1997; Kacperczyk, 
2009). Even though the KLD data has been widely used in the organizational and 
management literature, it has also come under criticism because of its social rankings. 
For example, while Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel (2009) found that the KLD 
environmental responsibility measures nicely capture past environmental performance, 
they raised some cautions about the use of other KLD indicators as a good measure of 
social performance (e.g., community, diversity). However, Kacperczyk (2009) argued 
“because the purpose of KLD is to deliver objective information on corporate attention 
to stakeholders to institutional investors, the rating agency has an incentive to remain 
objective rather than politically or ideologically driven” (p. 280). Therefore, many 
studies in management used KLD’s social ratings as a measure of corporate social 
performance and as a measure of attention to stakeholders (David et al., 2007; Hillman 
& Keim, 2001; Kacperczyk, 2009). Indeed, the data has been validated as the best 
available measure of corporate social responsibility (Sharfman, 1996), and it is 
considered as “the gold standard” for measuring corporate social performance 
(Waddock, 2003, p. 371). Many studies used the KLD’s social ratings as a measure of 
corporate social performance and as a measure of attention to different type of 
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stakeholders (e.g., David et al., 2007; Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Hillman & Keim, 2001; 
Kacperczyk, 2009). Hence, recognizing the limitations noted in management research, 
this dissertation used the KLD dataset as a measure of commitment to stakeholders in 
the theoretical models. To the knowledge of the researcher, this dissertation is the first 
study in public relations research that uses KLD dataset to develop and test theoretical 
models. 
KLD provides eight sub-indicators for community strengths and five sub-
indicators for community concerns. If the corporation meets the threshold in each area, 
KLD assigns a value of one. Some researchers tend to simply aggregate strengths and 
concerns in the KLD data to get a single measure (e.g., Graves & Waddock, 1994). 
However, this method can be problematic as the two categories—strengths and 
concerns—are conceptually and empirically distinct constructs. In this dissertation, to 
construct a variable that represent community commitment of a corporation in the 
sample (n = 3,449), the researcher coded corporations for their strengths and concerns 
in the community dimension. If a company has strengths but no concerns in the 
community dimension, then it was given a value of one. For example, if Starbucks 
Corporation (SBUX) had strengths in charitable giving and had no concerns (e.g., 
investment controversies, tax disputes) as reported in KLD for the 1997 and 2011 time 
period, it is was assigned a value of one. 
 Similarly, KLD provides seven sub-indicators for environmental strengths (e.g., 
Pollution Prevention; Recycling) and seven sub-indicators for environmental concerns 
(e.g., Hazardous Waste; Ozone Depleting Chemicals). The sub-indicators demonstrate 
for environmental strengths demonstrate the extent to which the company has 
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environmentally beneficial products and services, uses clean energy, provides open 
communication about its environmental program and engages in extensive recycling. If 
the company meets the threshold in each area, KLD assigns a value of one, or zero 
otherwise. Table 1 shows KLD indicators for corporate community and environmental 
performance. 
***Insert Table 1 about here*** 
To construct a measure of corporate environmental commitment, a variable was created 
to represent a company’s strengths in environmental responsibility. Corporations in the 
sample were coded based on their strengths and concerns in the environmental area. 
Between 1997 and 2011, if a corporation had strengths but no concerns regarding 
environmental performance, it was assigned a value of one. For example, over the study 
time period, if Starbucks Corporation (SBUX) had environmental strengths (e.g., 
pollution prevention, recycling) and had no environmental concerns (e.g., agricultural 
chemicals, hazardous waste), it was assigned a value of one. Using the KLD data thus 
enabled the researcher to obtain a consistent, easily classifiable measure of community 
responsibility performance of the research sample.  
Industry classification. Several studies documented the impact of industry 
classification on a corporate organization’s responses to stakeholder activism (Den 
Hond & Bakker, 2007; Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Reid & Toffel, 2009; Zoller, 2009). 
Building on this literature, H7 in the second model tests the relation between a target 
corporation’s industry categorization and its implementation level of a sustainability-
reporting request. To address this hypothesis, an industry classification variable was 
constructed by using two-digit Standard Industry Code (SIC) for the companies in the 
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sample (Den Hond & Bakker, 2007). The SIC codes indicate the corporation’s type of 
business and they appear in a corporation’s filings with the U.S. Securities Exchange 
Commission. The SEC provides online access to corporate filings through the 
Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval database system (EDGAR). The 
database is freely available to public via the Internet. The SIC codes were obtained by 
searching the SEC database for each company name in the sample 
(http://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/siccodes.htm). To assess potential variations across 
industries in terms of organizational legitimacy concerns, for the purpose of this study, 
only companies in the petroleum, chemical, oil, and gas industry (with SIC codes 
between 2000 & 3999) were included in the analysis. For each target corporation that 
received a social shareholder resolution, a SIC industry code was entered. Following 
Reid and Toffel (2009), corporations in the petro-chemical, oil, and gas industry were 
coded one, while other industries (e.g., consumer goods, financial services) were coded 
zero. For example, Exxon Mobil was a target of a social shareholder resolution in 2007. 
After a search via EDGAR for its SIC code, it was determined that the company 
operates in the oil industry and thus entered a value of one. The next sections directed 
the attention to the variables at sponsor-level and issue-level.  
Issue level variable: Types of issues. The types of issues addressed in the 
shareholder resolutions may affect how corporations respond to these resolutions 
(Eesley & Lenox, 2006). H3 in the first model tests the impact of issue type on 
probability of withdrawing a social resolution. The extant literature on social 
shareholder activism (Graves et al., 2001; Tkac, 2006; Sjorstrom, 2009) suggested that, 
in resolutions, shareholders were concerned about two major issue types—
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environmental and social. Environmental issue-oriented resolutions included topics that 
pertained to the preservation, restoration, and/or improvement of the natural 
environment. Social issue-oriented resolutions included the topics that pertained to the 
lives of people in the society such as education and race/gender discrimination. As such, 
the categories created in answering RQ2 on types of issues in the shareholder 
resolutions were further used to address H3. Specifically, the environmental category in 
RQ2 was kept in order to operationalize the environmental issue-oriented variable. To 
operationalize social-issue oriented variable, a new variable was created by collapsing 
the community, diversity, employee, and human rights categories in RQ2. For each 
corporate social responsibility shareholder resolution in the sample, it was assigned a 
value of 1 if it raised an environmental issue. If the resolution raised a social issue (in 
one of the community, diversity, employee, and human rights categories), it was 
assigned a value of 0. For example, a shareholder resolution asked a target corporation 
to report on water waste, it was coded as environmental issue-oriented and assigned 1. 
However, if a shareholder resolution asked a target corporation to adopt a sexual 
orientation antidiscrimination policy, it was assigned 0. 
Sponsor level variable: Types of sponsors. Prior research has documented that 
the type of sponsors affects the voting outcome of shareholder resolutions (e.g., David 
et al., 2007; Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999; Ertimur et al., 2010; Thomas & Cotter, 
2007). It is possible that different types of shareholder groups will employ different 
types of shareholder activism tactics and exert different levels of pressure on the 
targeted corporations. H4 in the first research model tested the effect of sponsor type on 
the likelihood of withdrawing a social resolution. In the second model, H7 tested the 
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effect of sponsor type on the implementation level of a sustainability reporting 
resolution. This study considered sponsor type as a form of shareholder pressure that 
can push corporations to be responsive to social shareholder resolutions. To address H4 
and H7, categories that were defined in the Risk Metrics data for institutional 
shareholders who filed social shareholder resolutions were used to operationalize the 
effect of sponsor type on probability of a withdrawal outcome. Accordingly, 
shareholder activist groups were organized into six groups: public pension funds (e.g., 
CalPERS, New York City Pension Funds), religious organizations (e.g., Interfaith 
Center on Corporate Responsibility, Adrian Dominican Sisters), socially responsible 
investing fund (SRI) (e.g., Domini Social Investment, Walden Asset Management), 
special interest groups (e.g., PETA), unions (e.g., GBPUMC), and others (e.g., 
foundations, company). Individual shareholders were excluded from the analysis as the 
focus of this study was on institutional shareholder activists. Specifically, H4 and H7 
predicted social resolutions sponsored by public pension funds will be more likely to 
elicit positive responses from target corporations. To test these hypotheses, sponsor type 
information extracted from Risk Metrics dataset for each social shareholder resolution. 
A dummy variable was created for public pension funds that took on value of one if a 
sponsor who filed a social shareholder resolution was a public pension fund, zero 
otherwise.  
Control variables. Financial indicators at corporate-level were controlled in this 
study in order to exclude the effect of these variables on the dependent variables—
withdrawal probability and implementation level. Literature suggested that corporate 
financial performance can affect organizational legitimacy of a corporation; because 
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financial indicators, such as company size, profitability, show effectiveness and 
competence of the corporation (Epstein, 1972, Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Organizational 
financial indicators have not been commonly used in public relations research. Most 
recently, a couple of public relations scholars have recently incorporated financial 
indicators as variables in corporate communication studies (e.g., Kiousis et al., 2007; 
Pang, Jin, & Cameron, 2007; Ragas, 2012). For example, using contingency theory, 
Pang et al. (2007) found that the size of an organization affected how the public 
relations efforts were practiced in the organization.  
Management literature has recognized the effect of financial variables on 
corporate-stakeholder relationships (e.g., Eesley & Lenox, 2006; den Hond & de 
Bakker, 2007; Kacperczyk, 2009; Reid & Toffel, 2009; Rehbein et al., 2004; Thomas & 
Cotter, 2007). These studies were followed to construct the control variables. In Model 
1 (Probability of Withdrawal) the following six financial variables were included 
company size, financial performance, growth opportunities, debt, stock return (financial 
performance), and financial slack. Model 2 (Implementation Level) included company 
size, financial performance, growth opportunities, and debt; however, because the 
sample size in the second model was relatively small (n = 89), financial slack and 
performance were excluded from the analysis. First, the researcher obtained the 
following accounting measures from the COMPUSTAT database. Size was measured 
annually as the natural logarithm of sales. Following prior research in management 
(e.g., Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Kacperczyk, 2009; Waddock & Graves, 1997), 
profitability was measured by the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, 
and amortization to total assets (EBITD/TA). Financial slack of the company was 
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measured as the ratio of total cash holdings to total assets. Growth opportunities were 
measured as the ratio of market value to the book value of the company (Market-to-
Book Ratio). Debt of the company was computed as the ratio of total debt to market 
value of the firm. The researcher used the CRSP dataset to obtain the financial 
performance of the company. Specifically, annual stock return of the company was used 
as a proxy for financial performance. In all models, year effects were included. The 
inclusion of the year control variable enhances the robustness of estimates (Wooldridge, 
2006). 
Dependent Variables 
This part directs the attention to the dependent variables of the theoretical 
models. In the first model the dependent variable is likelihood of a withdrawal, while in 
the second model it is level of implementation. The following sections describe 
operationalizations of the dependent variables in the models. 
Withdrawal probability of a social shareholder resolution.  Prior research has 
suggested that a withdrawal indicates that the targeted corporation and the shareholder 
activists were able to reach an agreement prior to the resolution going to a vote among 
all shareholders or alternatively being challenged at the SEC (e.g., Carleton et al., 1998; 
Doh, 2002; Guay et al., 2004; Logsdon & van Buren, 2008). From the social movement 
theory perspective (Lee & Lounsbury, 2011; Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003), this study 
considered a withdrawn resolution as a desirable outcome for social shareholder 
activism and as a positive corporate response. To assess the likelihood of withdrawing a 
social resolution in the first model, a dichotomous variable called withdrawal outcome 
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was created that took the value of 1 when a social/environmental resolution was 
withdrawn and zero otherwise.  
Implementation level of a withdrawn social shareholder resolution. In the 
second model, the dependent variable assesses whether and to what extent a withdrawn 
social shareholder resolution is implemented by the target company. To analyze the 
level of implementation of a social shareholder resolution, the researcher initially 
identified all social resolutions that requested a clear structural change (e.g., establish a 
Global Sustainability Committee). However, the preliminary analysis showed that there 
were only four resolutions that asked for structural changes. Because the objective of 
the study was to test a theoretical model, a sample with four observations was not 
adequate. Therefore, the researcher turned to the resolutions that requested from target 
corporations to issue a sustainability report. As mentioned earlier, corporate 
sustainability reporting provides a useful context for this particular study because there 
are externally verified and globally recognized levels of corporate sustainability 
reporting through which the researcher could determined the implementation of a 
withdrawn social shareholder resolution that asked for a sustainability report. 
Corporate sustainability reporting shareholder request. Essentially, shareholder 
activists that request from corporations to issue a corporate sustainability report in the 
social resolutions demand for increased corporate communication on corporate social 
responsibility issues. The underlying expectation is that corporations should practice 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) and then they should say they practice CSR 
(Ihlen, Bartlett, & May, 2011). Therefore, through sustainability-reporting resolutions 
social shareholder activists request for communication-based changes. 
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 Prior research in public relations has argued that corporate social responsibility 
or sustainability reports can indeed be an official description of CSR activities of a 
corporation because the practice of reporting on corporate social performance 
demonstrates the corporation’s willingness to be transparent and accountable for its 
stakeholders (Golob & Bartlett, 2007; Ihlen et al., 2011; Signitzer & Prexl, 2008; Weber 
& Marley, 2012). The researcher thus identified all withdrawn social resolutions that 
requested corporations to issue a sustainability report specifically in compliance with 
GRI Guidelines (n = 89).  A typical shareholder resolution that asked for sustainability 
reporting reads as the following:  
RESOLVED:  Shareholders request that the Board of Directors take the steps 
necessary to require the Company’s significant suppliers to each publish an 
annual, independently verifiable sustainability report that the Company makes 
available to its shareholders and stakeholders.  Among other disclosures, reports 
should include the suppliers’ objective assessments and measurements of 
performance on workplace safety, human and worker rights, and environmental 
compliance using internationally recognized standards, indicators and 
measurement protocols. In addition, reports should include incidents of non-
compliance, actions taken to remedy those incidents, and measures taken to 
contribute to long-term prevention and mitigation.  
The researcher identified target corporations of these resolutions and determined the 
implementation levels of corporate sustainability reporting based on the criteria 
described below. 
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Identifying levels of corporate sustainability reporting. The Global Reporting 
Initiative’s (GRI) Sustainability Reporting Guidelines 
(https://www.globalreporting.org) were used as criteria for assessing the 
implementation level of a withdrawn social resolution that asked for sustainability 
reporting. The non-profit organization provides a comprehensive framework for 
organizational sustainability reporting that is globally recognized (Golob & Bartlett, 
2007; Kolk, 2003, 2004; Signitzer & Prexl, 2008; Weber & Marley, 2012). Specifically, 
GRI has developed G3.1 Reporting Guidelines which has two parts: Part 1 provides 
guidance in how to report, and Part 2 features guidance on the content and scope of the 
reporting in the form of Disclosures on Management Approach and Performance 
Indicators. The Performance indicators are organized into three categories: Economic, 
Environmental, and Social. The social category is further categorized into Labor, 
Human Rights, Society, and Product Responsibility subcategories. 
Furthermore, GRI provides Application Levels to determine the level of 
sustainability reporting (https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/G3.1-
Application-Levels.pdf). There are three GRI Application Levels, A, B, and C that 
denote beginner level (C), advance level (A), and somewhere in between (B).  The 
reporting criteria at each level reflect a measure of the extent of application and 
coverage of the GRI Reporting Framework. A reporting organization declares a Level 
based on its own assessment of its report content against the criteria in the GRI 
Application Levels. In addition to self-declaration, reporting organizations receive a 
third party opinion and the GRI check. Only after successfully completing a GRI 
Application Level Check, reporting organizations can include the customized GRI 
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Application Level Check Statement in their report, which incorporates the special GRI-
Check icon. To verify the GRI Application Levels information of the corporations in the 
sample, an additional search was performed through cross-referencing the corporation’s 
Level with the GRI’s Disclosure Database. GRI maintains a website archive for GRI 
based reports of 5,297 organizations with their GRI Content Index and Application 
Levels (http://database.globalreporting.org/search). Therefore, GRI Application Levels 
constituted a reliable source for determining the implementation levels of sustainability 
reporting requests. 
To evaluate the implementation levels of a social shareholder request that asked 
for a sustainability report in compliance with GRI, the researcher developed a coding 
schema based on GRI’s Application Levels with slight modifications. Four levels of 
implementation were created: basic, middle, advanced, and upper. At the time of 
analysis (March 1-21, 2013), if a target corporation did not produce a sustainability 
report, it was assigned a zero. If target corporations produced a sustainability report 
after the resolution withdrawal date, these corporations were categorized into four 
levels. Specifically, if a target company produced a sustainability report at a C level 
which indicates that the report met the basic standards of GRI Guidelines by providing 
Profile Disclosures and a minimum of any 10 Performance Indicators, at least one from 
each of social, economic, and environment; it was assigned a value of one—basic level. 
If a target corporation produced a sustainability report at B level, which indicates that 
the report met the medium standards of GRI Guidelines by providing Profile 
Disclosures, Management Approach Disclosures, and a minimum of any 20 
Performance Indicators, at least one from each of economic, environment, human 
160 
rights, labor, society, and product responsibility; it was assigned a value of two—middle 
level. If a target corporation produced a sustainability report at A level, which indicates 
the report met the advanced standards of GRI Guidelines by providing Profile 
Disclosures, Management Approach Disclosures, and all of Performance Indicators as 
well as Sector Supplement Performance Indicators; it was assigned a value of three—
advanced level.  
  In addition to producing sustainability reports at an advanced level, if a target 
corporation had a committee dedicated to social and environmental responsibility issues 
within its organizational structure, then it was assigned a value of four—Upper level. It 
was important to identify the presence of such committee within the organizational 
structure because it may imply the extent to which a target corporation has a serious 
commitment to improve its social impact on society. For example, some of the purposes 
of Public Responsibility Committee at Procter & Gamble include: 
…overseeing the Company’s social investments and commitment to making a 
meaningful impact around the world, by reviewing strategies and plans for 
improving lives in ways that enable people thrive and that increase their quality 
of living…overseeing the Company’s commitment to and efforts regarding 
environmental sustainability. (P&G Company Board of Directors, 2012). 
To determine the existence of such a committee, the researcher examined corporate 
annual reports filed with the SEC and corporate websites for corporate governance 
information. Corporate annual reports explicitly indicate presence of social 
responsibility committees by labeling of committee names such as “public 
responsibility,” “social responsibility,” “environment health and public safety,” and 
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“sustainability.” In addition, these reports include detailed information about the names 
of committee chairs and members as well as their annual compensations.  
The Application Levels of sustainability reporting were determined by analyzing the 
corporate sustainability reports issued in the following year of resolution withdrawal. 
These reports are available through corporate websites either as downloadable 
documents or as web pages. The researcher first looked for the GRI Application Level 
of the report. If the report did not have a GRI Application Level, then the researcher 
closely examined the content of the report and assigned a level based on the GRI G3 
Sustainability Reporting Reference sheet (See Appendix D for the details on 
Implementation Levels). 
Between 1997 and 2011, there were total 89 withdrawn social resolutions that 
requested target corporations to issue sustainability reports in compliance with GRI 
Reporting Guidelines. Table 2 presents the names of target corporations, sponsors, 
sponsor types, and the levels of implementation ranging from one to four. 
***Insert Table 2 about here*** 
Overall, the target corporations in the sample implemented the sustainability-
reporting request at a slightly above average level (M = 2.31, SD = 1,19). There were 17 
corporations that produced sustainability reports at an advanced level and had a 
sustainability/corporate social responsibility committee in the organizations (upper 
level). There were 23 corporations that produced sustainability reports at an advanced 
level, while there were 27 corporations that produced sustainability reports at a medium 
level. Finally, 15 corporations produced sustainability reports at a basic level. Seven of 
them did not have sustainability reports at the time of analysis. Among the corporations 
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that had sustainability reports, 82 percent (n = 68) adopted GRI guidelines. There were 
14 corporations that produced sustainability reports at either basic or medium levels. 
Types of sponsors examined in this dissertation were well represented in the 
sample. Four types of institutional shareholder activists sponsored sustainability 
reporting resolutions with withdrawal outcomes: socially responsible investing (SRI) 
funds (n = 44), public pension funds (n = 34), religious groups (n = 6), unions (n = 4), 
and special interest group (n = 1). Some of the major SRI fund sponsors included 
Calvert, Domini, and Walden Asset Management, while major public pension funds 
sponsors included New York City Pension Funds and California State Teachers' 
Retirement. In terms of the corporations that received sustainability reporting 
shareholder resolutions, it was found that target corporations varied in terms of their 
industries, with more resolutions targeted at corporations that operated in the field of 
energy, electric, mining, chemicals, gas, and oil were the primary targets of these 
resolutions (%59). The next section described the data analysis methods. 
Data Analysis 
Several statistical analyses were used to address research questions and to test 
hypotheses. To address research questions (RQ1-3), a set of descriptive statistical 
analyses were performed. Additionally, to address RQ3 and its sub-questions on types 
of issues and types of requested changes in the withdrawn social resolutions, a set of 
quantitative content analyses was performed. To assess the research hypotheses in the 
first model (H1-H4), a set of maximum likelihood probit models were estimated. To 
address research hypotheses on level of implementation (H5-H8), a set of ordinary least 
square (OLS) regression analyses were performed. 
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Model 1: Probit model analysis. A probit model is a common specification for 
an ordinal or binary dependent variable model in econometrics (e.g., Geweke, Keane, & 
Runkle, 1994; Denham, 2002; Long & Freese, 2005). A probit analysis transforms a 
sigmoid (S-shape) response curve into a straight line that can then be analyzed by 
regression either through least squares or maximum likelihood (Long, 1997; 
Wooldridge, 2009). That is, in the probit model, the inverse standard normal 
distribution of the probability is modeled as a linear combination of the predictors. A 
probit model takes the following form: 
                                        Pr (Y = 1 X) = Ф(X'β) 
where Pr refers to probability and Ф is the Cumulative Distribution Function of the 
standard normal distribution. The parameters β are computed by maximum likelihood.  
The power of probit analysis as a statistical method has been long established in 
econometrics and statistical analysis research (see, for example, Agresti, 1990; Ashford 
& Sowden, 1970, Long, 1997; Keane, 1992). In particular, probit models are useful in 
social sciences as many research situations involve the dependent (outcome) variable 
(Y) as dichotomous (e.g., legislator votes: yes/no) (Denham, 2002). In these situations, 
the dependent variable can only have the value of 0 or 1. That is, 
                                         Yi  Є {0, 1} 
In his book Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables, Long 
(1997) explained that a probit model transforms a dichotomous dependent variable into 
a continuous variable. More specifically, a link function F(Y) takes a dichotomous Y and 
gives a continuous value of Y'. 
                              Yi Є {-∞, ∞} 
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 Thus, the specification can be run as the following: 
                                 F(Y) = Y' = Xβ + ε 
In a sense, Y is transformed into a probability of Y between 0 and 1. Given any 
real value it produces a number (probability) between 0 and 1; the dependent variable is 
redefined based on the cumulative normal distribution (Z-score). In other words, the 
value of an independent variable (Xβ) is taken to be the z-value of a normal distribution. 
It is important to note that interpretation of probit test statistics is somewhat different 
than regression analysis.  After running a probit analysis, the output of the analysis will 
show the coefficients, their standard errors, the z-statistic (a Wald z-statistic), and the 
associated p-values that allow the researcher to evaluate the goodness of fit of the 
model. Denham (2002) explained that first one must consider the probability level for 
the likelihood ratio chi-square coefficient. If the model tested has a probability level 
near .50, it is generally is considered a good fit (Denham, 2002; Long, 1997). When 
interpreting the results, it should be noted that the probit regression coefficients give the 
change in the z-score for a one unit change in the predictor (Long, 1997).  
Justification of probit modeling methodology. A probit model is thus a powerful 
statistical analysis because it allows redefining the dependent variable in continuous 
variable (McCulloch & Rossi, 1994). Yet, some scholars criticize probit models because 
of their structures, arguing that these models are too complicated to be applicable in 
practice (Hausman & Wise, 1978). Woolridge (2006) also discussed some sample 
selection problems (pp. 576-578). Ordinary least square (OLS) regression can be also 
used with a binary response variable, constructing a linear probability model. However, 
Long (1997) noted that “the errors (residuals) from the linear probability model violate 
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the homoscedasticity and normality of errors assumptions of OLS regression,” resulting 
in invalid standard errors and hypothesis tests (p. 38). In addition, probit and logit 
models provide better estimates for large samples than OLS regression because they use 
maximum likelihood estimation techniques (Long, 1997).  
McCulloch and Rossi (1994) wrote that both OLS and maximum likelihood are 
acceptable techniques to fitting the regression, but maximum likelihood is preferred 
because it gives a more precise estimation of necessary parameters for correct 
evaluation of the results. The probit model assumes that while only the values 0 and 1 
for the variable Y are observed, there is a latent, unobserved continuous variable Y' that 
determines the value of Y. The prediction of a dependent variable (Y) is interpreted as a 
prediction of the probability that Y takes on the value 1 as a response to the independent 
variables (X). That is, probit estimates attempt to predict the effect of changes in an 
independent variable on the probability that the dependent variable takes the value 1 (Pr 
(Yi = 1). Y' is the variable of interest, though it is unobserved. The probit analysis thus 
holds the basic OLS assumptions that it is linear in the independent variables 
(Woolridge, 2006). Changes in the independent variables are assumed to have a 
constant affect on the dependent variable.  
Denham (2002) wrote that log-linear modeling, such as probit analysis, is 
advantageous in that it allows researchers “to fit the most parsimonious model to the 
data under study and thus offer an accurate explanation of the relationships between 
variables” (p. 165). Therefore, recognizing the potential statistical issues associated 
with the probit models, this study employed a probit analysis for the first model to 
address H1 through H4, because the outcome variable (withdrawal) is a dichotomous 
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variable (withdrawn or not), and the research design deals with large, cross-sectional 
data. In these cases, a probit model analysis is the right statistical model for assessing 
research hypotheses (Long, 1997; Woolridge, 2006, p. 575). Furthermore, previous 
studies on corporate responses to stakeholder requests have commonly used probit 
models to assess model specifications (see, for example, David, Bloom, & Hillman, 
2007; Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Kacperczyk, 2009; Thomas & Cotter, 2007). For 
example, Eesley and Lenox (2006) estimated the likelihood that a corporation would 
positively respond to a stakeholder request through a probit model. Similarly, 
Kacperczyk (2009) examined the effect of takeover protection on corporation attention 
to stakeholders through a probit model (see p. 272). In a recent study on shareholder 
resolutions, Ertimur et al. (2010) examined board of directors’ responsiveness to 
shareholders through a probit model as well. More specifically, the researchers 
estimated a maximum likelihood probit model to analyze probability of a majority vote 
(Y) using binary regressors (X). 
In communication research, probit analysis has been less frequently used than in 
management research. Indeed, in a Journal of Communication article, Denham (2002) 
discussed applications of advanced categorical statics in communication research. 
Indicating a high reliance on cross-tabulation and chi-square analysis in communication 
research, Denham argued that communication research would greatly benefit from 
advanced categorical statistics such as log-linear modeling, probit and logit regression 
analyses. According to Denham probit and logit regression procedures allow scholars 
“to fit both theoretically driven and mathematically parsimonious models to the data 
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under study and to avoid making statistical errors common bivariate comparisons” (p. 
162).  
Probit modeling has been widely used in health communication research (e.g., 
Hutchinson et al, 2006; Jones, Denham, & Springston, 2007). For example, using a 
cross-sectional data, Hutchinson et al. (2006) performed a set of probit maximum 
likelihood models to estimate recall of a health campaign symbol among the sample. 
The researchers reported marginal effects and their standard errors for interpreting the 
power of the tests. In public relations research, when estimating probability, linear 
discriminant analysis (LDA) seems to be more commonly used than probit and logit 
models (e.g., Ledignham & Bruning, 1998; Taylor, Kent, & White, 2001). LDA is 
similar to probit analysis in that it attempts to find a linear combination of features and 
that it has categorical dependent variable (Wooldridge, 2006). 
Probit model specifications. In the first model, the dependent variable is whether 
a social/environmental resolution is withdrawn or not. Model 1 estimates the probability 
of withdrawal in the following formats: 
Pr (Wit = 1) = Ф (β1Cit-1 + β2Xit-1 + εi)                                           (1) 
Pr (Wit = 1) = Ф (β3Eit-1 + β4Xit-1 + εi)                                           (2)     
Pr (Wit = 1) = Ф (β5Iit-1 + β6Xit-1 + εi)                 (3) 
Pr (Wit = 1) = Ф (β7Sit-1 + β8Xit-1 + εi)                                            (4) 
                                                
where W indexes withdrawals, i indexes the corporation, and t is the year. Wit is a 
dummy variable taking the value of one if a social/environmental shareholder resolution 
was withdrawn at time t in Equations 1, 2, 3, and 4. In Equation 1 and Equation 2 the 
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explanatory variables that measure the effects of corporate social performance are the 
company’s community commitment performance (Cit-1) and the company’s 
environmental commitment performance (Eit-1), respectively. In Equation 3, the 
explanatory variable is issue type (Iit-1), while in Equation 4, the explanatory variable 
is sponsor type (Sit-1). The vector of control variables, Xit-1, includes company size, 
profitability, financial slack, growth opportunities, debt, and financial performance. εi is 
the error term.  
 Model 2: Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis. In second model, to 
address (H5-H8) level of implementation, a series of ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression analyses were performed. The second model estimates the likelihood of 




where the dependent variable (Y) is Implementation Level of corporate sustainability 
reporting, i indexes the target corporation and t is the year. Implementation Level is a 
linear function of Environmental Responsibility Performance of the target corporation 
(Eit), Sponsor Type who filed the shareholder resolution, Industry Classification of the 
target corporation (Oil&Gas Industry), and the control variables, Xit-1, which includes 
company size, profitability, financial slack, growth opportunities, debt, and financial 
performance. εit is the error term.  
Minimizing data analysis problems. Heterodaskedascity and serial correlation in 
the error term can bias the standard errors of regression co-efficient which may lead to 
incorrect inferences (Mella & Kopalle, 2002; Stewart, 1987; Woolridge, 2006). Before 
Implementation Level = b0 +b1Eit +b2Sponsor Type+b3Oil&Gas Industry+b4Xit-1 +eit
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performing the actual analyses, the researcher looked for the problems of 
heterodaskedascity and serial correlation, and performed necessary tests to detect and 
address these problems. The OSL residuals were tested for heteroskedasticity using a 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook Weisberg test and whenever the null hypothesis of constant 
variance was rejected, the Huber-White sandwich estimator was used, which provides 
consistent standard errors in the presence of heteroskedasticity (White, 1980). After 
each regression estimation, variance inflation factors (VIF) were checked to ensure the 
average values were well under two and the condition number of the design matrix was 
well under 30, which suggests multicollinearity did not pose a problem (Mella & 
Kopalle, 2002). Given the possible multicollienairty problems among the environmental 
performance, petro-chemical industry, and company size variable in the second model, 
variables on withdrawal status were regressed and obtained a mean variance inflation 
factor of 1.06, which was below the commonly accepted threshold (Mella & Kopalle, 
2002; Wooldridge, 2006). Because some corporations received more than one 
resolution per year, the observations were not statistically independent. To address this 
potential source of heteroskedasity, robust standard errors were computed by clustering 
the observations by corporation (Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Kacperczky, 2009; Woolridge, 
2006). The researcher followed prior studies to address this problem by clustering the 
observations by corporation. 
Justification of use of regression analysis. Regression analysis via OLS is a 
commonly applied statistical technique in social sciences including communication. A 
regression analysis can explain how the typical value of the dependent variable changes 
when the value of any independent variables is altered while the other independent 
170 
variables are held fixed (Wooldridge, 2006). In addition to OLS regression analysis, 
because the dependent variable—level of implementation—is an ordinal variable that 
takes on four values, a cross-sectional logit regression analysis was performed.  A 
logistic model is a type of probit model with multivariate variables (Long, 1997). 
Estimating the odds of an event happening, the logit function allows working with 
multinomial dependent variables. The results of both OLS and cross-sectional logit 
analysis were compared to obtain the most robust model. 
To run the probit and regression analyses, the statistical package STATA 11.0 
was used. The probit analysis was conducted using the probit command (Long & 
Freese, 2005). Logit analysis was conducted using the logit command (Long & Freese, 
2005). OLS regression was performed using the regress command. Because the Risk 
Metrics is a hierarchically structured data set, that is, the same company could be 
involved in multiple stakeholder resolutions; cluster option in STATA was used. This 
function computes standard errors by clustering the observations by corporation.  
Study 3: An Illustrative Case Study 
After Study 1 provided a foundation to understand the nature and scope of social 
shareholder activism via resolutions, Study 2 tested test two theoretical models that 
explain the factors that affect corporate responses to social shareholder resolutions. 
Finally, Study 3 was a case study that illustrated the process of implementing a change 
as a result of a social shareholder resolution that was filed and later withdrawn by a 
public pension fund. Conceptually, this dissertation holds that organizations would 
make structural and procedural arrangements in order to be congruent with societal 
demands (e.g., Cutlip et al., 2000; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Everett, 2001; Scott et 
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al., 2000; Suchman, 1995). A case study has potential to enhance the understanding of 
how a social shareholder resolution may create not only procedural and communication-
based changes but also structural changes. A closer look at the interactions between a 
shareholder activist-corporate engagement will also provide some insights into how 
Boyd’s (2000) actional legitimacy plays out in day-to-day public relations activities of 
both corporations and sponsors regarding the proposed change.   
Justification of case study methodology. Case study is an essential form of social 
science research that provides an intensive analysis of an individual unit such as a 
person, an event or an organization (Yin, 2011). Case study method is widely used in 
public relations research as well (e.g., Veil & Kent, 2008). Case studies illuminate and 
explicate the subject of the inquiry (Thomas, 2011). There are four types of cases 
studies: illustrative, exploratory (or pilot case study) cumulative, and critical. An 
illustrative case study is a descriptive study that utilizes one or two instances of an event 
to illustrate the research phenomenon (Yin, 2011, p. 39). Case studies may involve 
several data sources such as documents, archival records, and artifacts depending on the 
subject of the case study (Yin, 2011, pp. 10-14). Yin explained that when selecting a 
subject for a case study, researchers should use information-based sampling, rather than 
random sampling. Often, a case is selected as a key case that can shed light on the 
research phenomena at hand (Yin, 2011).  
The case: CONSOL Energy Inc. and NYC Public Pension Funds. The current 
study analyzed a shareholder activist-corporate engagement case in which a withdrawn 
shareholder resolution elicited a structural change within the organization. The case 
involved a social resolution sponsored by New York City Public Pension Funds, a 
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public pension fund, in which the funds requested CONSOL Energy Inc., the targeted 
corporation, to issue a sustainability report. This case sets an excellent context for this 
dissertation as the factors involved with the engagement exemplifies the main variables 
in the theoretical models (sponsor type/public pension, industry classification/petro-
chemical, gas, and energy). 
The written correspondence documents (e.g., shareholder letters, no-action 
letters) between the sponsor and the target corporation were analyzed. Corporate filings 
(e.g., proxy statements, no-action letters) were obtained from the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s Electronic Data-Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) 
system. The SEC requires that all shareholder resolution materials should be filed with 
EDGAR (http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml). A proxy statement is a statement required 
of a corporation when soliciting shareholder support via votes (Smith, 2012). The proxy 
statement, also known as a Form DEF 14A, is required to be filed with SEC before the 
annual meeting. This statement should include information regarding CEO and board 
compensation, voting procedure and information, audit committee structure and 
payment (Mahoney, 1991). A no-action letter is filed by target corporations to the SEC 
when they request the permission to exclude the resolution from the proxy vote. Most 
no-action letters “describe the request, analyze the particular facts and circumstances 
involved, discuss applicable laws and rules, and request that the SEC staff would not 
recommend that the Commission take enforcement action against the requester” (SEC, 
No Action Letters, 2013, p. 1).  
In addition to the SEC filings, public relations materials published by the target 
corporation and the sponsor organization were analyzed. CEO letters, annual reports, 
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and sustainability reports are fundamental component of financial public relations 
(Mahoney, 1991; Smith, 2012).  A CEO letter is a letter written by a corporation’s top 
executives to its shareholders to provide a board overview of the corporation’s 
operations throughout the year (Mahoney, 1991). The letter generally covers the 
corporation’s basic financial performance, its current position in the market, and some 
of its future plans. An annual report is “a formal corporate progress report issued by 
corporations and other organizations” (Smith, 2012, p. 242). In addition, other public 
relations documents such as website communication, news releases, and press briefings 
were analyzed.  
For the resolution topic (sustainability reporting) and corporate name, a search 
was conducted of the EDGAR database using the name of the corporation over the 
period of time 2010-2012. This period of time was specified because it captures the 
beginning of the shareholder-corporate engagement and the implementation date of the 
proposed change. A total of three corporate letters, two shareholder letters, one no-
action letter, three annual reports (2010-2012), two sustainability reports (2011-2012) 
and two proxy statements were obtained and analyzed in the case study.  In addition to 
corporate communication, sponsor communication on its shareholder activism was 
examined (e.g., organizational website, press releases, Proxy Postseason Reports). 
To find out whether the parties sought for publicity over the shareholder activist-
corporate engagement, searches of the Factiva and Lexis Nexis databases of news 
content was conducted for news media outlets. The databases are available through OU 
university libraries. The resolution topic, sponsor name, and corporate name were used 
for each media outlet to search for the case from 2011 to 2012. The search included the 
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headline, lead, and the body of all news stories that were substantively concerned with 
the shareholder resolution and the corporate response to the resolution, including hard 
news stories and soft stories (e.g., editorials and letters to the editor). The search string 
“CONSOL Energy AND NYC Public Pension Funds” was used to search the news 
stories that were published in the media outlets during the specified time period. 
Summary of the Methodological Approaches 
This chapter laid the methodological grounds for the analytical portion of this 
dissertation. Study 1 attempted to map the landscape of social shareholder activism 
through filing resolutions between 1997 and 2011. Through RQ1and its sub-questions, a 
series of descriptive analyses aimed to identify the major issues, sponsors, and 
outcomes of all shareholder resolutions for the studied period. Next, attention was 
directed to social shareholder resolutions filed between 1997 and 2011. To address 
RQ2, a descriptive analysis of social shareholder resolutions was performed with a 
focus on sponsors and outcomes. To address RQ3 and its sub-questions (RQ3a-d) 
descriptive analyses and two content analyses of withdrawn social resolutions were 
conducted in order to provide a deeper understanding of the social topics that concerned 
institutional shareholders and the changes that they demanded from corporations. To 
address RQ3e-f on types of sponsors, withdrawn social resolutions were analyzed by 
organizational types of sponsoring institutional shareholders. Thus, by addressing the 
research questions (RQ1-RQ3), the first section prepared a foundation for hypothesis 
testing in Study 2.  
Study 2 tested two theoretical models to explain and predict the factors that 
affect corporate responses to social shareholder resolutions. Specifically, Model 1 (H1-
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H4) tested the effects of corporate stakeholder commitment, as measured by corporate 
social performance values, issue type, and sponsor type on the likelihood of 
withdrawing a social resolution by performing a set of probit model analyses. In Model 
2 (H5-H8), the effects of corporate stakeholder commitment, industry classification, and 
sponsor type on the implementation level of a social shareholder resolution are tested 
through a set of OLS regression analyses and logistic analyses. 
Finally, Study 3 analyzed a case study to illustrate how a withdrawn social 
shareholder resolution can elicit changes within a targeted corporation. Specifically, the 
case study illustrated the extent to which a target corporation implemented the proposed 
change requested in a social shareholder resolution and communicated the implemented 
changes to stakeholders. The case thus aimed to demonstrate the viability of social 
shareholder activism practiced through filing resolutions to improve society at large by 
pressuring corporations to improve their corporate social performance. Appendix E 
provides a list of the research questions and hypotheses along with their corresponding 






CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS 
 
This chapter presents findings of this dissertation. From a societal perspective, 
this dissertation analyzes social pressures on corporations exerted by shareholders—a 
stakeholder group that possesses power, legitimacy, and urgency (Agle et al., 1999; 
Mitchell et al., 1997). Specifically, the dissertation examines social shareholder 
resolutions—those that were concerned with corporate social and environmental 
responsibility issues—filed by institutional shareholder activists under the SEC rule 
14a-8 as a formal mechanism by which shareholders can propose changes regarding 
social performance of corporations. The main focus of the dissertation was directed to 
the social resolutions that were withdrawn by sponsors before the annual meetings, 
which reflects a process of engagement between shareholder activists and target 
corporations managers to reach an agreement. Several methods were used to analyze the 
data and assess the research questions and hypotheses that guided this investigation. 
The task of reporting the findings was undertaken in three sections. 
The first section, Study 1: Descriptive Statistics and Content Analyses of 
Shareholder Resolutions, presented the basic descriptive statistical analysis of all 
shareholder resolutions as well as the descriptive and content analysis of social 
shareholder resolutions filed by institutional shareholders at publicly traded U.S. 
corporations during the time period of 1997-2011. Specifically, this section reported the 
findings for RQ1-RQ3. 
The second section, Study 2: Theoretical Model Testing included two parts. The 
first part, Withdrawal Probability of Social Shareholder Resolutions, reported the 
findings of the model testing that predicted the likelihood of withdrawing a social 
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resolution. This section presented the results of a series of probit analyses that examined 
the effects of explanatory variables at three levels: corporate-level (stakeholder 
commitment of target corporations), issue-level (issue type), and sponsor-level (sponsor 
type). This part reported the results of H1-H4 on the likelihood of withdrawing a social 
resolution. 
The second part, Implementation Level of Social Shareholder Resolutions, 
focused on the key question of whether target corporations indeed implemented social 
changes proposed in the withdrawn social shareholder resolutions. Focusing on 
sustainability-reporting requests in the withdrawn social resolution sample, this section 
reported the results of a series of OLS regression analyses that tested research 
hypotheses for the second model on the effects of corporate stakeholder commitment, 
industry classification, and sponsor type on the implementation level of the 
sustainability-reporting request (H5-H8). 
Finally, the third section, Study 3: Case Study: CONSOL Energy Inc. and NYC 
Public Pension Funds, presents a critical case study on the aftermath of a withdrawn 
social resolution filed by New York City Pension Fund at CONSOL Energy. The case 
study thus illustrated the extent of a series of changes in a target corporation following a 
withdrawal of a social resolution.  
Study 1: Descriptive Statistics and Content Analysis Findings 
This section presented the basic descriptive statistical analysis of shareholder 
resolutions filed by institutional investors at publicly traded U.S. corporations during 
the time period of 1997-2011. The section first reported the results of the analyses on all 
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shareholder resolutions, followed by the results of social shareholder resolutions and 
withdrawn social resolutions. 
All Shareholder Resolutions, 1997-2011 
This section provides a landscape of shareholder resolutions in order to lay a 
foundation to understand social shareholder activism via filing resolutions. To address 
RQ1and its sub-questions RQ1a-c, all shareholders resolutions filed at U.S. publicly 
traded corporations between 1997 and 2011 were analyzed. RQ 1 asked about a 
landscape of all shareholder resolutions filed between 1997 and 2011. Figure 5 displays 
the distribution of all shareholder resolutions filed at U.S. corporations over the time 
period of 1997-2011.  
***Insert Figure 5 Here*** 
Shareholders filed total 14,271 resolutions during the 14-year period. On 
average, 951 resolutions were submitted each year. The annual number of resolutions 
has remained relatively stable over time, ranging from 755 in 2011 to 1,160 in 2007. 
Figure 1 shows that there was a steady increase in the number of resolutions between 
2001 and 2006. The number of resolutions reached at its peak in 2007 (n = 1,160). This 
record number of resolutions may imply the increasing discontent of shareholders with 
the overall corporate performance before the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, which is 
considered one of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s 
(Reuters, 2009). In the following years of the crisis, the number of resolution steadily 
decreased. Indeed, one notable trend was the decreasing number of resolution in recent 
years. This decrease can be partly explained by the rise of an engagement-based 
approach to shareholder activism in recent years discussed in the aforementioned 
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literature (Guay et al., 2004; MacLeod, 2009; Mathiasen, Mell, & Gallimore, 2012; 
Sjorstrom, 2008). Furthermore, new media technologies with their networking 
capabilities, such as social media, may have increased the awareness and ability of 
shareholders to coordinate actions giving them more leverage in the engagement 
process with the target corporations. 
Types of institutional sponsors in all shareholder resolutions. RQ1a asked about 
types of sponsors who filed shareholder resolutions at corporations. Figure 8 provides a 
distribution of resolutions by sponsor type over the time period between 1997 and 2011. 
Shareholder groups engaged in filing resolutions covered a wide spectrum, from 
churches to large public pension funds. The shareholders who submitted resolutions 
were organized into six categories: public pension funds, socially responsible investing 
(SRI) funds, unions, religious organizations, special interest groups, and other (an 
umbrella category including sponsor groups that do not fall within one of the six 
categories above, such as foundations, asset managers, and endowments).  
Figure 6 presents distribution of all shareholder resolutions by sponsor type. The 
figure shows that unions were the major sponsor groups of all shareholder resolutions. 
They filed 45% of the resolutions between 1997 and 2011.  
***Insert Figure 6 Here*** 
Unions such as AFL-CIO (The American Federation of Labor and Congress of 
Industrial Organizations), the Service Employees International Union, Amalgamated 
Bank’s LongView Funds, International Brotherhood of Du Pont Workers, and United 
Steel Workers of America pursued an active agenda concentrated on labor and corporate 
political contribution issues, as demonstrated in the tests of resolutions.  
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Religious organizations were also prominent figure in filing resolutions (24%). 
The most active religious shareholder group was Interfaith Center on Corporate Social 
Responsibility (ICCR), Jewish Voice for Peace, Episcopal Church, Sisters of Charity of 
St. Elizabeth, and Sisters of Mercy. Filing total 537 shareholder resolutions over the 
study time period, ICCR was the leading figure among religious shareholder sponsors. 
Most recently, ICCR representatives noted that they were cutting back on resolution 
filings in favor of engagement with companies (Mathiasen, Mell, & Gallimore, 2012), 
which may explain the overall decrease in the number of resolutions in recent years. 
SRI funds—asset management funds that seek to consider both financial return and 
social good—were also well represented sponsor type of shareholder resolutions. The 
SRI funds filed 15% of the total resolutions during the time period of 1997 and 2011. 
Further, the most active SRI sponsors were Walden Asset Management, Trillium Asset 
Management, Domini Social, and Calvert funds.  
The analysis showed that 8% of all resolutions were filed by public pension 
funds. This number was relatively low compared to union or religious group 
shareholder activism. In the study sample, the most active public pension shareholder 
was New York City Pension Funds filing resolutions regarding both governance and 
social issues (n = 894). The fund was particularly active in getting the corporations to 
include sexual orientation as a secure category in their Equal Employee Opportunity 
(EEO) statements. The California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalPERS), was 
active in filing resolutions regarding both social and governance issues.  
Special interest groups sponsored 4% of the resolutions over the study period 
(Figure 6). Special interest groups have been traditionally involved with social issues. 
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The most active special interest shareholder groups were Human Society of the US, 
PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals), Sierra Club, and National Center 
for Public Policy Research.  These sponsors are activist groups with already established 
social-issue agenda. For these groups, filing shareholder resolution is just another 
channel to engage corporations about their issue agendas.  
There are also special interest groups that are formed solely for the purpose of 
social shareholder activism around an emerging issue such as GE Stockholders ’ 
Alliances against Nuclear Power and As You Sow Foundation. For example, As You 
Sow describes its mission as “to promote environmental and social corporate 
responsibility through shareholder advocacy, coalition building, and innovative legal 
strategies” (As You Sow, 2013). In 2011, As You Sow focused six of its 13 resolutions 
on recycling. The organization also filed resolutions regarding fracking and coal risk. A 
broad picture of shareholders who sponsored resolutions thus presents a wide spectrum 
of shareholder groups with various issue agendas. 
The outcomes of all shareholder resolutions. RQ1b inquired about the outcomes 
of all shareholder resolutions. This part of the analysis focuses on the final disposition 
of shareholder resolutions as indicators of corporate responses to shareholder activism.  
Figure 7 displays distribution of all resolution outcomes per year between 1997 and 
2011. 
***Insert Figure 7 Here*** 
Figure 7 shows that roughly half of all resolutions (42%) were taken to a 
shareholder vote (58% of the resolutions were rejected). Voted (passed) resolutions 
accounted for only 3% of the resolutions. Shareholders showed the highest level of 
182 
voting support for resolutions (n = 133) in 2009. Between 1997 and 2011, nearly 18% 
of resolutions were omitted via petitioning of the SEC, and 21% of resolutions were 
withdrawn (n = 2,943). This suggests that SEC omissions are a challenge for 
shareholder activists who want to engage corporations about a social issue. Notably, 
after 2001, the number of withdrawn resolutions was higher than the omitted or voted 
ones. Shareholder activists withdrew the highest number of resolutions in 2007  
(n = 308). To visualize the outcomes of all resolutions between 1997 and 2011, Table 3 
further provides the frequencies and percentages of resolution outcomes. 
***Insert Table 3 Here*** 
The outcomes of shareholder resolutions are expected to vary across sponsor 
types (Ertimur et al., 2010; Thomas & Cotter, 2007). Figure 8 provides ratios of all 
resolution outcomes by sponsor type: public pension fund, SRI fund, religious 
organization, special interest group, union, and other (e.g., endowments, foundations, 
company).  
***Insert Figure 8 Here*** 
 Figure 8 shows that unions had the higher percentages in the withdrawn and 
voted outcomes (26%). Resolutions filed by public pension funds also had high 
withdrawal outcomes (18%). The figure shows that the lower levels of withdrawal rates 
were for special interests groups (1%) and other category (0.7%), while the higher 
levels were withdrawal rates for unions (26%), public pension funds (18%), SRI funds 
(12%), and religious organizations (11%).  
Proportion of shareholder resolutions devoted to social issues. RQ1c inquired 
about the proportion of resolutions devoted to social issues in the all resolutions filed 
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between 1997 and 2011. As described in the Methodology chapter, issues raised in the 
shareholder resolutions were grouped into two categories: corporate governance and 
social (corporate social responsibility) resolutions. Corporate governance resolutions 
mainly addressed the issues regarding board (e.g., board composition, director 
independence and qualifications), defense (e.g., removal of anti-takeover measures), 
executive compensation (e.g., severance packages, accounting options, levels of CEO 
pay), and shareholder rights (e.g., confidential voting, cumulative voting). Social 
resolutions concerned issues regarding antidiscrimination policies, impact on the natural 
environment, political contributions, human rights, health care, employee well being, 
smoking/tobacco, charitable contributions, and reproductive issues. The analysis 
showed that, out of 14, 271 shareholder resolutions, 9,744 (86%) were concerned with 
corporate governance issues, while 4,527 (32%) were concerned with social issues. 
Figure 9 provides the number of corporate governance and social resolutions filed per 
year between 1997 and 2011. 
***Insert Figure 9 Here*** 
A few features of the data stand out in Figure 9. Each year, the number of 
corporate governance resolutions was higher than social resolutions. On average, 
shareholders submitted 649 governance resolutions each year between 1997 and 2011, 
ranging from 805 in 2007 to 453 in 2011. There were 505 governance resolutions 
submitted in 2001, while this number was half for social resolutions (n = 242). The 
highest number of social resolution was filed in 2007 (n = 805). Notably, in 2007 the 
number of all filed shareholder resolutions was highest (n = 1,160). Overall, 
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shareholders were more active in corporate governance issues than social issues 
between 1997 and 2011. 
Figure 10 provides the ratio of social and governance resolution to total number 
of shareholder resolutions. Specifically, the ratio of governance resolutions was higher 
than social resolutions each year between 1997 and 2011. Notably, the ratio of social 
resolutions increased in 2011, while the ratio of governance resolutions decreased in the 
same year. 
***Insert Figure 10 Here*** 
In sum, the results of the descriptive analyses so far addressed RQ1a, RQ1b, and 
RQ1c on all shareholder resolutions filed by institutional shareholders over the time 
period of 1997 and 2011. It was important to gain a clear picture of shareholder 
activism in general to compare the scope and nature of social shareholder activism in 
specific. The findings suggested that shareholder activism is focused on corporate 
governance issues rather than social issues. About 32% of shareholder resolutions were 
devoted to social issues. Major types of institutional sponsors who filed shareholder 
resolutions were unions, religious groups, public pension funds, SRI funds, and special 
interest groups. Unions were the most active sponsor type in filing shareholder 
resolutions followed by religious groups. Overall, shareholder resolutions received low 
support over the study period of time. The number of withdrawn resolutions was 
slightly higher than the omitted resolutions. Resolutions that were filed by unions had 
the most withdrawal outcome, followed by public pension funds. Since 2007 there has 
been a decrease in the number of resolutions filed in both social and corporate 
governance issue areas. This section thus provided a launch pad for analyzing social 
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shareholder resolutions that were withdrawn after shareholder activist-corporate 
engagements. The next section reports the answers of research questions on social 
shareholder resolutions and withdrawn social resolutions. 
Social Shareholder Resolutions, 1997-2011 
RQ2 directed the attention to social shareholder resolutions. The question asked 
about the landscape of social shareholder resolutions 1997 and 2011. Figure 11 provides 
distributions of social shareholder resolutions outcomes by sponsor types. The figure 
shows that public pension funds (27%) and SRI funds (21%) were major sponsors of 
withdrawn social resolutions. Religious groups were also well represented in the 
withdrawal outcome (19%). Unions seemed to lag behind in terms of reaching 
withdrawal agreements.  
It is important to note that this preliminary analysis only provides the 
percentages of withdrawal outcomes by these sponsors. Additional analyses are 
required to examine the probability of having a withdrawal outcome depending on 
sponsor type. This topic will be addressed in the Withdrawal Probability of Social 
Resolutions part in the next section.  
***Insert Figure 11 Here*** 
Withdrawn Social Shareholder Resolutions, 1997-2011 
The main focus of this dissertation was withdrawn social resolutions. Prior 
research has indicated that majority of withdrawn resolutions resulted from engagement 
between the shareholder activists and the corporate managers, and that in the majority 
of these cases the corporations agreed to the shareholders’ requests (e.g., Carleton et al., 
1998; Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999; Guay et al., 2004; Logsdon & van Buren, 2008). 
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Withdrawn social resolutions thus imply a sense of engagement between shareholders 
and corporations over social issues. Figure 12 tracks total number of withdrawn social 
resolutions per year over the study time period.  
***Insert Figure 12 Here*** 
RQ3 asked about the landscape of withdrawn social resolutions. Between 1997 
and 2011, a total of 1,017 social resolutions were withdrawn. On average, 68 social 
resolutions were withdrawn each year between 1997 and 2011. The yearly number of 
social resolution withdrawn ranged from 29 in 1999 to 100 in 2010.  There was an 
increase in the number of withdrawn social resolutions since 2000 until 2010. The 
number of withdrawn social resolutions decreased in 2011 (n = 87). This decrease 
paralleled the general trends in all resolutions.  
Specifically, RQ3a inquired about the types of issues raised in the withdrawn 
social shareholder resolutions. Following the codebook, the social issues addressed in 
the social resolutions were coded into six categories: environment, community, 
employee, diversity, human rights, and product responsibility. The results of the content 
analysis showed that environmental issues were prevalent in the withdrawn social 
resolutions. Figure 13 provides a distribution of social issues raised in the withdrawn 
resolutions. 
***Insert Figure 13 Here*** 
The figure shows that majority of withdrawn social resolutions concerned 
environmental issues (41%), followed by the issues regarding community (21%), 
employee (16%), and diversity (14%). The least common issues were concerned with 
human rights (4%) and product responsibility (4%). Given that a withdrawn resolution 
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indicates some type of action on the part of the target corporation—full or partial 
agreement to resolution—or some type of compromise, identifying the specific issues 
voiced in these withdrawn resolutions is important.  
Table 4 provides a list of top five social issues and their frequencies in the 
withdrawn social resolutions between 1997 and 2011. 
***Insert Table 4 Here*** 
During the period of the study, the most prominent social issues across the 
categories, those with over 50 resolutions, in decreasing order of frequency were 
environmental sustainability issues, political contribution and lobbying, 
antidiscrimination, and international conduct. In terms of community oriented-issues, 
results suggest that shareholder activists addressed several community issues in the 
withdrawn social resolutions (see Table 4). Overall, two most common topics were 
corporate political contributions and lobbying (n = 92) and health care/drug pricing (n = 
41). Social shareholder resolutions dealing with corporate political contributions in the 
study sample seemed to reflect the growing tension about corporate political 
contributions in recent years. See Figure 14 for a trend analysis of political contribution 
resolutions filed between 1997 and 2011.  
***Insert Figure 14 Here*** 
Between 2004 and 2011, shareholders filed total 235 resolutions (including all 
outcomes) concerned about corporate political contributions. There was a drastic 
increase in the number of political contribution resolutions from three in 2010 to 78 in 
2011.  
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The second type of issue in focus was environment. Social resolutions regarding 
the natural environment raised a wide range of issues. The most common issue in the 
environmental resolutions sample was environmental sustainability reporting (n = 89), 
followed by the issues of recycling (n = 74), greenhouse gas emission (n = 56), climate 
change (n = 47), and wildlife/animal protection (n = 45). The largest number of 
resolutions in the environment category, sustainability reporting, asked corporations to 
issue a sustainability report with an emphasis on environmental issues.  
An emerging trend was observed from the analysis that the resolved clauses of 
sustainability reporting resolutions proposed that the report include specific measures 
on particular subjects such as water metrics, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, water 
usage etc. For example, in early 2011, California State Teachers’ Retirement System 
filed a resolution at Tesoro Corporation asking the corporation to produce a 
sustainability report. The retirement fund argued that sustainability reporting makes “a 
company more responsive to increasing public expectations of corporate behavior” and 
helps “identify gaps and opportunities, develop company-wide communication, 
publicize innovative practices and receive feedback.” The resolution proposed the 
resolved clause as the following:  
RESOLVED 
Shareholders request that the Board of Directors issue a report describing the 
company’s short- and long-term responses to environmental, social, and 
governance related issues and associated risks, including greenhouse gas 
emissions data and plans to manage emissions. The report should be prepared at 
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information, and made available to shareholders by November 30, 2011. (Tesoro 
Sustainability Report Shareholder Resolution, 2011, para. 6).  
RQ3b inquired about the most common type of issue addressed in the withdrawn 
resolutions. Analysis of the withdrawn social resolutions filed between 1997 and 2001 
indicated that social shareholders addressed five major types of issues in the resolutions: 
environment, community, employee, diversity, human rights, and product 
responsibility. Among these types of issues, environment was the most prevalent issue 
type, followed by community. To further assess whether the observed difference in the 
frequencies was statistically significant, a chi-square test was performed (Sprinthall, 
2006). Table 5 provides the results of the analysis on types of issues.  
***Insert Table 5 Here*** 
The sample of withdrawn social resolutions included 408 (41%) environmental 
and 212 (21%) community resolutions. The difference in the frequencies of the 
environmental and the community issues addressed in the withdrawn social resolutions 
significantly different, X
2
 (1, N = 1,017) = 8.302, p < .001. This finding suggests 
environmental issue-oriented resolutions were more frequently withdrawn than 
community resolutions. Figure 15 further illustrates the percentages of environmental 
and community resolutions in the withdrawn resolution sample. 
***Insert Figure 15 Here*** 
The figure shows that the number of withdrawn environmental resolutions was 
higher than the number of withdrawn community resolutions each year. In 2011, nearly 
30% of the withdrawn social resolutions were concerned with environmental and 
community issues. The number of withdrawn resolutions concerned with community 
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issues almost tripled within a year in 2011, while the number of withdrawn 
environmental resolutions decreased in the same year. 
RQ3c asked about types of changes social shareholder activists demand from 
corporations in the withdrawn social shareholder resolutions. Building on the literature 
on shareholder activism (Graves et al., 2001; Tkac, 2006) and organizational theory 
(e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Everett, 2001; Scott et al., 2000), types of changes 
requested in the withdrawn social resolutions were coded under three categories: a) 
structural changes; b) policy/procedural changes; and c) communication-based 
changes. The results of the content analysis showed that shareholders mostly requested 
communication-based changes (n = 527, 57%) in the withdrawn social resolutions 
followed by policy/procedural changes (n = 308, 33%), and structural changes (n = 89, 
10%). RQ3d asked about the most common type of change requested in the withdrawn 
shareholder resolutions. The analysis showed that the most common category was 
communication-based changes, which included requests such as reporting on 
policy/operations, labeling products properly, and warning stakeholders about negative 
impacts. To find out whether the observed difference in the frequencies between 
communication-based and policy/procedural changes had statistical significance, a chi-
square test was performed. Table 6 provides the results. The findings indicated that the 
observed difference in the frequencies was significantly different, X
2
 (1, N = 1,017) = 
12.1, p < .05. Shareholders most frequently asked corporations to perform 
communication-based changes.  
***Insert Table 6 Here*** 
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After discussing the issues addressed in the withdrawn social resolutions, types 
of sponsors who filed these resolutions were examined. RQ3e asked about major types 
of institutional sponsors who were the proponents of withdrawn social resolutions 
between 1997 and 2011. Based on the literature, this study coded types of sponsors 
under six categories: public pension funds (e.g., CalPERS, New York City Pension 
Funds), religious organizations (e.g., ICCR, Sisters of St. Francis), socially responsible 
investing funds (e.g., Walden Asset Management, Domini Social Investments), unions 
(e.g., ALF-CIO, International Brotherhood of Teamsters), special interest groups (e.g., 
PETA, Human Society of the US), and other (e.g., company, family foundations). 
Figure 16 presents the distribution of withdrawn social resolutions by sponsor type in 
the withdrawn sample.  
***Insert Figure 16 Here*** 
RQ3f further inquired about the most common type of institutional sponsor who 
withdrew social resolutions. Majority of withdrawn social resolutions were sponsored 
by public pension funds (34%), followed by SRI funds (29%), religious groups (19%), 
and unions (11%). This distribution is somewhat different than the distribution of all 
resolutions by sponsor type. As previously demonstrated (Figure 6), unions were the 
major sponsors of all resolutions (including governance and social) (45%). However, 
when it came to the social resolutions that were withdrawn after corporate-shareholder 
engagement, public pension funds were the leading sponsors.  
Because sponsor type is one of the indicators of the research models proposed in 
this study, it will be useful to identify the major institutional shareholders who 
sponsored the withdrawn social resolutions. Table 7 displays the major institutions who 
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were the proponents of withdrawn social shareholder resolutions between 1997 and 
2011.  
***Insert Table 7 Here*** 
The table shows that public pension funds were the leading sponsors of 
withdrawn social resolutions (n = 342). In particular, New York City Fund was the most 
active among public pension fund sponsors (n = 274). New York City Employee’s 
Retirement, New York State Common Retirement Fund, and California State Teachers’ 
Retirement were among the public pension funds that were the sponsors of withdrawn 
social resolutions. Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) groups were also leading 
shareholder sponsors of withdrawn social resolutions (n = 284). The most active SRI 
group was Walden Asset Management (n = 107). In addition, Calvert Asset 
Management, Trillium Asset Management, Domini Social Investments, Green Century 
Funds, and Harrington Investments were among active SRI sponsors. Religious groups 
were also well represented among the sponsors of withdrawn social resolutions (n = 
209). Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR) was the leading figure filing 
106 social resolutions. Some of the major union sponsors of withdrawn social 
resolutions (n = 88) include AFL-CIO, GBPUMC, and International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters. The resolutions filed by unions demonstrated that unions concentrated their 
social activism on workplace standards and antidiscrimination policies. Finally, special 
interest groups were the least frequent institution type in the withdrawn social resolution 
sample (n = 51). The major special interest shareholder activists were People for the 
Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), The Humane Society of the US, and Pro Vita 
Advisors.  
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This section reported the findings on the landscape of shareholder activism via 
filing resolutions over the time period of 1997 and 2011. The section presented major 
issues, sponsors, and outcomes of all shareholder resolutions in general and social 
resolutions and withdrawn social resolutions in specific. Further, the section reported 
the results of the content analyses of the withdrawn social resolutions with a focus on 
major types of issues addressed and major types of changes requested in these 
resolutions. The next section reported the results of hypotheses testing for the two 
theoretical models of the study. 
Study 2: Theoretical Model Testing Findings 
The previous section provided a clear picture of shareholder resolutions filed 
between 1997 and 2011. This section reports the results of a series of probit analyses 
that tested the factors that affect the probability of withdrawing a social resolution 
through a set of hypotheses.  
Withdrawal Probability of a Social Shareholder Resolution 
Prior research (e.g., Carleton et al., 1998; Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999; Lee & 
Lounsbury, 2011) documented that a withdrawal indicates that corporation and the 
shareholder activists were engaged in a conversation about the issue and they were able 
to reach an agreement prior to the resolution going to a vote among all shareholders at 
the annual meeting. The first theoretical model in this dissertation aimed to test the 
factors that affect the probability of withdrawing a social resolution. Table 8 reports the 
descriptive statistics of variables in the model.  
***Insert Table 8 Here*** 
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Table 8 displays that, in the sample, 29.5% of the social shareholder resolutions were 
withdrawn (n = 1,017). In relation to the issue type, the withdrawal rate was 14.8% for 
the environmental issue-oriented resolutions while this rate was 7.5% for the 
community issue-oriented resolutions. In the sample, 11.2% of the corporations were in 
the environmentally committed category (as measured by KLD corporate social 
performance values) while 26.6% of the corporations were in the community committed 
category.  
The table also shows that descriptive statistics for the control variables in the 
model. The average total assets of corporations in the sample were $87.72 billion. The 
smallest corporation had total assets of $119.84 million while the largest company in 
the sample had $267.95 billion. This allows for testing the research hypotheses in a 
sample with wide variation in company size. Studies in the management literature were 
followed to construct corporate-level financial variables (Eesley & Lenox, 2006; 
Kacperczyk, 2009). The mean market leverage (company debt) was 39.1%. In this 
study, the model also accounted for stock price performance by including annual stock 
return. The mean stock return was 12% and there was a large variation in stock returns 
surrounding the mean (SD = .39%). The mean of growth opportunities of corporations, 
the ratio of market value to book value of the corporation, was 1.989 (SD = 1.25) and 
ranged between 0.60 and 8.98. The wide variation in corporate growth opportunities 
allows accounting for the effect of growth opportunities on the outcome of shareholder 
resolutions. The corporations in the sample were typically profitable. The ratio of 
profitability ranged from -.24 to .43 (M = 0.15, SD = 0.08). Furthermore, the average 
ratio of cash holdings (financial slack) to total assets was 11.6%.  
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Table 9 reports the pairwise correlation coefficients of the relevant variables 
used to test H1-H4 in the first model. The pairwise correlations show a strong 
association between withdrawn resolutions and environmental commitment (r = .057, p 
< .01). The correlation between withdrawn resolution and community commitment was 
positive, but lacks statistical significance. Several factors might make this association 
between withdrawal resolution and community commitment insignificant, which will be 
further accounted for in the probit analyses. There was a significant correlation between 
withdrawn resolution and corporate sales (r = -.133, p < .05). The significant negative 
correlation between sales and withdrawn resolution suggests that small corporations 
were more responsive to shareholder resolutions. Overall, the finding is consistent with 
the literature that shows company size affects corporate responses to stakeholder 
activism (Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Kacperczyk, 2009; den Hond & de Bakker, 2007). 
There was a positive association between withdrawn resolution and company debt, 
suggesting that target corporations with greater debt are more responsive to social 
shareholder resolutions. These findings are largely consistent with the initial prediction 
that corporate-level financial variables affect withdrawal agreements and confirmed the 
decision to control for corporate-level financial variables in the research designs. 
***Insert Table 9 Here*** 
Regarding the type of withdrawn resolution, there was a positive and statistically 
significant correlation between withdrawn environment resolution and environmental 
commitment (r = .033, p < .01). This association suggests that corporations with a high 
level commitment to the natural environment were more likely to have withdrawal 
outcomes on the shareholder resolutions concerning environmental issues. There was a 
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significant association between withdrawn community resolution and community 
commitment (r = .073, p < .05). That is, corporations with a high level commitment to 
community were more likely to have withdrawal outcomes on the shareholder 
resolutions concerning community issues. Having presented the descriptive statistics 
and pairwise correlation analyses of the variables, the next section addresses the 
hypotheses of the first theoretical model. The formal hypotheses were restated before 
reporting the results in order to refresh the reader’s memory. 
Impact of corporate stakeholder commitment. The first set of research 
hypotheses focused on the relationship between corporate stakeholder commitment and 
the likelihood of a shareholder resolution to be withdrawn. As discussed earlier, studies 
in the management literature established that corporate social performance can be best 
evaluated by a given corporation’s commitment to its stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995; 
Wood, 1991). To examine this relationship, the first research hypothesis was posited as 
the following: 
H1: Social resolutions filed at corporations with high levels of community 
commitment will be more likely to be withdrawn than the ones filed at 
corporations with low levels of community commitment. 
The first hypothesis predicted that corporate commitment to community—one of the 
major institutional stakeholders of a corporate organization—had an impact on the 
withdrawal outcome of a social shareholder resolution. H1 was supported.  
Table 10 reports the results from probit analysis models including marginal 
effects and associated p values. It should be noted that the marginal effects indicate a 
change in the probability of withdrawal in response to one standard deviation increase 
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relative to the mean of the independent continuous variables. Regarding a dummy 
independent variable, the marginal effect represents the difference in the distribution 
function when the independent variable changes from zero to one. The results show 
significant effects of corporate community commitment on the withdrawal outcome. 
Specifically, the table shows that corporations that had higher social performance values 
in the community dimension (community commitment) are 5.4% more likely to 
withdraw a social resolution than corporations with lower social performance values 
(p<0.05). This is an increase of 18.4% relative to the sample average of withdrawal 
ratio (0.29). This finding suggests that target corporations with high levels of 
community commitment were 18.4% more likely to engage with social shareholder 
activists and reach at a withdrawal agreement with social shareholder resolutions than 
those with low levels of community commitment. 
***Insert Table 10 Here*** 
The second hypothesis focused on the impact of corporate environmental 
commitment on the probability of withdrawing a social shareholder resolution. More 
formally, the hypothesis posited that, 
H2: Social resolutions filed at corporations with high levels of environmental 
commitment will be more likely to be withdrawn than the ones filed at 
corporations with low levels of environmental commitment. 
In the similar vein, the second research hypothesis predicted that corporate 
environmental commitment would affect the likelihood of withdrawing a social 
shareholder resolution. H2 was supported.  
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Table 11 reports the results from probit analysis and shows a significant effect 
of environmental commitment on the likelihood of withdrawing a social shareholder 
resolution. Specifically, the model indicates that resolutions filed at corporation with a 
high level of environment commitment are 8.0% more likely to be withdrawn (p<0.01). 
This is an increase of 27.1% over the sample mean (0.295). The finding suggests that 
target corporations with high levels of environmental commitment were more likely to 
engage with social shareholder activists and reach at an agreement than those with low 
levels of environmental commitment. 
***Insert Table 11 Here*** 
Impact of types of issues. The next hypothesis directed the focus to the issue-
level factors that might affect the withdrawal outcome of a social shareholder 
resolution. The research hypothesis was posed as the following:  
H3: Resolutions that raised an environmental issue will be more likely to be 
withdrawn than the ones that raised other social issues. 
H3 was supported. Table 12 displays the results from the probit analysis and shows a 
significant effect of issue type on the likelihood of withdrawing a shareholder 
resolution. More specifically, the analysis indicates that environmental issue-oriented 
resolutions are 83% more likely to be withdrawn than social issue resolutions (p<0.01). 
This finding suggests that corporations and social shareholder activists were more likely 
to engage and reach at a withdrawal agreement on an environment oriented-issue 
resolution than a social issue one. 
***Insert Table 12 Here*** 
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Impact of types of sponsors. Next, the attention was directed to the sponsor-level 
factors. Research hypothesis four predicted the effect of sponsor type on the withdrawal 
outcome by focusing on public pension funds. The hypothesis reads that, 
H4: Social resolutions sponsored by public pension funds will be more likely to 
be withdrawn than those sponsored by other institutional shareholder activists. 
H4 was supported. Table 13 presents the results from probit analysis. Consistent with 
the literature (e.g., Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999; Monks et al., 2003), the analysis 
indicated a significant effect of being public pension fund on the withdrawal outcome of 
a social shareholder resolution. Specifically, the model shows that public pension funds 
6.5% are more likely to withdraw a resolution than other types of sponsors (p < 0.1). 
This is an increase of 22.0% over the sample average (0.295). The finding suggests that 
social shareholder resolutions filed by public pensions were more likely to withdrawn 
than the ones filed by other sponsors. 
***Insert Table 13 Here***  
In order to account for the effect of corporate-level financial variables, the 
natural log of company size, financial performance, sales, and cash were taken and 
included in the probit models (H1-H4). Table 10-13 show that corporate-level financial 
indicators (control variables) also influenced the withdrawal decisions. Notably, large 
corporations were less likely to reach at withdrawal agreements with social shareholder 
activists in general. Thus, controlling for financial indicators improved the robustness of 
the model.   
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Implementation Level of a Withdrawn Social Shareholder Resolution (Model 2) 
This section reports the results of research hypotheses that analyze the factors 
that influence the implementation level of a withdrawn social resolution. The main 
dependent variable of interest here is the level of implementation of a proposed change 
in a withdrawn shareholder resolution. The hypotheses in Model 2 aimed to examine the 
factors that might affect a target corporation’s implementation level of a sustainability-
reporting request made in the withdrawn social shareholder resolutions. Essentially, the 
research design examined whether and to what extent target corporations actually 
implemented a requested change after reaching a withdrawal agreement with sponsoring 
social shareholder activists. Table 14 displays descriptive analysis of the variables in the 
model. 
***Insert Table 14 Here*** 
The table shows that, between 1997 and 2011, targeted corporations of 
sustainability reporting resolutions implemented the request on average (M = 2.281, SD 
= 1.168). Nearly 11% of the target corporations implemented the sustainability 
reporting shareholder request at the highest level by fully complying with GRI 
sustainability reporting standards and creating a CSR or sustainability unit in their 
organizations.  Of the subsample of corporations that received sustainability-reporting 
requests, 12.4% of them were in the environmentally committed category—that is, they 
had higher values in the corporate environmental performance dimension. Of the 
subsample of corporations that received sustainability-reporting requests, 13.5 % of 
them were in the community-committed category—that is, these corporations had 
higher values in the corporate community performance dimension. Public pension funds 
201 
filed 32 sustainability-reporting resolutions, with the level of implementation mean 
2.905 on the target corporation’s part. This value was higher than the sample average 
(M = 2.281). Socially responsible investing funds (SRI) filed 44 sustainability-reporting 
resolutions, with a 2.022 mean of level of implementation on the target corporation’s 
part.   
To further assess the research hypotheses, a series of OLS regression analyses 
was performed. Variance Inflation factor (VIF) was computed to detect presence of 
collinearity among the variables. To avoid any possible collinearity problem whereby 
two variables in a matrix are perfectly correlated (Mella & Kopalle, 2002; Stewart, 
1987), environmental commitment and community commitment were entered into the 
analysis in different models.  
Impact of corporate stakeholder commitment. At corporate-level, the model 
focused on the impact of corporate stakeholder commitment to community and 
environment. More specifically, the research hypothesis five predicted that,  
H5: Withdrawn social resolutions filed at corporations with high levels of 
community commitment will be more likely to be implemented at a  
greater level than the ones filed at corporations with low levels of community 
commitment. 
Table 15 reports the results of the regression analysis on the level of implementation 
tested in four different models (Model 1-4).  
***Insert Table 15 Here*** 
Table 15, Model 1, shows the effect of corporate community commitment on the level 
implementation. The coefficient estimate for corporate community commitment is 
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positive (β = 0.582) but lacks significance (p>0.1). H5 was not supported. This model 
continues to find significant effects of oil-petro chemical industry classification (β =. 
0.851, p<0.1) and public pension fund (β = 0.818, p<0.01) on the implementation level, 
R
2
 = .166, F = 1.026, p<0.1.  
In a similar vein, research hypothesis six predicted the impact of corporate 
commitment to the environment on the implementation level of sustainability reporting 
request. More formally, the hypothesis stated that, 
H6: Withdrawn Social resolutions filed at corporations with high levels of  
environmental commitment are more likely to be implemented at a greater level 
than the ones filed at corporations with low levels of community commitment. 
Table 15, Model 2, shows significantly strong effects of environmental commitment on 
the level of implementation (β = .614, p<0.1). H6 was supported. Specifically, 
resolutions for environmentally committed corporations increase the implementation 
level by 0.614, corresponding to 27% increase relative to mean level of implementation 
(2.281). The finding suggests that corporations that had higher social performance with 
regard to the natural environment (environmental commitment) produced sustainability 
reports at greater levels after reaching at withdrawal agreements with social shareholder 
activists. This model shows significant effects of oil-petro chemical industry 
classification (β =. 0.891, p<0.1) and public pension fund (β = 0.748, p<0.05) on the 
implementation level, R
2
 = .171, F = 1.827, p<0.1. 
Additionally, Model 3- 4 examines the effect of community commitment on the 
level implementation entering the SRI sponsor type variable in the model (Table 15). 
Similar to Model 2, the coefficient estimate for community commitment is positive (β = 
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0.573) but lacks significance (p>0.1). This model continues to find significant effects of 
oil-petro chemical industry classification (β =. 0.855, p<0.1) and public pension fund (β 
= 0.767, p<0.05) on the implementation level. As such, community commitment did not 
seem to a significant predictor of implementation level in these models. Thus, the 
analysis suggested that corporate environmental commitment was a better predictor of a 
corporation’s implementation level of a sustainability-reporting request than corporate 
community commitment.  
Impact of industry classification. The research model also tested the effect of 
industry category of a target corporation on its implementation level of a withdrawn 
sustainability-reporting request. The research hypothesis seven posed the following: 
H7: Withdrawn social resolutions filed at corporations within the petro-
chemical industry are more likely to be implemented at a greater level than the 
ones filed at corporations within other industries.   
H7 was supported (Table 15). Specifically, the results from the regression analysis in 
Model 2 indicated that target corporations in oil and gas industry were more likely to 
implement sustainability reporting at a higher level than the corporations in other 
industries (β = .891, p<0.1).  
Impact of types of sponsors. Finally, the analysis tested the effect of sponsor 
type on the implementation level of a withdrawn resolution that requested target 
corporations to issue a sustainability report. The research hypothesis eight stated: 
H8: Withdrawn social resolutions sponsored by public pension funds will be 
more likely to be implemented at a greater extent than the ones filed by other 
shareholder activists. 
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H8 was supported (Table 15). The results indicated that sustainability reporting 
resolutions sponsored by public pension funds generated higher levels of 
implementation (β = .748, p<.05). Specifically, the implementation level increased by 
0.748 when a public pension fund sponsors a resolution, corresponding to 33% increase 
relative to the mean level of implementation (2.281). In other words, target corporations 
produced sustainability reports at a greater level when the request was made by public 
pension funds. Overall, Model 2 explained 17% of the variance in a target corporation’s 
implementation level of a withdrawn sustainability reporting shareholder resolution, R
2
 
= .171, F=1.021, p<0.05.  
Further, the researchers computed a variety of OLS regression analyses 
including different combinations of the variables used in the research model. Table 16 
displays the results from the regression models and standard coefficients. Model 5 and 
Model 6 excluded the industry classification variable. The effect of public pension 
continues in this model as well (β = 0.782, p<0.01). Model 5 was significant, R
2
 = .133, 
F = 1.003, p<0.1. However, this model explained less variance (13%) than the original 
model with the industry classification variable. 
***Insert Table 17 Here*** 
After computing various models, it was concluded that Model 1 explained the 
most variance (17%) on the level of implementation of a sustainability-reporting request 
in a withdrawn social resolution. Results suggested that corporations with high-level 
commitment to environment and corporations in the petro-chemical oil and gas industry 
implemented the sustainability-reporting shareholder request at a greater level. Also, 
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corporations implemented the sustainability-reporting request at a greater level when 
public pension sponsors made the request.  
Study 3: Case Study Findings 
To gain a deeper insight into whether and to what extent target corporations 
implement proposed changes in the withdrawn social shareholder resolutions, an 
illustrative case study was conducted (Yin, 2011). The study presented a critical case 
(Yin, 2011, p. 40) to traditional shareholder view demonstrating several structural, 
procedural, and communication-based changes implemented by a target corporation as a 
response to social shareholder pressures. Specifically, the case described developments 
surrounding a withdrawn social shareholder resolution on climate change (an 
environmental issue-oriented resolution type) filed by New York City Pension Fund at 
CONSOL Energy Inc. (NYSE: CNX)—an energy corporation in the coal mining and 
natural gas production sector. 
The Case: CONSOL Energy Inc. and New York City Pension Funds 
On November 25, 2008, Jerome Richey, the General Counsel and Corporate 
Secretary of CONSOL Energy, Inc. (www.consolenergy.com), received a shareholder 
letter from Thomas P. DiNapoli at New York City Pension Funds (NYC funds)
7
. In the 
letter, DiNapoli informed the company that the NYC funds were sponsoring a 
resolution on corporation’s responses to climate change (DiNapoli, T. P., Letter to 
Jerome Richey, November 25, 2008). Attached to the letter was a copy of the 
resolution. The resolution consisted of a series of whereas clauses followed by a 
                                                 
7
 There are five NYC funds: New York City Board of Education Retirement Systems (BERS); 
New York City Employees’ Retirement System (NYCERS); New York City Fire Department 
Pension Fund (Fire); New York City Police Pension Fund (Police); New York City Teachers’ 
Retirement System (TRS). 
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resolved clause. The whereas clauses discussed the importance of the issue and benefits 
of corporate disclosures. The resolved clause stated:   
RESOLVED: The proposal requests a report (reviewed by a board committee of 
independent directors) on how the company is responding to rising regulatory 
and public pressure to significantly reduce the social and environmental harm 
associated with carbon dioxide emissions from the company’s operations and 
from the use of its primary products.  
As such, the first step of shareholder activist-corporate engagement, which is called  
“jawboning” (Carleton et al., 1998, p. 41), took place. The shareholder letter to the 
targeted corporation was sent to the corporation, explaining why the corporation was 
targeted and what action the institution requests from the targeted corporation.  
 Indeed, the NYC funds have recently increased its role in social shareholder 
activism (Tkac, 2006; Sjorstrom, 2008). Comptroller of the NYC Funds explained the 
funds’ role in social shareholder activism as the following:  
The New York City Pension Funds have been at the fore of shareholder activism 
in pressuring many of America’s largest companies to improve workplace 
condition, protect the environment, promote human rights abroad, and adhere to 
accepted corporate governance standards. (US Feds News, 2008, para. 9). 
Meanwhile, the NYC resolution found some coverage in news media. On February 23, 
2009, Natural Gas Intelligence, a trade magazine, published a news story, mentioning 
CONSOL Energy as one of the “offenders” of Climate Change initiatives (para. 1). The 
story also featured an extensive coverage of the New York City Pension Funds’ 
shareholder activism. Comptroller Thompson, “whose office oversees $115 billion in 
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pension fund assets” (para. 2) was quoted to say that ‘Investors require full and 
transparent disclosure of the actions companies are taking to address the risks and 
opportunities of climate change, so that they can make informed investment decisions’ 
(para. 3). More importantly, the story covered the NYC’s CONSOL resolution noting 
that, “The New York City Pension Funds filed a resolution with CONSOL Energy 
requesting a report on how the company is responding to regulatory and competitive 
pressures to reduce greenhouse has (GHG) emissions” (para. 5). 
CONSOL Energy Inc., headquartered in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania with over 9,000 
employees and $5,236 billion revenues (10-K CONSOL Energy, 2012), first took an 
adversarial approach and filed a no-action letter to the SEC on January 6, 2009 to 
exclude the resolution from its proxy materials through a private attorney (Davis, L. U. 
Letter to Division of Corporate Finance SEC, December 30, 2008). In the nine-page 
letter, Attorney Davis explained that, under rule 14a-8(i)(7), the SEC should grant the 
no-action relief for CONSOL because the resolution related to “an internal assessment 
of the risks or liabilities that the company faces as a result of its operations that may 
adversely affect the environment or the public's health” (p. 4). Davis also provided 
several arguments by giving examples from the SEC’s no-action decisions in the past. 
On February 23, 2009, the SEC responded to CONSOL’s no-action request 
allowing the corporation to omit the NYC resolution from its proxy materials (Maples, 
H. L. Letter to Davis, L. U., February 23, 2009). As such in 2009, the NYC Funds’ 
resolution requesting a report from CONSOL Energy on how the corporation responded 
to climate change concerns was found to be “an internal assessment” that relates to 
ordinary business operations of the corporation. 
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In 2010, the NYC funds filed the same resolution at CONSOL. This time, the 
resolution was withdrawn by the NYC before the annual meeting because the 
corporation agreed to “adopt reforms to address risks long-term associated with climate 
change or poor environmental practices” and “provided substantial information on its 
R&D projects aimed at reducing carbon emissions” (The 2010 NYC Funds Shareholder 
Proposal Programs, p. 18).  The NYC funds announced the withdrawal in its 2010 
Postseason Reports on the Shareholder Proposal Programs of the New York City 
Pension Funds and Retirement Systems.  
The NYC Funds mentioned the withdrawals as “achievements” (Comptroller 
John Liu, Letter to NYC Trustees, December 2, 2010, p. 1). In the letter, the 
Comptroller summarized the shareholder activism in both governance and social issues 
arguing that, 
In 2010 the New York City Funds continued to be leaders in advancing 
corporate governance and responsibility reforms at dozens of portfolio 
companies. Several of these reforms also became requirements of all public 
companies as a result of recent legislation and regulation, further demonstrating 
the Funds’ leadership and impact. (NYC Funds Postseason Report, 2010, p. 1).  
The 2010 Postseason Report also featured detailed information on the shareholder 
resolutions filed by the NYC Funds with their outcomes as well as the names of the 
targeted companies. The report included the resolution with CONSOL under the “Social 
and Environmental Issues-Proposals” category (p. 13). The outcome of the resolution 
was reported as withdrawn, noting “company provided substantial information on its 
R&D projects aimed at reducing carbon emissions” (p. 13). 
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The NYC Funds noted the withdrawal reason as company’s commitment to 
reduce carbon emissions. However, this report was an internal communication 
document. Consistent with previous cases studied on public pension funds activism 
(e.g., Carleton et al., 1998; Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999), the NYC Funds kept the 
withdrawal process private. An analysis of the organizational website and media 
coverage did not yield any information about the nature and the process of the 
withdrawal.  
Implementation of Changes at CONSOL Energy Inc. On March 26, 2012, 
CONSOL Energy produced its first corporate responsibility report that captured 
activities undertaken in 2011 (PRNewswire, 2012). The report outlined its 
environmental responsibility activities and listed information on its greenhouse gas and 
air emissions (CONSOL 2011 Corporate Social Responsibility Report, pp. 26-33). The 
report devoted four pages on greenhouse gas and air emission reporting the metrics on 
coal emission intensity and gas emission intensity. In addition, the report detailed the 
Research and Development (R&D) efforts to develop strategic technology for business 
operations with “smaller environmental footprints” (p. 49). 
Brett Harvey, the chairman of the company, introduced the report in his CEO 
letter to public as the following: 
CONSOL Energy’s first corporate social responsibility report has been created 
to clearly communicate who we are, what we believe, and how we conduct our 
business. You will see that CONSOL Energy is no stranger to the concept of 
responsible business practices. Responsibility is a fundamental principle that has 
driven CONSOL Energy’s actions since its inception nearly 150 years ago. 
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Further, this report demonstrates just how strongly the company’s ethics and 
core value—Safety, Compliance, and Continuous Improvement—influence the 
business decisions CONSOL Energy makes every day. (CONSOL Energy 2011 
Corporate Social Responsibility Report, CEO Letter, para. 3). 
In closing the letter, Harvey noted that this report would serve as “an invitation to a 
continuing dialogue with our partners, employees and the communities in which we 
operate” (CEO Letter, para. 6). In the content index of the report, it was noted that the 
Report was based on the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) G3.I reporting guidelines. A 
verification search on the GRI’s Disclosure Database for CONSOL Energy’s Corporate 
Social Responsibility Report indicated that the company reported based on GRI’s G3.1 
framework (database.globalreporting.org/reports/view/9665). However, CONSOL did 
not provide any information on the Application Level of the report. 
Most notably, in 2011 the CONSOL created a new position and hired Katharine 
Fredriksen as vice president of Environmental Strategy and Regulatory Affairs (Litvak, 
2011). Fredriksen seems to have a relevant academic and professional background for 
consulting the company on environmental issues. Fredriksen has a bachelor’s degree in 
Marine Biology and a MS (abd) in Civil and Environmental Engineering from Texas 
A&M University. Before joining to CONSOL, Fredriksen worked as a Senior Policy 
Advisor to the Secretary on environmental and energy issues at the U.S. Department of 
Treasury, as an Environmental Protection Specialist at the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, and as a Director of Environmental and Regulatory Affairs at Koch 
Industries (Forbes Profiles, 2013). Fredriksen was responsible for the publication of 
CONSOL’s first Corporate Sustainability Report (Litvak, 2012).  
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On April 1, 2013, CONSOL published its second Corporate Social 
Responsibility Report covering the corporate activities undertaken in 2012 
(PRNewswire, 2013). The 2012 report was more robust than the 2011. The report 
followed the GRI’s G3.1 Reporting Guidelines by providing Profile Disclosures and 
Management Approach Disclosures as well as 17 Performance Indicators. A 
verification search on the GRI’s Disclosure Database indicated that CONSOL’s the 
2012 Corporate Social Responsibility Report was reported at the B medium- level 
(http://database.globalreporting.org/reports/view/9665). 
The report also provided more specific information on air and greenhouse gas 
emissions (CONSOL 2012 Corporate Social Responsibility Report, pp. 40-46). Indeed, 
an analysis of the 2012 Corporate Annual Report indicated the company spent $267.4 
million on environmental compliance (CONSOL 2012 Corporate Annual Report, p. 32). 
The corporate R&D efforts coordinated collaborations to replace half of the normal 
diesel fuel requirements with natural gas (CONSOL 2012 Corporate Social 
Responsibility Report, p. 48). In addition, the corporation has received several awards 
(e.g., Virginia Reclamation Award) and recognitions for its environmentally responsible 
practices, which were shared with media via news releases (Gough, 2013). 
This case study thus illustrated that a social shareholder resolution might have 
triggered a series of progressive changes in a target corporation’s social and 
environmental practices. Overall, the critical case study suggests that societal pressures 
exerted by shareholders can push corporations to make institutional arrangements even 
though making these arrangements may not be economically rational in terms of cost-
effective analysis (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Galaskiewicz, 1991). More specifically, 
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the case showed that a social shareholder resolution can engage a target corporation in 
an environmental issue, leading the corporation to implement structural, procedural, and 
communication-based changes within the organization. Implications of the case study 
for the concept of organizational legitimacy will be further discussed. 
Summary of Findings 
In Study 1, all shareholder resolutions, social shareholder resolutions, and 
withdrawn social resolutions were analyzed respectively. The results of the descriptive 
analysis of all shareholder resolutions filed at U.S. publicly traded corporations between 
1997 and 2011 showed that shareholders filed total 14,271 resolutions during the 14-
year period. On average, 951 resolutions were submitted each year. The major types of 
institutional shareholders that filed resolutions were public pension funds, unions, 
socially responsible investing (SRI) funds, religious organizations, and special interest 
groups.  Between 1997 and 2011, unions were the most active shareholders, filing 45 
percent of all shareholder resolutions (including corporate governance and social 
resolutions), followed by religious groups (24%). The analysis on the outcomes of all 
shareholder resolutions showed that roughly half of the resolutions were taken to a vote 
(42%). Overall, there was low support for shareholder resolutions (3%). The percentage 
of resolutions that were withdrawn (24%) was higher than the percentage of those that 
were omitted by the SEC (18%).  
After analyzing all shareholder resolutions, the analysis focused on social 
shareholder resolutions filed by institutional shareholders between 1997 and 2011. 
Institutional shareholders filed 4,527 resolutions that were devoted to social issues. 
Social shareholder resolutions constituted 32 percent of the total sample. In terms of the 
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outcomes, social shareholder resolutions had relatively more voted and withdrawal 
outcomes than the omitted ones. Social resolutions sponsored by public pension funds 
received the most withdrawal outcomes, followed by SRI funds. 
In the next step, the attention was directed to withdrawn social resolutions (n = 
1,017). The withdrawn social resolutions were of interest for the dissertation because a 
withdrawal outcome implies an engagement and possibly an agreement between 
sponsoring shareholder activists and targeted corporations on the social issue under 
consideration (Carleton et al., 1997; Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999; Guay et al., 2004; 
Logsdon & van Buren, 2008; Proffitt & Spicer, 2003). The findings of content analysis 
of the withdrawn social resolutions suggested that social issues addressed by 
shareholder resolutions ranged widely and varied greatly in the intensity of attention 
they received. Social issues that were prevalent in the social shareholder resolutions 
were analyzed under six categories: community, environment, diversity, human rights, 
employee relations, and product responsibility. The most common type of issue 
addressed in the withdrawn social resolutions was environment (41%) followed by 
community (21%). In the environment category the most prevailing issue was 
environmental sustainability. In the community category, the issue of corporate political 
contributions and lobbying was the most prevalent. In the withdrawn social shareholder 
resolutions, shareholder activists more frequently asked for communication-based 
changes, such as reporting and labeling (57%) than policy/procedural changes, such as 
adopting a sexual orientation antidiscrimination policy (33%), or structural changes, 
such as establishing a board of committee or adopting a policy (10%). The analysis on 
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sponsor types demonstrated that public pension funds were the most prominent filers of 
withdrawn social resolutions (34%), followed by SRI funds (29%).  
In Study 2, two theoretical models were tested. The research hypotheses on the 
probability of withdrawing a social shareholder resolution in Model 1 were addressed 
through a set of probit analyses. Controlling for corporate financial characteristics (e.g., 
company size, profitability), corporate community commitment and corporate 
environmental commitment affected the withdrawal probability of a social shareholder 
resolution. H1 and H2 were supported. More specifically, target corporations that a had 
high level of commitment to community and environment, as measured by CSP values, 
were more likely to reach withdrawal agreements with shareholder activists on social 
resolutions. The results from the probit analysis on the impact of types of issues further 
indicated that there was a strong relation between a resolution addressing an 
environmental issue and its likelihood of being withdrawn. H3 was supported. The 
finding suggested that shareholder resolutions that raised environmental issues were 
more likely to be withdrawn than those that raised other social issues, such as 
community, diversity, and human rights. Collectively, the results of the analysis 
indicated the importance of environmental issues for initiating social shareholder 
activist-corporate engagement. Further, the findings showed that social resolutions 
submitted by public pension funds were more likely to be withdrawn than those 
submitted by other sponsor types such as religious groups, SRI groups, unions, and 
special interests. H4 was supported. This finding suggested that public pension funds 
might induce more positive corporate responses than other sponsor types to the social 
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issues addressed in the shareholder resolutions. Figure 17 presents the empirical results 
from the probit analysis in Model 1 (Probability of Withdrawal). 
***Insert Figure 17 Here*** 
In Model 2, the attention was directed to the factors that predict the 
implementation level of a withdrawn social resolution. To test the research hypotheses 
(H5-8), withdrawn social shareholder resolutions that asked corporations to issue 
sustainability reports were used as a sample (n = 89). A somewhat unexpected finding 
of this study was that corporate community commitment did not affect the 
implementation level of a sustainability-reporting request. H5 was not supported. On 
the other hand, corporate environmental commitment was found to be a significant 
predictor of the level of corporate sustainability reporting. H6 was supported. This 
finding suggested that corporate environmental commitment can explain more variance 
in the implementation level of a sustainability-reporting request made in the social 
shareholder resolutions than corporate community commitment. Further, the analysis 
found that targeted corporations in the petro-chemical oil and gas industry were more 
likely to implement a sustainability-reporting request at a greater level than the 
corporations in other industries. H7 was supported. Also, corporations implemented 
sustainability-reporting requests at a greater level when public pension sponsors made 
the request. H8 was supported. Overall, the model explained 17 percent of the variance 
in a target corporation’s implementation level of sustainability reporting requests in a 
withdrawn social resolution. Figure 18 presents the empirical results from OLS 
regression analysis for Model 2 (Implementation Level). 
***Insert Figure 18 Here*** 
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Finally, in Study 3, the case showed that a corporation targeted by a climate 
change resolution implemented a series of structural, procedural, and communication-
based changes. Following the withdrawal, the corporation, CONSOL Energy Inc., first 
created a new position on the environmental issues—a boundary-spanning role (Aldrich 
& Heker, 1977; Rao & Sivakumer, 1999) and produced the corporation’s first 
sustainability report. Further, the corporation sought for external endorsement by 
obtaining awards and certifications regarding its environmental responsibility to 
enhance its organizational legitimacy (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Meyer & Rowan, 
1977). The case study suggested that societal pressures exerted by shareholders can 
induce target corporations to make institutional arrangements within the organization 
even though making these arrangements may not be economically rational in terms of 
cost-effective analysis (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Galaskiewicz, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). A number of theoretical and practical 
implications have emerged in interpreting the results with respect to research questions 




CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION 
 
The previous chapter presented the results the descriptive and content analyses 
of shareholder resolutions filed between 1997 and 2011 (N = 14, 271) have identified 
major types of social issues addressed in the resolutions, the major institutional sponsor 
types, and the outcomes of these resolutions. The results of the research on corporate 
responses to social shareholder activism via resolution filing were presented. Two 
theoretical models have pointed out the effects of corporate stakeholder commitment, 
industry classification, issue type, and sponsor type on withdrawal outcomes and 
implementation levels of social resolutions.  Further, the case study has helped to 
illuminate how a target corporation implemented a proposed change in a withdrawn 
social resolution. This chapter interprets and discusses the findings in relation to the 
research questions and hypotheses. The chapter consists of six sections. The first section 
discusses some of the important findings of the study in relation to the literature with a 
focus on the social issues voiced in the resolutions. The second and third sections 
discuss theoretical and practical contributions, respectively. The fourth section suggests 
implications of the study for public relations theory and research. The fifth section 
acknowledges the limitations of the study. Finally, the last section suggests directions 
for future research.  
A Societal Approach to Social Shareholder Activism 
Ferguson (1984) identified social responsibility and social issues as two of the 
three major research areas of public relations. This dissertation examined social issues 
voiced by one type of stakeholder—shareholders—and investigated corporate responses 
to social shareholder activist demands for improved corporate social responsibility. 
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From a societal view, this dissertation contends that public relations is primarily 
concerned with social issues and values that are considered publicly relevant which 
means relating to the public sphere (Bentele & Nothhaft, 2010; Holmstrom, 2004; 
Jensen, 2002). As such, public relations facilitates reaching agreements on mutually 
acceptable social expectations emerged in the public sphere through engagement. The 
societal view to public relations considers organizational legitimacy as a rationale for 
practicing public relations (Ihlen & Van Ruler, 2009; Holmstrom, 2004, 2005; Vercic et 
al., 2001). Grounded in this societal view to public relations, this dissertation explained 
corporate responses to social shareholder activism through the theoretical lens of 
organizational legitimacy. 
Such a societal approach allows theorizing how organization-stakeholder 
engagements, as a whole, can contribute to the betterment of society in the 21
st
 century. 
The concept of public sphere plays a central role as organizational legitimacy largely 
rests in public perceptions, which continuously change (Holmstrom, 2004; Suchman, 
1995). Public sphere suggests a discursive, dynamic process that takes place in complex 
interactions between organizations, institutions, individuals, and groups (Habermas, 
1989; Holmstrom, 2009; Jensen, 2002; Raupp, 2004). Public sphere has been 
considered as mirror that helps society observe itself (Raupp, 2004). This metaphor 
implies that public sphere is not identical with society but a reflection of it. As 
discussed earlier, Bentele and Nothhaft (2010) described public sphere as a “supra-
institution” which is concerned “not only one single matter, such as finance, legality, 
welfare—it is concerned with all” (p. 106). Bentele and Nothhaft (2010) proposed one 




According to Bentele and Nothhaft, public sphere is a network of points of interest that 
attracts a high communication density. This conceptualization emphasizes volatility and 
complexity of public sphere as it constantly evolves with the interactions of connected 
social actors. From this perspective, stakeholders are only one of the social actors in 
public sphere, which is dynamic and evolving (Benetel& Nothhaft, 2010; Self, 2010). 
The conceptualization of public sphere as a dynamic process that evolves through 
communication of social actors provides a coherent understanding of organizational 
legitimacy and the role of public relations in achieving it.  
The concept of public sphere thus suggests a more inclusive framework to 
understand social shareholder activism because there may be some agents in the public 
sphere who cannot be identified as shareholding stakeholders but still affect or can be 
affected by the course of shareholder activism (e.g., NGOs, activist groups). The 
concept of public sphere also captures the “networking” among stakeholder groups and 
their interactions with organizations (Jensen, 2002, p. 144). In the context of social 
shareholder activism, people who are members of institutional shareholder 
organizations (e.g., public pension funds, unions) interact with other stakeholders in the 
public sphere cocreating meaning (Heath, 2006; Taylor, 2010) and framing issues 
(Burns, 1999; Snow et al., 1986) that are deemed important in the public sphere. These 
members pressure their asset management organizations to invest their money in a more 
socially responsible way. Institutional shareholders in turn pressure corporations in 
which they have ownership stakes. Having a direct access to corporate boardrooms, 
shareholder activists thus function as a catalyst that connects corporate managements to 
public issues that emerge in public sphere.  
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 The concept of public sphere can contribute to theorizing efforts in management 
disciplines as well. In particular, with the increasing scholarly attention in corporate 
responses to social movements in recent management literature (e.g., Eesley & Lenox, 
2006; Lee & Lounsbury, 2011; Reid & Toffel, 2009), the concept of public sphere, with 
its emphasis on interconnectivity and dynamism of publics, can advance theory-
building efforts. This emphasis on public sphere can shift the focus from the issues 
brought up by primary stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995) or salient stakeholders (Mitchell 
et al., 1997) to the issues that arise from the public sphere as a result of high 
communication intensity caused by interconnected social actors. Reductionist 
approaches to stakeholder relationships prevent organizations from addressing the 
complex expectations and demands of society at large. This dissertation argues that, 
moving beyond dyadic conceptualizations, organization-stakeholder relationships 
should be conceptualized as an interaction within the public sphere that involves local 
and global actors (Bentele & Nothhaft, 2010; Jensen, 2002; Self, 2010). 
Social shareholder resolutions: Transferring public sphere. For many social 
activist organizations, filing shareholder resolutions is another tool to supplement a 
broader campaign about an issue such as climate change, global warming, or human 
rights (Graves et al., 2001; Rehbein et al., 2004; Tkac, 2006). Thus, important issues of 
the day that concerned a majority of the public are likely to be brought to the corporate 
attention. As such, social shareholder resolutions transfer the prevalent social issues 
from public sphere to corporate boardrooms.  
Bentele and Nothhaft (2010) lamented that issues that generated a high level of 
communication in the public sphere do not always transfer to the policy-making 
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mechanisms in society. This study suggests that social shareholder resolutions not only 
voice some of the pressing issues that concerned the public sphere, but also they have 
the potential to transfer these issues to the relevant institutional mechanisms for policy 
making. For example, this study showed an increasing shareholder demand for 
corporate political contribution disclosure. Corporate contributions to political parties, 
candidates or other political campaigns have been a compelling issue that has become 
the topic of public discourse in recent years (Blumenthal, 2013; Bobelian, 2013; 
Confessore, 2013). Since the 2010 Citizens United Supreme Court ruling that freed 
corporations to spend their money directly on political elections, the effort to use 
shareholder activism to impose more transparent practices on corporations regarding 
their political contributions has accelerated. Indeed, a coalition of shareholder activists 
has mobilized elected officials and public pension funds to petition the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) to require publicly traded corporations to disclose all of 
their political donations (Confessore, 2013). The shareholder activist campaign 
(www.action.citizen.org) has published a petition that has gathered nearly 500,000 
public comments, more than any petition in the SEC’s history (Confessore, 2013). At 
the time of writing this dissertation, SEC officials have indicated that they would 
propose a new disclosure rule (Blumenthal, 2013; Bobelian, 2013; Confessore, 2013). 
This is a clear example of how shareholder activism can transfer issues from the public 
sphere to the institution that can develop policies. 
However, in some cases, corporations might get ahead of other policy-making 
mechanisms such as governments. For example, the Human Rights Campaign, the 
leading activist group on gay rights issues, reported that many large public corporations, 
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such as Chevron and IBM, have adopted antidiscrimination policies and provided equal 
treatment for LGBT employees even before the issue was picked up by the U.S. 
government (Gunther, 2008). KLD Social Ratings, an index designed to guide socially 
responsible investors, started rating corporations for their antidiscrimination based on 
sexual orientation polices as early as 1995 (KLD Social Ratings, 2013). Thus, 
shareholder resolutions on social issues not only mirror the public sphere but also may 
actively affect the course of the public policy making process.  
Moving beyond dichotomous stakeholder conceptualizations. This dissertation 
studied one type of stakeholders—shareholders. By studying shareholders who 
challenged corporations to address social issues relevant to stakeholders, the 
dissertation calls into the question of who exactly is a stakeholder. While there is no 
universally definition of stakeholder, Freeman’s (1984) definition of stakeholder as 
“any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the firm’s 
objectives” (p. 25) seems to be well accepted in the literature across management, 
organizational theory, and public relations. Traditionally, management literature treats 
the term stakeholder as a dichotomous concept—such as, internal versus external 
stakeholders (Freeman, 1984); institutional versus technical stakeholders (Jones, 1995); 
and primary versus secondary stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995). The phenomenon studied 
in the dissertation—social shareholder activism—has challenged this traditional 
dichotomous conceptualization of shareholders because the study showed that 
stakeholders can take on multiple roles and memberships at the same time. 
The findings in this dissertation showed that some of the major U.S. institutional 
shareholders (e.g., CalPERS, New York City pension funds, Walden Asset 
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Management, International Brotherhood of Teamsters) filed resolutions to advocate for 
the interests of non-shareholding stakeholders. For example, the analysis showed that, 
only in 2011, New York State Common Retirement Fund filed 24 resolutions to get 
corporations to include sexual orientation clause in their Equal Employee Opportunity 
(EEO) statements. Social shareholder activism is thus a clear case in which the interests 
of shareholders are aligned with those of non-shareholding stakeholders. Social 
shareholder activism has challenged a previous understanding of stakeholders as 
homogenous groups with a single motivation and questioned the traditional 
conceptualization of non-shareholding stakeholders as opposite to shareholders. 
Analyzing the social shareholder activism phenomenon, this dissertation argues 
that conceptualizing stakeholders in dichotomous terms is reductionist in that it 
constrains theorizing efforts in complex relationships between organization and 
stakeholders. In particular, with the advent of new media technologies the lines between 
stakeholder types seem to have blurred (e.g., internal vs. external stakeholders). 
Employees of a corporation can easily turn into activists as well as become shareholders 
by buying company stocks. Therefore, understanding organization-stakeholder 
relationships in today’s world requires more complex theoretical approaches. 
Social shareholder resolutions: “Canaries in the coal mine.” Social shareholder 
activists often file resolutions to identify and define problems for corporations (Graves 
et al., 2004). Social shareholder resolutions can be considered as a first step in trying to 
improve corporate social responsibility policies and actions. In essence, by filing 
resolutions, social shareholder activists can signal an emerging expectancy gap (Sethi, 
1979) between a corporation’s policies and practices and stakeholder demands. For 
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example, issues of climate change and sexual orientation anti-bias policies have been 
brought up in the shareholder resolutions long before corporations begin to address or 
even acknowledge these issues. Social shareholder resolutions can thus offer an 
opportunity for corporations to identify an expectancy gap between a corporation and its 
stakeholders.  
Social shareholder resolutions are closely related to organizational legitimacy. 
Essentially, through filing resolutions shareholders point out the social issues that 
concern stakeholders, who, in turn, affect the success and survival of organizations 
(Clarkson, 1995; Cutlip et al., 2000; Heath, 2006). Public relations scholars have 
pointed the importance of social environmental monitoring through constant 
communication with organizational stakeholders to create and maintain organizational 
legitimacy (Boyd, 2000; Heath, 2006; Holmström, 2005, 2009). Social shareholder 
resolutions can provide corporations a useful mechanism to monitor and sense their 
social environment. Results showed that social shareholder resolutions brought issues to 
corporate attention before these issues were picked up by the media and acknowledged 
by the governments, in other words, before these issues have become public. In 
particular, with the rise of engagement-based approach to social shareholder activism 
(Guay et al., 2002; MacLeod, 2009; Sjorstrom, 2008), corporations have a choice to 
address societal issues without any negative publicity (e.g., activist media campaigns, 
boycotts). Therefore, social shareholder resolutions can function as “canaries in the coal 
mine,” signaling corporations about stakeholder expectations and demands generated in 
public sphere. However, corporations can benefit from this opportunity if they listen to 
the proponents’ concerns and are willing to address the proposed changes. 
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Corporate stakeholder commitment. This dissertation suggested that one way to 
understand whether corporate organizations reflectively remain cognizant of their 
interdependence to the society of which they are a part was to evaluate corporations’ 
commitment to their social and environmental responsibilities. Epstein (1972) argued 
that a corporation is regarded as legitimate if publics perceive it to be practically useful 
and socially responsible. In the same vein, Wood (1991) argued that the degree to which 
principles of social responsibility put into actions through stakeholder interactions can 
be an indicator to assess whether a corporation meets society’s expectations. As such, 
corporate stakeholder commitment is closely related to organizational legitimacy.  
Building on this link, this study tested the impact of corporate stakeholder 
commitment, as measured by corporate social performance values (Clarkson, 1995; 
Wood, 1991), on corporate responses to social shareholder resolutions. Examination of 
the relation between corporate stakeholder commitment and corporate responses to 
social shareholder activism provided an excellent context which allowed the researcher 
to evaluate the purpose of the corporation in society from the societal view on the 
public relations (e.g., Holmstrom, 2005, 2009, Ihlen et al., 2009; van Ruler & Vercic, 
2004) as well as from the stakeholder theory in management (Clarkson, 1995; Freeman, 
1984). 
It is important to remember that, by law, a corporation is required to put 
resolutions to an advisory vote by all shareholders in its proxy statement. However, 
corporate managers have discretion regarding whether to engage with shareholder 
activists to settle on an agreement on the proposed changes (Carleton et al., 1998; Del 
Guercio & Hawkins, 1999; Guay et al., 2004). During the engagement process, if a 
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sponsor is convinced that a target corporation is committed to take steps to implement 
the proposed changes in the resolution, the sponsor then withdraws the resolution from 
the proxy ballot. As such, it was important to understand the factors that influence 
corporations to pay attention to social shareholder activism.   
This dissertation focused on corporate commitment to community and the 
environment—two major issues addressed in social shareholder resolutions—as one of 
the factors that might affect corporate responses to shareholder activism. As predicted 
in H1, the findings of probit analysis showed that corporations that had high levels of 
community commitment were 5.4 percent more likely to reach at withdrawal 
agreements with social shareholder activists than the ones with low levels of community 
commitment. Further, as predicted in H2, the findings demonstrated that corporate 
corporations that had higher levels of environmental commitment were 8 percent more 
likely to reach at withdrawal agreements with social shareholder activists than the ones 
with low levels of environmental commitment. Thus, the results suggested that, 
controlling for the effect of corporate financial indicators (e.g., size, profitability), 
corporations with high levels of commitment to community and environmental will be 
more likely to engage with social shareholder activists to address the social issue raised 
in the shareholder resolution. These findings are consistent with studies that showed 
that corporate stakeholder attention affected corporate responses to secondary 
stakeholders (e.g., activists, NGOs) (Eesley & Lenox, 2006) and the structure of 
corporate governance mechanism (Kacperczyk, 2009).  
One conclusion that can be drawn from interpreting the results is that there is a 
link between corporate stakeholder commitment and corporations’ willingness to 
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engage with social shareholder activists. Shareholder activists, acting in their dual roles 
of stakeholder and shareholder, bring the social issues that concerned non-shareholding 
stakeholders to the attention of corporate managers. Corporations that have high 
stakeholder commitment are considered to have “frequent, high-quality interactions” 
(Carroll, 1999, p. 57) and intense communication (Suchman, 1995) with their 
stakeholders. Corporations that maintain healthy stakeholder interactions can be more 
likely to be open to address societal demands expressed by shareholders.  
Theoretically, by addressing stakeholder needs and expectations through 
meaningful interactions, corporations acknowledge their interdependencies to the 
society. How a corporation considers its broader role in society and positions itself 
toward social issues will affect its day-to-day interactions with stakeholders. Corporate 
stakeholder commitment thus can predict corporate actions in the societal realm, 
including responses to social activism. For example, Starbucks has worked to maintain 
an upscale clientele and has positioned itself as a socially conscious and responsive 
company (Baron, 2003). The way that Starbucks handles shareholder activism is likely 
to differ from a corporation without such a position. For example, at 2013 Starbucks’ 
annual shareholder meeting in Seattle a shareholder complained to the chief executive, 
Howard Schultz, that “the company had lost customers because of its support for gay 
marriage” (Allen, 2013, para. 1). In response to the shareholder’s complaint, Schultz 
said: 
Not every decision is an economic decision. Despite the fact that you recite 
statistics that are narrow in time, we did provide 38% shareholder return over 
the last year. Having said that, it is not economic decision to me. The lens in 
228 
which we are making that decision is through the lens of people. We employ 
over 200,000 people in this company, and we want to embrace diversity. Of all 
kinds… it’s a free country. You can sell your shares in Starbucks and buy shares 
in another company. (Allen, 2013, para. 3). 
As such, how a corporation positions itself in relation to society is likely to affect the 
ways in which this corporation interacts with its stakeholders—who can decide whether 
“the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within a social system” 
(Suchman, 1995, p. 574) and who have legitimacy-determining power (Dowling & 
Pfeffer, 1975; Heath, 2006; Kruckeberg & Stark, 1988; Sethi, 1979). This link can 
develop a fertile scholarship in corporate communication and public relations theory 
and research. 
 Public relations theories from a societal perspective are anchored in the concept 
of organizational legitimacy (Boyd, 2000; Heath, 2006; Holmstrom, 2005; Ihlen & van 
Ruler, 2009). From this perspective, organizations will change their policies, structures 
or operations to conform to societal expectations about what structures and operations 
are legitimate. Failure to undertake this process that leads to congruence can cause a 
legitimacy gap between the organization and its publics. Similarly, the concept of 
organizational legitimacy predicts that organizations will change their structures or 
operations to conform to external expectations about what structures and operations are 
legitimate (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Everett, 2001; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott et 
al., 2000; Suchman, 1995). 
Grounded in these theoretical traditions, the second model focused on the 
implementation level of a proposed change raised in a withdrawn social shareholder 
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resolution. To evaluate a true change resulted from shareholder activist-corporate 
engagement, research hypotheses 5-8 focused on withdrawn shareholder resolutions that 
requested corporations to issue a sustainability report. Building upon the same 
theoretical approach in the first model, corporate stakeholder commitment was 
conceived as one of the main factors that would affect the implementation of a social 
proposal. The results of OLS analyses showed that corporations with high levels of 
environmental commitment, as measured by corporate social performance (CSP) 
values, were more likely to produce sustainability reports at a higher level than 
corporations with low levels of environmental commitment (shown in Table 15). In 
other words, corporations with high levels of environmental commitment were more 
likely to produce better (in terms of quality, scope of disclosure, and organizational 
concern) sustainability reports than those corporations with low levels of environmental 
commitment. Literature on sustainability reporting (Golob & Barttlett, 2007; Ihlen & 
Roper, 2011; Kolk, 2004; Weber & Marley, 2012) suggests in order to produce more 
comprehensive, high quality sustainability reports, organizations need spend more time 
and resources (e.g., research, additional employees). Therefore, the application of 
sustainability reporting at higher levels signal the targeted corporation’s attention to the 
proposed change in the shareholder resolution. 
The analysis that tested H5 failed to find a significant relationship between 
corporate community commitment and withdrawal outcome. This finding should be 
interpreted with some caution given the measures. The dissertation used KLD dataset to 
measure corporate commitment to stakeholders. It is possible that the KLD measures of 
corporate social performance in the community dimension may not be refined enough to 
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capture the effect corporate community commitment on shareholder activist-corporate 
engagement. Rather than rejecting the model outright, additional research with more 
precise measures is needed to definitely dismiss or support the impact of corporate 
stakeholder commitment on withdrawal outcomes. Nevertheless, one conclusion that 
can be drawn from interpreting the results of the second model is that targeted 
corporations’ environmental commitment can predict whether and to what extent these 
corporations will implement the sustainability reporting request made in shareholder 
resolutions. This can be related to the prominence of environmental issues for 
shareholders. Perhaps, environmental issues offered a practical platform for 
corporations demonstrate their commitment. It can be inferred that corporations and 
organizational stakeholders find environmental issues more workable than community 
issues. Therefore, KLD measures proved to be a valid measure to operationalize 
corporate environmental commitment.  
Overall, the findings suggest that, to achieve organizational legitimacy, 
organizational-stakeholder interactions should be considered as a whole by 
incorporating a broader view of the interests of both shareholders and non-shareholding 
stakeholders. As such, this view challenges the traditional stakeholder vs. shareholder 
conceptualizations in which shareholder interests have been pitted against those of 
stakeholders or vice versa (Freeman, 1984; Friedman, 1970; Metzler, 2001). 
Environmental issues provide a platform for engagement. The findings of this 
dissertation suggested that overall environmental issues were a major interest of 
institutional shareholder activists in the withdrawn social resolutions. Specifically, the 
results of the descriptive analyses showed that 41 percent of the withdrawn social 
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shareholder resolutions concerned environmental issues over the period of 1997-2011. 
Further, as seen in the answer of H3, the probability of reaching a withdrawal 
agreement on an environment-oriented resolution was higher than that of a community-
oriented issue resolution. We must interpret these findings from both social shareholder 
activist and corporate management perspectives in order to have a more comprehensive 
view. From the social shareholder activist perspective, two main interpretations help 
understand the findings. 
First, like other issues in social activist movements (Heath & Palenchar, 2009; 
Smith & Ferguson, 2010), the interests of shareholder activists are subject to their time 
and societal context. That is, the issues brought to the corporate attention by social 
shareholder activists are subject to shifts in the broader society in which organizations 
are located. Therefore, the prevalence of environmental issues in the withdrawn social 
resolutions reflects the growing awareness and concern about environmental issues in 
society. Indeed, a recent survey reported that the level of awareness and concern on 
environmental issues, such as global warming, has significantly increased in the United 
States (Gallup, 2013). Environmental issues voiced through various media channels 
often spark heated discussion on many levels of society (e.g., Al Gore’s An 
Inconvenient Truth). Thus, the increasing concern for environmental issues in the public 
agenda manifests in the social shareholder resolutions.  
Prior research showed that shareholder activists annually pick the issues on 
which they will focus (Graves et al., 2001; Gillan & Strack, 2007). A commonly shared 
concern on environmental issues provides social shareholder activists a platform for 
building relationships with other corporate stakeholders who share similar concerns 
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about these issues. In particular, NGOs can facilitate collaborations and alliances with 
larger institutional shareholders such as public pension funds to address environmental 
issues at multiple levels (Burns, 2012). For example, Ceres, a SRI fund, concentrates its 
shareholder activism on mobilizing a network of investors and NGOs to push 
corporations to adopt environmentally sustainable practices (www.ceres.org). 
Undoubtedly, developing a strong relationship with other stakeholders, such as 
consumers, employees, and shareholders, through a common denominator issue is likely 
to enable social shareholder activist groups to exert more pressure on corporations.  
Alternatively, strategic deliberations of social shareholder activists might 
explain the prevalence of environmental issues in the withdrawn social resolutions. It is 
important to keep in mind that a withdrawal is an indicator of success on the social 
shareholder activist part (Carleton et al., 1998; Guay et al., 2004; Profitt & Spicer, 
2006). Rowley and Moldoveanu’s (2003) identity-based stakeholder action perspective 
can explain why social shareholder activists focused their efforts on environmental 
issues. According to identity-based explanations of stakeholder action, social 
shareholder activists may focus on environmental issues, at which corporations are 
likely to reach agreements to take actions, to affirm the members’ collective identity. In 
particular, considering that socially responsible investing (SRI) funds attract their client 
base mainly through their social activism (Tkac, 2006), it might be a strategic choice for 
these shareholder groups to focus their activism on environmental issues rather than 
other social issues, such as diversity, which are often complex to address by 
organizations or seem controversial (Hon & Brunner, 2000). By taking actions on 
environmental issues and initiating engagement with corporations about these issues, 
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shareholder organizations may aim to differentiate themselves from other similar asset 
management organizations.   
A possible alternative explanation has to do with framing the issues in the 
shareholder resolutions. Literature on social shareholder activism suggested that 
sponsors frame shareholder resolutions using a nonconfrontational approach and often 
offering a clear economic rationale for demanding the change (Rehbein et al., 2004; Lee 
& Lounsbury, 2011). Building on the assumption that being good also pays off 
financially (Porter & Kramer, 2011), these shareholders believe that corporations should 
creatively manage the potential legal and market risks associated with irresponsible 
environmental behaviors (Lee & Lounsbury, 2011). Shareholder activists might find it 
more convenient to link environmentally responsible practices with corporate social 
performance. In other words, with the overall increasing environmental awareness and 
concern, social shareholder activists can easily make a business case for corporate 
environmental responsibility as a viable frame. Whereas other social issues regarding 
community, human rights, or diversity can be more difficult for social shareholder 
activists to construct such a frame. Social shareholder activists might assume that the 
provision of an economic rationale for corporate responsibility and framing issues with 
a market logic make it easier for corporate managers to accept the demands voiced in 
the social resolutions, which will be a success on the social shareholder activist part.  
From the corporate management perspective, as previously discussed, a 
withdrawn resolution signals the corporation’s willingness to engage with sponsors 
toward solving the issue under consideration (Carleton et al., 1998; Del Guercio & 
Hawkins, 2003; Guay et al., 2004; O’Rourke, 2003). As soon as a shareholder activist 
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reaches out the target corporation, the shareholder-corporate engagement process starts. 
The fate of a social resolution resides in the corporation’s willing to continue this 
engagement process, often considered as a “window of opportunity” by shareholder 
activists (O’Rourke, 2003, p. 21). Therefore, the nature of the issue raised in the social 
shareholder resolution can be a decisive factor for corporate responses to social 
shareholder activists’ calls for engagement. The results of the analyses showed that 
corporations were more willing to engage with social shareholder activists on 
environmental issues. 
Several alternative explanations can shed light on this finding. 
Some critics may argue about the impact of government regulations on corporations’ 
willingness to take actions on environmental issues. Corporations may have greater 
attention on some of the issues because of the external regulatory environment. For 
example, under the Section 313 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
Know Act of 1986, corporations have to report their toxic chemical releases and 
hazardous waste management. The regulation is later expanded by the Pollution 
Prevention Act of 1986. Indeed, there is extensive data called “The Toxic Release 
Inventory database” which provides full information on corporate pollution 
management practices. As such, corporations will be more willing to reach at 
withdrawal agreements on the environmental issues on which they have already 
obligations to report.  
A related argument can be that shareholder requests on environmental issues do 
not necessarily require target corporations to make profound structural changes in the 
organization. Environment oriented-issue resolutions often ask target corporations to 
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implement communication-based changes. For example, a majority of environment 
oriented-issue resolutions asked corporations to issue environmental sustainability 
reports. In these cases, the target corporations need to cull the information from related 
offices and put together in a coherent way. However, social shareholder resolutions that 
asked structural changes, such as establishing a committee on human rights, or 
procedural changes such as adopting a sexual orientation antidiscrimination policy will 
require target corporations to make institutional arrangements, which will lead to a 
series of profound and complex changes (Aldrich & Heker, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 
1991). 
Zoller (2009) argued, negotiations on issues and policy formations do not occur 
in isolation from any of the key components of society, but rather, they are sensitive to 
social norms at any given time and place. The growing stakeholder demand for 
improved corporate environmental responsibility following the recent environmental 
crises resulting from corporate misconduct (Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Harlow et al., 2011; 
Muralidharan et al., 2011) can push corporations to be more vigilant about 
environmental issues.  
The increasing impact of corporations on the natural environment has 
questioned the role of the environment in mediating the relationship between business 
and society. Although stakeholder status has been traditionally granted to human agents 
who can affect and be affected by corporations (Clarkson, 1995; Freeman, 1984), 
recently several scholars in the business ethics literature have argued that the natural 
environment should be considered as one type of stakeholder (e.g., Driscoll & Starik, 
2004; Jacobs, 1997; Philips & Reichart, 2000). The results of the current study 
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corroborate this line of research emphasizing the importance of corporate environmental 
responsibility as an important criterion for organizational legitimacy. The pervasive 
adoption of corporate sustainability reporting by large corporations in recent years 
(Golob & Bartlett, 2007; Ihlen, 2008; Signtzer & Prexl, 2007), also documented in this 
study, can be explained by corporations’ legitimatization efforts through socially 
accepted ceremonial activities (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). As organizational legitimacy of 
a corporation is socially constructed and is largely subjected to the dynamic perceptions 
of the stakeholders (Boyd, 2000; Holmstrom, 2007; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 
1995), we can argue that environmental responsibility has become one of the main 
components of corporate organizational legitimacy of corporations in the 21
st
 Century. 
Indeed, environmental problems have interwoven with social problems. It is 
difficult to isolate an environmental problem from the society as a whole. 
Environmental problems have manifested on various levels of society from the local to 
the global. The results of this study pointed out the important role of a concerted effort 
to address environmental issues led by social actors in the public sphere, such as NGOs 
and environmentalist groups. As Burns (2012) argued, a more structured holistic 
approach, on all levels of society, should be taken to ensure best environmental 
practices are adopted and implemented across the board. More initiatives should be 
developed through stakeholder collaborations that are designed to lead corporations to 
adopt environmentally responsible policies and practices.  
Public pension funds: The game changer. The results of this study demonstrated 
that institutional shareholders who demand for improved corporate social responsibility 
are not homogenous. The study showed that public pension funds, unions, religious 
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organizations, SRI funds, and special interest groups were the major institutional 
shareholders that sponsored social shareholder resolutions. Given that the outcomes of 
shareholder resolutions vary across sponsor types (Ertimur et al., 2010; Thomas & 
Cotter, 2007), it was important to identify the major sponsor type that received the 
highest percentage of withdrawal outcomes. 
The results of the research questions on sponsor type (RQ3e-f) showed that 
public pension funds were the leading institutional sponsors of withdrawn social 
resolutions. Nearly 82% of social resolutions filed by public pension funds were 
withdrawn. In other words, these funds most frequently withdrew their shareholder 
resolutions after reaching agreements with target corporations. As predicted in H3, 
social resolutions sponsored by public pension funds were more likely to be withdrawn 
as opposed to the ones filed by other sponsor types (e.g., religious organizations, 
unions). Furthermore, the results from the regression analysis testing H8 showed that 
withdrawn social resolutions sponsored by public pension funds were more likely to be 
implemented at higher levels by target corporations than the ones sponsored by other 
sponsor types. These findings are consistent with prior research which found that public 
pension funds were effective in initiating corporate governance changes (Ertimur et al., 
2010; Thomas & Cotter, 2007). This finding can be explained through several 
interpretations.  
The finding that a majority of withdrawn social shareholder resolutions were 
sponsored by public pension funds can be explained by stakeholder salience theory in 
management (Agle et al., 1999; Mitchell et al., 1999). The theory predicts that 
corporations will be more sensitive to stakeholders who posses legitimacy, power, and 
238 
urgency. As discussed in the literature review of this dissertation, public pension funds 
have the largest ownership stakes among the externally managed indexed funds—the 
average percentage stake in target corporations owned by the funds ranges from 0.5% to 
2.3% (Del Guercio & Hawkins, 1999; Gillan & Starks, 2000). Considering that the 
average percentage stake in target corporations by inactive institutional investors is only 
about 0.3%, public pension funds may be viewed as more powerful, legitimate, and 
salient in the eyes of corporate managements. It is difficult for corporations to simply 
dismiss the public pension funds’ demands, even if they consider the demands trivial. 
Corporations may feel pressure to address the issue one way or the other. Thus, public 
pension funds had more leverage in the shareholder activist-corporate engagement 
regarding a social issue. 
The finding that social resolutions filed by public pension funds were more 
likely to be withdrawn and implemented at higher levels can be also explained by 
resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The theory views resources as a 
basis of power and emphasizes interdependencies of organizations resulting from 
recourse dependencies. In other words, power and recourse dependence are directly 
linked. Accordingly, shareholders with greater resources have more power and can 
exert greater influences on target corporations. Because of their abundant resources, 
public pension funds are likely to garner more support from other shareholders, to 
maintain a more intense campaign for the issue they are advocating, and to attract 
greater media coverage. For example, the Council for Institutional Investors, a nonprofit 
association of pension funds with combined assets exceeding $4 trillion (www.cii.org/), 
regularly sends a series of letters to corporations that receive shareholder resolutions 
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filed by its members urging their implementation. Corporations cannot easily dismiss 
the social demands made by public pension funds. Given the growth of public pension 
funds’ involvement in social issues in recent years (Lee & Lounsbury, 2011; Smith, 
2012), public pension funds can be a game changer in social shareholder activism. 
The increasing role of public pension funds in social shareholder activism has 
important implications for public relations, which is concerned with how organizations 
relate to the public sphere through enagement (Bentele & Nothhaft, 2010; Jensen, 
2002). Prior research has documented that the immediate goals of shareholder 
resolution is not necessarily winning proxy votes, but simply to gain corporate 
management’s attention (Lee & Lounsbury, 2011; Logsdon & van Buren, 2008). Public 
pension funds can play a central role in attracting the corporate attention on a social 
issue. Often, religious organizations and special interest groups attempt to mobilize 
public pension funds to garner support for the social issue under consideration (Logsdon 
& van Buren, 2009; MacLeod, 2002). For example, to strengthen their bargaining 
position, ICCR enlist the support of public pension funds such as New York City 
Pension Funds for their resolutions. As the support for social shareholder resolutions 
increases with the involvement of public pension funds, corporations might become 
more willing to listen to the demands of social shareholder activists and agree on a 
workable solution. This means an increasing number of collaborations and alliances 
among social actors including corporations, NGOs, social activist groups, governments, 
and private persons on social issues. Public relations can play an instrumental role in 
facilitating engagements to reach on mutually acceptable agreements.  
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Social shareholder activists demand for increased stakeholder communication. 
One of the important conclusions drawn from this dissertation is that social shareholder 
activists mostly demanded for corporate accountability by asking target corporations to 
report their impact on the environment and society at large. A majority of withdrawn 
social shareholder resolutions between 1997 and 2011 specifically requested 
corporations to implement communication-based changes (e.g., report on corporate 
practices and polices) (n = 527, 57%).  In other words, social shareholder activists asked 
for greater corporate disclosures. One of the assumptions of shareholder resolutions that 
asked target corporations to disclose information can be that these corporations were 
already involved with socially responsible actions to a certain extent. By demanding 
written reports from these corporations, shareholders activists wish to monitor the 
progress in corporate social responsibility activities. Alternatively, the assumption can 
be that shareholder activists use resolutions as a first step in establishing an issue as 
worthy of corporate concern. In a sense, resolutions that demanded from corporations to 
report on a social issue expect the target corporation to improve in that area in a way 
that can be demonstrated to all organizational stakeholders.  
The results of the regression analysis on the implementation level of 
sustainability reporting request (H5-H8) suggested that social shareholder activism via 
filing resolutions can offer a viable tool for improving corporate transparency. A 
majority of corporations that reached at withdrawal agreements on sustainability 
reporting resolutions implemented the request by producing a corporate sustainability 
report at various levels with a mean value of 2.281 on a one to four scale (SD = 1.168). 
Further, the results indicated that corporations with higher level of environmental 
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commitment (as measured by corporate social performance values) produced 
sustainability reports at higher levels than the ones with low levels of stakeholder 
commitment (27% increase relative to the mean level). Overall, the results highlighted 
the importance of shareholder activist-corporate engagements in pushing corporations 
to disclose information on their impacts on environment and society at large, increasing 
organizational transparency.  
The implementation of corporate sustainability reporting examined here 
provides preliminary evidence for organizational legitimacy efforts. The practice of 
sustainability reporting (or corporate social responsibility) provides a way for 
corporations to share their social and environmental responsibility policies and practices 
with the different stakeholders. Further, as predicted in H6, target corporations in the 
petro-chemical industry produced higher levels of sustainability reports than the ones in 
other industry classifications. That is, corporations in different industries will have 
different levels of organizational legitimacy to maintain, with the implication that the 
more a corporation relies upon products extracted from the natural environment (for 
example, oil, gas, and chemicals), the more vigilant the corporation needs to be to 
maintain its organizational legitimacy.  
Another potential explanation for these differences can be corporate concerns on 
organizational reputation (Fombrun & van Riel, 2004). Kreps and Wilson (1982) noted 
that the value of a reputation is positively related to its fragility. Because corporations 
that are closer to the end-user consumers are more exposed to potential social sanctions 
in the form of boycotts and negative publicity (Rehbein et al., 2004), a corporation’s 
product mix is important to determine its social exposure. As oil and gas corporations 
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(e.g., Chevron, Exxon Mobil) heavily depend on end-user consumers, their reputation 
can be particularly vulnerable to losses resulting from social sanctions (Reid & Toffel, 
2009). Thus, corporations within the oil and gas industry may direct more attention and 
resources to express their positions on corporate sustainability issues.  
The finding further suggests that corporate sustainability reporting practices are 
undertaken as a part of organizational legitimacy efforts (Signitzer & Prexl, 2008). By 
adopting a standardized practice that adheres to the prescriptions generated within the 
field, an organization demonstrates that it is acting on collectively valued purpose in a 
proper and adequate manner (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Meyer & Roman, 1977). Thus, 
the sustainability reporting practice provides an account of organizational activities that 
helps an organization garner social legitimacy to strengthen its support and help secure 
its survival. 
The findings showed that social shareholder activists have played a role in 
making sustainability reporting a norm for corporations. Indeed, today the trend of 
sustainability reporting has grown into an acceptable practice, a socially the right thing 
to do, for corporations. There are several initiatives that create global guidelines for 
corporate sustainability reporting (e.g., Global Reporting Initiative, UN Global 
Compact principles) (Golob & Bartlett, 2007; Kolk, 2004; Weber & Marley, 2012). The 
pervasive adoption of sustainability reporting charters an important role for 
communication professionals who could help corporate managers to understand 
different expectations and demands of stakeholders and increase transparency and 
features that facilitate relationship building.  
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Implementation of changes: Organizational legitimacy through communication. 
Legitimacy is the link that connects societal systems and institutions (Epstein, 1972). 
Suchman (1995) argued that an organization is connected to its society through publics. 
As such, the concept plays an important role in understanding the relationships between 
an organization and its publics—the main area of study in public relations theory and 
research (Ferguson, 1984; Ledingham & Bruning, 1998).  Organization-public 
relationships are built around two key elements: stakeholders and communication. The 
review of the literature undertaken in this dissertation suggested that stakeholders are 
recognized sources of social environmental change pressures on organizations (Cutlip et 
al., 2000; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Scott et al., 2000). To gain organizational 
legitimacy in society organizations must constantly adjust their policies and actions to 
remain congruent with the expectations and demands of their stakeholders (Holmström, 
2009; Ihlen, 2008; van Ruler & Vercic, 2004), including those of shareholders.  
The results of this study showed that social shareholder resolutions reflect the 
changing social norms and expectations. Shareholders are one of the social actors in the 
public sphere who use a range of societal values and norms to evaluate the actions of 
the corporations. Changing social norms and expectations framed and voiced by various 
actors in society (Burns, 1999; Snow et al., 1986) constitute a source of pressure for 
organizations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Meyer & Rowan, 
1977). The findings of the Study 2 and the Study 3 confirmed that corporations 
implement structural and procedural changes to conform to societal expectations voiced 
by one type of stakeholder—shareholders. 
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This study suggests that understanding corporate responses to social shareholder 
activism requires an integrative approach to organizational legitimacy. As discussed 
earlier, approaches to legitimacy can be organized into two categories: strategic and 
institutional. Suchman (1995) discussed strategic and institutional aspects of legitimacy 
as two sides of the same idea. The strategic approach is that of “corporations looking 
out of” and working to secure legitimacy, while the institutional view is that of “society 
looking into” and imposing conditions for legitimacy (Suchman, 1995, p. 577). 
Similarly, Boyd (2000) distinguished two types of legitimacy—institutional and 
actional—in public relations literature. Boyd explained institutional legitimacy based on 
“an organization’s perceived competence and responsibility to publics’ interests” 
(Boyd, 2000, p. 351), which is close to Suchman’s (1995) concept of institutional 
legitimacy. Boyd (2000) described actional legitimacy as legitimation strategies enacted 
through rhetorical tactics on a more day-to-day basis. Boyd argued that public relations 
efforts should involve both institutional and actional legitimacy of organizations. For 
the purpose of this study, actional legitimacy can be considered from the strategic 
legitimacy perspective. The corporate responses to social shareholder activism studied 
in this dissertation suggested that organizations can be judged as legitimate or 
illegitimate using a combination of both perspectives. 
The case study provided an example for understanding the workings of 
organizational legitimacy—the ways in which organizations seek both strategic and 
institutional legitimacy. CONSOL Inc., the target corporation of a climate change 
resolution, responded to the proposed change by “incorporating structures and 
procedures that match widely accepted cultural models embodying common beliefs and 
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knowledge systems” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 878). The corporation created a 
boundary-spanning role called Environmental Strategy and Regulation Affairs, to signal 
its concern about the impact of the corporation on the natural environment (Aldrich & 
Heker, 1977; Heugens, Van den Bosch, & Van Riel, 2002; Rao & Sivakumar, 1999).  
Organizations use “symbolic references and gestures” in efforts to obtain legitimacy 
status from a relevant public (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975, p. 128). Meyer and Rowan 
(1977) highlighted the importance of the evolution of organizational language, such as 
the labels on the organizational chart, job titles, and vocabularies of motives used to 
describe the activities of individuals as a response to societal pressures. Furthermore, 
for this new position, the corporation employed a person who had a strong academic 
and professional background in environmental responsibility, which is also likely to 
contribute to organizational legitimacy efforts of the corporation (Aldrich & Heker, 
1977). The corporation then implemented a procedural change, largely based on 
stakeholder communication, reporting its corporate environmental responsibility as 
requested in the shareholder resolution. The procedural change thus involved actional 
legitimacy relying on “rhetorical tactics on a more day-to-day basis” (Boyd, 2000, p. 
348). In the next step, the corporation communicated to its stakeholders through 
corporate communication channels that the change was implemented. 
When introducing the first corporate social responsibility report of the 
organization, CONSOL did not refer to any shareholder pressure behind this step. 
Instead, the corporation emphasized that it is competent and socially responsible—two 
elements of gaining organizational legitimacy (Epstein, 1972). Using communication 
strategies in its corporate public relations documents (e.g., CEO letters, CSR reports, 
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press releases), the company attempted to establish actional legitimacy. Boyd (2000) 
explained that corporations undertake actional legitimacy when they attempt to 
demonstrate the legitimacy of a new policy or a procedure. The goal is to maintain 
legitimacy by giving reasons for stakeholders and that to garner their support by 
demonstrating that the corporation’s operations are useful and the corporation is acting 
responsibly. CONSOL also shared the news of its rewards and recognitions regarding 
environmental responsibility through using various communication channels. In doing 
so, the corporation sought for external endorsement and used symbolic references to 
enhance its organizational legitimacy (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Dowling & 
Pfeffer, 1975; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The case study confirmed the main propositions 
of the concept of organizational legitimacy by showing that a target corporation, faced 
by an external pressure, undertook a set of structural and procedural changes and 
communicated these changes to its stakeholders in order to maintain its organizational 
legitimacy. 
The case study also suggested that public relations function is instrumental in 
the ways that organizations seek legitimacy and support by implementing the changes 
proposed by social shareholder activists. After implementing the changes proposed by 
social shareholder activists, the target corporation conveyed the message that the 
organization is acting in congruence with stakeholder expectations and norms. Noting 
the socially constructed nature of legitimacy, Suchman (1995) noted that establishing 
and maintaining organizational legitimacy rested heavily on communication between 
organizations and their social environments. In other words, organizations cannot 
directly extract legitimacy from their social environment; instead they rely on 
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communication with stakeholders that demonstrate their congruence with societal 
expectations and norms. Communication of the implementation of changes is thus used 
to signal legitimation to stakeholders. Because organizational legitimacy implies some 
degree of justification for organizational existence in society through communication 
(Wæraas, 2007), public relations efforts are essential for communicating corporate 
actions and policies that serve stakeholders expectations and needs. Communication of 
organizational changes that signal stakeholder commitment can lead to organizational 
legitimacy, which largely rests in stakeholder perceptions (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; 
Suchman, 1995). Public relations activities thus play an important role for organizations 
seeking legitimacy and support by incorporating structural and procedural changes that 
address social shareholder activists.  
The organizational legitimization process exemplified in this dissertation 
provides an excellent case in which cocreational and functional approaches can 
reconcile. An integrative approach to public relations theory and practice (Boyd, 2000; 
Falkhaimer, 2007; Taylor, 2011; Raupp, 2004) can explain shareholder activist-
corporate engagement as a method of creating the meaning of the issue under 
consideration as well as corporations’ efforts for maintaining legitimacy through 
communication. Specifically, this study provides support for Boyd’s (2000) argument 
that both institutional (e.g., facilitating changes) and actional (day-to-day strategic 
communication activities) public relations can help build organizational legitimacy 
through applying both functional and cocreational approaches. 
Proposed model of organizational legitimacy. This study provided evidence for 
the legitimization efforts of organizations as a response to societal pressures imposed by 
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shareholder activists. The literature reviewed in this study suggested that shareholder 
activists are one type of stakeholders who have power to influence the organization, 
legitimacy of relationship, and urgency of a claim (Agle et al., 1999; Mitchel et al., 
1997). Shareholder activists are thus recognized sources of environmental change 
pressures on organizations (Cutlip et al., 2000; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Through a 
multimethod approach, this study proved that, to maintain organizational legitimacy, 
target corporations implemented structural and procedural changes demanded by social 
shareholders activists. Based on the literature review and the study results, the 
dissertation proposes a model of social shareholder activism (see Figure 19).  
***Insert Figure 19 Here*** 
The figure illustrates a simplified visualization of the process through which 
social shareholder activism can elicit changes in corporate practices and policies. The 
figure shows that the corporation is a part of an interconnected web of entities, such as 
NGOs, institutional shareholders, social activists, and private individuals, governments, 
in the social environment. This model places a social responsibility on the corporation 
determined by the interactions among various stakeholders including the social 
shareholder activists. After social issues are identified and framed by these interactions, 
social shareholder activists channel the social demands to the corporation through 
institutional mechanisms such as filing resolutions. As previously discussed, social 
shareholder activists can file a resolution under the SEC Rule 14a-8 which provides a 
legal and institutional channel for communication with corporate management. Written 
resolutions require a response by corporations (Gillan & Starks, 2000; Vogel, 1983), 
which forces them to acknowledge the issues being raised and to submit their responses 
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on record (through the SEC). The shareholder resolution mechanism thus allows social 
shareholder activists to extract formal written responses from corporations to social 
issues that corporations may not otherwise address directly. Further, social shareholder 
resolutions can start shareholder activist-corporate engagement to discuss the issue 
under consideration. Shareholder activists withdraw their resolutions based on the 
corporation’s commitment to address the proposed changes building upon the ongoing 
“good faith communication” about the issue (Logsdon & van Buren, 2008, p. 355). 
Prior research has shown that shareholder activists only withdraw their resolutions 
when the corporate management shows “sincerity and legitimate progress” towards 
meeting the goal or request made in the resolution (Carleton et al., 1998; Graves et al., 
2001, p. 296). Faced with shareholder pressure to maintain its organizational 
legitimacy, the target corporation implements structural or procedural changes proposed 
in the withdrawn social resolutions to signal that its policies and practices are congruent 
with societal expectations. 
Premised on interconnectedness, the interactions among social actors in the 
model emphasize networks and demand a collaborative process.  In every step of this 
process, communication plays an essential role. Social shareholder activists first 
communicate with other shareholders and social actors. Especially, since the relaxation 
of the SEC’s communication rule in 1992, which required shareholders to file and 
distribute a proxy statement with the SEC when communicating with 10 or more 
shareholders, shareholder activism has gained a new momentum through 
communication and networking (Doh, 2002; Macleod, 2009). Through communication 
the boundaries of corporation emerge with viewpoints of stakeholders on what it means 
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to be legitimate and responsible corporation. As a response, corporations implement 
procedural and structural changes and communicate these changes to stakeholders to 
maintain organizational legitimacy. Building on the organizational theory, management, 
and public relations literature, the proposed model suggests that social norms and 
expectations are socially constructed and become institutionalized through stakeholder 
interactions. As such, shareholder activist-corporate engagement process, through 
which corporations and shareholder activists mutually agree to address social issues 
voiced in shareholder resolutions, can lead to progressive changes in society. 
This dissertation supported previous literature that shows that withdrawal 
outcomes signal shareholder activist-corporate engagement regarding the social issue in 
private settings (Carleton et al., 1998; Guay et al., 2004; Logsdon & van Buren, 2008). 
The study proved that after withdrawals target corporations in the sample implemented 
the requested changes. The case study further showed that a procedural change 
requested in a withdrawn social resolution eventually led a series of related changes in 
the organizations. Thus, the study suggests that social shareholder activism can offer a 
viable tool to contribute to the betterment of society by engaging corporations in a 
conversation over social issues that arise from the public sphere and eliciting changes in 
corporate social policies and practices through institutional channels.  
Theoretical Contributions 
Organizational legitimacy is a central concept in understanding the relationship 
between society and business. However, a comprehensive reading of the literature 
undertaken in this dissertation suggested that studies on organizational legitimacy were 
fragmented across several social sciences. Combining three theoretical traditions in 
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management, organizational theory, and public relations, this dissertation proved the 
value of organizational legitimacy as a useful theoretical lens through which researchers 
across social sciences can explain and predict the voluntary compliances of corporations 
to societal pressures. The dissertation provided an empirical account of organizational 
legitimacy in a unique setting by examining corporate responses to societal expectations 
voiced by shareholders. The dissertation thus extended the organizational legitimacy 
framework by testing hypotheses on its theoretical scope and demonstrating its 
generality—which are the main criteria in assessing the value of a theory in social 
sciences (Chaffee & Berger, 1987; Littlejohn, 2002). 
Organizational theory literature has recognized the challenges related to 
conceptualization and measurement of organizational legitimacy (Deephouse & 
Suchman, 2008; Heugens et al., 2002; Scott et al., 2000). Similarly, in public relations 
literature, even though a number of scholars emphasized the importance of the concept 
of legitimacy for public relations (e.g., Boyd, 2000; Heath, 2006; Ihlen & van Ruler, 
2009; Metzler, 2001; Raupp, 2004), empirical accounts, to date, have been limited to 
explanatory case studies discussing legitimacy being gained or lost after a major crisis 
(e.g., Coombs, 1992; Hearit, 1995). Studies that operationalize constructs of 
organizational legitimacy and employ the concept in hypothesis testing are largely 
absent in public relations literature. This dissertation filled the gap by testing the main 
assumptions of organizational legitimacy in a non-traditional setting. By focusing on 
one dimension of organizational legitimacy, corporate social responsibility, and 
controlling for the other dimension, financial competence (Epstein, 1972; Heath, 2006; 
Kruckeberg & Starcks, 2001; Leeper, 2001), and operationalizing the concept through 
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the measures of corporate stakeholder commitment; this dissertation offered an 
analytical tool for future public relations research. 
This dissertation makes a variety of important contributions to public relations 
as well as business and society scholarship. Using organizational legitimacy as an 
overarching concept, the role of corporations in society was explained through societal 
approaches developed within organizational theory, public relations, and management. 
Specifically, institutional theory in organizational research posited that organizations 
change their structures or operations to conform to societal expectations about which 
structures and operations are legitimate (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 
1977; Scott et al., 2000). This theory views stakeholders as an environmental change 
agent that can influence organizations (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). Stakeholder 
theory (Clarkson, 1995; Freeman, 1984) in management states that an organization can 
affect and be affected by a wide range of stakeholders in its social environment and that 
these groups have legitimate claims on the organization. Finally, societal views in 
public relations examine the role of public relations in society and highlight the 
importance of constantly sensing the environment by interactions with multiple publics 
and adjusting the organization to the changing values and norms of publics. 
Specifically, community-building theory holds that organizational efforts should 
address the society at large to build and restore a sense of community, and that 
organizations inherently have responsibilities for their local and global communities 
(Kruckeberg & Starck, 1988; Valentini et al., 2012; Vujnovic & Kruckeberg, 2012). 
Fully functioning society theory contends that an organization’s legitimacy is tied to its 
capacity to meet and exceed the normative expectations of stakeholders (Heath, 2006). 
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Similarly, the reflective perspective developed in the European public relations 
scholarship argues that, in order to gain legitimacy, organizations should develop 
reflective mechanisms to be able to think from the inside out and the outside in to 
understand societal norms and expectations and adjust their practices and policies 
accordingly (e.g., Holmström, 2005, 2009; Ihlen & van Ruler, 2009; Vercic, van Ruler, 
Butschi, & Flodin, 2001). Further, societal approaches in public relations emphasizes 
the vitality and complexity of the public sphere, which constantly evolves with the 
interactions of connected social actors (Bentele & Nothhaft, 2010: Self, 2010), for 
building organizational legitimacy (Ihlen & van Ruler, 2009; Jensen, 2002; Raupp, 
2004).  
By combining the societal approaches that explain the constructive role of 
business in society across three fields, this dissertation took a multidisciplinary 
approach to explain and predict corporate responses to societal pressures exerted by 
shareholders. In doing so, the dissertation answered the call from public relations 
scholars (Botan & Hazelton, 2006; Gower, 2006; McKie, 2001; Toth, 2010) who 
highlighted the need for a multidisciplinary approach to improve public relations theory 
and research.  
 Several public relations scholars called for more scholarship specifically on 
investor relations (Botan & Hazelton, 2006; Laskin, 2009). This dissertation conducted 
a large-scale study of shareholder activism on social and environmental issues. In doing 
so, the dissertation contributed to the scholarship on investor relations by analyzing 
shareholder activism—a growing movement in recent years (Kiefer, 2013; Lee & 
Lounsbury, 2011). Further, by developing and testing models that explained corporate 
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responses to societal expectations of shareholders and demonstrating the importance of 
corporate communication in this process, the dissertation contributed to the scholarship 
that called for a convergence between investor relations and public relations (Botan & 
Hazelton, 2006; Dolphin, 2004; Laskin, 2006, 2009). The dissertation suggested the 
concept of organizational legitimacy as a theoretical basis for understanding the 
interactions between corporations and shareholders, who are increasingly becoming 
more concerned about the impact of corporations on society (Lee & Lounsbury, 2011; 
Logsdon & van Buren, 2009; Tkac, 2006; Sjorstrom, 2008).   
Practical Contributions 
This dissertation was grounded in a societal view that considers the role of 
public relations as building and maintaining organizational legitimacy. The theoretical 
stance that views the main function of public relations as societal legitimation of 
organizations offers some important insights for public relations practice. If an 
organization’s survival is dependent upon a generalized view that the actions of an 
organization are desirable and congruent with socially constructed system of norms and 
expectations (Suchman, 1995), the most ethical way to acquire and maintain public 
support and respect is building relationships through an open and honest 
communication between organizations and its various publics (Ledingham & Bruning, 
1998; Kent & Taylor, 2002; Pearson, 1989). Public relations practitioners can play a 
catalyst role in building and maintaining organizational legitimacy through an 
integrative approach that recognizes the societal pressures exerted by stakeholders as a 
change agent and uses communication to help organizations gain public support and 
respect. 
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In the context of social shareholder activism, communication not only with 
shareholder activists but also with other stakeholders is essential. This dissertation 
contends that corporations would have decreased the likelihood of being targeted by a 
social resolution if they had installed the mechanisms to understand their social 
environment through engagement with the public sphere. Indeed, practitioners pointed 
to the growing trend of shareholder activism in recent years and highlighted the 
importance of communication (Kiefer, 2013). The additional analysis of the shareholder 
activist-corporate correspondence filed with the SEC suggests that corporate attorneys 
and legal counsels tended to communicate with the activists. However, building upon 
the results, this dissertation argues that the corporate management team should include 
corporate communication professionals (e.g., public relations, investor relations) who 
need to engage in conversation with shareholder activists along with attorneys or 
counsels. Communication professionals anchored in the public sphere can facilitate an 
ongoing engagement that will contribute to the betterment of society. 
The process of understanding public expectations and acceptable corporate 
behaviors in a given society can only be achieved through listening to and engaging in 
conversations with publics, with the implication of the need for a constant engagement. 
The case analyzed in this study showed that building and maintain organizational 
legitimacy requires an integrative approach to public relations. CONSOL Energy, the 
target corporation of the social resolution, attempted to align itself with the societal 
expectations voiced by shareholders through implementing structural and procedural 
changes, such as creating a boundary-spanning role and producing corporate 
sustainability reports. The incorporation of these changes shields the organization from 
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external pressures (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). CONSOL 
also sought to enhance its legitimacy by obtaining external endorsements (e.g., awards, 
recognitions) and communicating its own right to exist by demonstrating that it is acting 
in congruent with the societal expectations and norms. Therefore, public relations 
professionals are expected to function as a change agent in the organization and to 
explain the theory of the organization to its various publics. This requires using ethical 
communication to maintain constant engagement with the public. 
Social shareholder activism can also empower public relations professionals 
who have a societal concern with regards to corporate social responsibility practices and 
policies. Public relations professionals often lack direct access to the dominant coalition 
(Grunig & Hunt, 1984; Bowen, 2009) and do not have the authority and power to 
implement fundamental changes within corporations (Holtzhausen, 2012). Social 
shareholder resolutions can provide a platform for these public relations professionals to 
engage corporate managements in a conversation about the social issue under 
consideration. For example, public relations professionals who work in corporate social 
responsibility communication might be likely to favor organizational efforts to improve 
corporate social performance. Social shareholder resolutions might allow public 
relations professionals of the target corporations to push for engagement with the 
shareholder activists and to advance their own goals to improve the corporation’s social 
performance. Public relations professionals can connect the target corporation to its 
social environment with the help of social shareholder activist engagement. 
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Methodological Contributions 
This dissertation has provided a number of methodological contributions. Ihlen 
and van Ruler (2009) suggested that pluralistic research approaches to public relations 
could help the field to avoid intellectual isolationism. Stacks (2002) called for public 
relations research that incorporates various methodological approaches. Specifically, 
Smith and Ferguson (2010) and McKie (2001) lamented the dearth of methodological 
approaches to activism research in public relations and highlighted the need for studies 
that examine the interactions between activists and organizations and the need for 
methodological diversity. This dissertation contributed to the diversity of 
methodological approaches by investigating one research phenomenon—social 
shareholder activism—through three different analytical procedures: content analysis, 
model testing, and a case study. Using cross-sectional panel data that covered 
shareholder resolutions filed at U.S. publicly traded corporations between 1997 and 
2011, this dissertation provided a clear picture of social shareholder activism. 
Furthermore, the dissertation used several methodological approaches to explain and 
test the conditions under which social shareholder activists can elicit positive responses 
corporations.  
The dissertation introduced to public relations research one proxy measure for 
measuring corporate stakeholder commitment: —Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini’s 
(KLD) corporate social performance values, which has been widely used in the 
management research (e.g., Graves & Waddock, 1994; Hillman & Keim, 2001; 
Kacperczyk, 2009; Sharfman, 1996; Reid & Toffel, 2009). The research design 
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provided an analytical tool to operationalize corporate stakeholder commitment as one 
indicator of organizational legitimacy. 
 In addition, this dissertation introduced several large datasets that have been 
widely used in the fields of management and finance but unknown to public relations 
research. For example, the Risk Metrics dataset on shareholder resolutions can be used 
for testing research hypotheses grounded in public relations theories. This dissertation 
introduced CRSP and COMPUSTAT dataset for future public relations research in the 
corporate context. Incorporating corporate financial indicators in the theoretical models 
is necessary in the corporate public relations research. Legitimacy of a corporation 
partly depends on its practical efficiency (Epstein, 1972; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  In 
other words, corporate financial performance is an indicator of a corporation’s 
organizational legitimacy. Therefore, corporate financial variables should be accounted 
for in the theoretical models that explain and predict the workings of organizational 
legitimacy.  
Limitations 
As with any study, there are several limitations that should be taken into account 
when evaluating the results of this investigation and setting out on future research 
projects. This dissertation is limited with respect to documenting the impact of 
corporate stakeholder commitment on the outcomes of social shareholder resolutions. 
Although the KLD measures were widely used and validated by a number of 
management scholars (e.g., Hillman & Keim, 2001; Kacperczyk, 2009; Sharfman, 
1996; Graves & Waddock, 1997), a few scholars argued that KLD measures for 
community dimension may produce poor predictors of corporate attention to 
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community (Chatterji et al., 2009). Additional research with more precise measures 
regarding community commitment is needed in public relations research. 
Nevertheless, KLD data provides a set of reliable and valid measures of 
corporate attention to stakeholders (e.g., Hillman & Keim, 2001; Kacperczyk, 2009; 
Mattingly & Berman, 2006; Sharfman, 1996; Waddock & Graves, 1997).  The large 
number of subscriptions to KLD dataset by socially sensitive institutional shareholders 
is the testimony for the reliability of the dataset. However, using more objective 
measures, such as corporate expenditures on stakeholders as a proportion of sales or 
profits, would contribute to our understanding of corporate commitment to stakeholders.  
This study employed probit analysis, a common specification for a binary 
response model, to assess the probability of withdrawing a social shareholder 
resolution. Advanced categorical statistics, such as probit and logit analyses, allow 
researchers to fit theoretically driven models to the data under study. Therefore, many 
communication scholars acknowledged the value of these analyses for testing 
hypotheses that involve categorical variables (e.g., Denham, 2002; Hutchinson et al, 
2006; Jones, Denham, & Springston, 2007). Although probit models are powerful 
statistical analyses (Denham, 2002; Long, 1997; McCulloch & Rossi, 1994), one 
limitation of the probit analysis is that they require normal distributions for all 
unobserved components (Wooldridge, 2006). In some situations, normal distribution 
may not be applicable, which may lead to some errors. Future researchers should use 
caution while implementing probit models.  
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Directions for Future Research 
This dissertation conducted a study of social shareholder activism using an 
extensive sample of shareholder resolutions filed between 1997 and 2011. There is an 
ample opportunity for public relations researchers to address new issues and develop 
new models on shareholder activism for improved corporate social performance. 
Regardless of whether a resolution is withdrawn through engagement or not, the 
shareholder resolution process requires repeated interactions between shareholder 
activists and corporations. While the outcomes might vary, the process of social 
shareholder activism involves communication and public relations efforts. By 
exercising their ownership rights, attending annual meetings, interacting with the 
management and submitting resolutions, shareholders communicate their dissatisfaction 
with corporations. Social shareholder activism that uses institutional mechanisms 
provides an excellent setting for public relations scholars in the relational paradigm to 
examine how antecedents of relationships (e.g., trust, commitment, satisfactions) play 
out between shareholder activists—powerful stakeholders with legitimate and urgent 
claims—and corporate managers.  
 One fruitful extension of this research would be case studies based on interviews 
and field observations, which could contribute to the understanding of organizational 
legitimacy through self-accounts of the involved parties. For example, in-depth focus 
groups with corporate managers can extend the current study by explaining the 
motivations for their responses to societal expectations raised by shareholders. 
Another fruitful research area for communication scholars to conduct a framing 
analysis of social shareholder resolutions. Social shareholder activists often reframe the 
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issues under consideration to align the issues with their objectives as well as the 
corporate objectives (Graves et al., 2004). Often, social resolutions frame the issues 
from the corporate managers’ perspectives, bringing up the potential financial 
benefit/loss as a result of a social issue (Lee & Lounsbury, 2011). It would be 
interesting to find out whether frames employed in shareholder resolutions have an 
impact on the outcomes of these resolutions. 
 Social shareholder resolutions may also provide a fruitful research setting for 
future rhetorical research in public relations. The correspondence between shareholder 
activists and corporate representatives consists of statement and counterstatement in the 
forms of shareholder letters, shareholder resolutions, and no-action and response letters 
by corporations. Considering that the SEC bases its omission decision on the arguments 
put forward in the shareholder resolutions and letters written by sponsors and in the no-
action letters written by corporations (Gillan & Starks, 2000), it is important to conduct 
rhetorical analyses on these documents. Indeed, the case study showed that the 
correspondence that took place between the target corporation and the sponsoring 
shareholder activist regarding the social resolution involves a series of letters written by 
the both parties over a two-year time span. A close analysis of strategic choices of 
arguments, ethics, and persuasion tactics in this type of correspondence would certainly 
contribute to our understanding of social shareholder activism, as it would indicate what  
“each organization does and says because of what meanings and interpretations people 
place on those actions and statements” (Heath, 2001, p. 32). 
Another aspect of social shareholder activism that requires future research is 
using media relations for eliciting social change; such research could illustrate the 
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coexistence of functional and cocreational approaches in public relations (Falkheimer, 
2007; Taylor, 2011). Research suggests that publicity plays an important role in 
evaluating the course of shareholder activist-corporate engagement (Carleton et al., 
1996; den Hond & Bakker, 2007; Reid & Toffel, 2009). Because large corporations are 
concerned about their reputation (Lee & Lounsbury, 2011; Kacperczyk, 2009), 
shareholder activism involves close relationships with media. For example, the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP), a London-based NGO that represents more than 300 
institutional shareholders (www.cdproject.net) asks the top executive managers of the 
world’s largest public corporations to disclose information about the risks and 
opportunities posed by climate change. In 2012, 69 percent of the S&P 500 Index 
corporations responded to this request by publicly disclosing the information (Who 
discloses to CDP, 2013). This information is then published on the organization’s 
website as well as shared with relevant publics through communication channels. 
Similarly, many SRI funds maintain extensive archives of their shareholder resolution 
filings including the target corporations’ names and responses (see for example, Walden 
Asset Management, Green Century Asset Management, and Ceres). 
In management literature publicity has been recognized as one potentially 
effective tool for promoting such spillover effects, since it affects not only the direct 
target of a fund’s activism but also other corporations who observe it (den Hond & de 
Bakker, 2007; Reid & Toffel, 2009). The threat of publicity might give funds leverage 
with target management, and might also motivate other corporations to proactively 
improve their corporate performance without being explicitly targeted (Del Guercio & 
Hawkins, 1999). However, not all shareholder activists use publicity as weapon. For 
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example, Carleton et al (1998) found that, during shareholder activist-corporate 
engagements, public pensions funds kept the process private, which yielded 
constructive outcomes. It would be a fruitful research area to investigate the role of 
publicity on the outcomes of social shareholder resolutions. Public relations activists 
and strategies can be studied for both conditions, comparing the subjects and results.  
Shareholder activists communicate and build relationships to garner the support 
of other shareholders, which increases the bargaining power of these shareholders and 
enhances the salience of the issue under consideration. Shareholder activists can achieve 
this goal with less expense because regulations require corporations to bear all costs of 
disseminating resolutions through proxy statements using the corporate communication 
channels. In particular, with the pervasive use of the Internet and social media, many 
shareholder activist organizations form networks of alliances (Guay, Doh, & Sinclair, 
2004; MacLeod, 2009). For example, Investment Network on Climate Risk (INCR), a 
nonprofit organization of investor coalition of 100 members that manages nearly $11 
trillion in assets, largely relies on the Internet to form global and local investor networks 
(Ceres, 2013). This area also bears fruitful ideas for network research.  
The research in the field of shareholder activism for corporate social and 
environmental responsibility is at an infant stage, with a limited number of published 
articles in the business and society and management journals. Public relations theory 






 century the role of business in society has induced a growing 
discussion in academia. From a societal perspective, this dissertation suggested that 
organizational legitimacy provides a valuable theoretical lens that can explain the role 
of corporations in society, which is increasingly becoming interconnected, dynamic, 
and volatile (Castells, 2009; Self, 2010; Valentini et al., 2012). Organizational 
legitimacy is a condition that reflects consonance with societal expectations and 
presence of public support (Boyd, 2000; Heath, 2006; Suchman, 1995). As such, 
legitimacy of an organization is deeply rooted in the concept of public sphere. 
Therefore, this dissertation argued that a reflective public relations approach anchored 
in the public sphere is needed for corporations to listen to and engage with its various 
publics.  
Social shareholder resolutions have potential for transferring the issues that are 
shaped by the public sphere to policy-making mechanisms. In essence, shareholder 
resolutions on social issues signal an expectancy gap (Sethi, 1979) between a 
corporation’s policies and practices and societal demands. From a societal perspective, 
by identifying the legitimacy gap and initiating an engagement to address this gap, 
social shareholder activists can indeed contribute to the betterment of a society. Heath 
and Waymer (2009) argued that “the dialogue of society is best when it helps 
organizations be more reflective and work for legitimacy; it voices perspectives to help 
society be more fully functional” (p. 201). Indeed, social shareholder activists are 
uniquely positioned to influence corporate managements because they can exert their 
influence as a both shareholder and stakeholder (Doh, 2002). Shareholder activists in 
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this dual role can help to provide the drive for other important stakeholders, such as 
consumers, employees, public pension funds, and socially responsible investors, to 
mobilize and exert pressure on the corporation. Corporate responses to social 
shareholder activism, in turn, may lead to broader changes in society. In particular, 
successful and large corporations are mimicked, with their model becoming the 
standard against which subsequent corporations are patterned and compared (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983). Thus, social shareholder activists not only can elicit direct changes in 
the corporations, as demonstrated in this study, but also they can create spillover effects 
at the industry and the societal levels.  
 The relationships between business and society have become more complicated 
than ever before with the global economic growth and increasing demands as well as 
active involvement of societal members (Bentele & Nothhaft, 2010; Castells, 2009; 
Self, 2010). This dissertation argued that organizational legitimacy provides a useful 
theoretical lens to understand the relationships of business and society in the 21
st
 
century.  Combining three theoretical traditions—organizational theory, public 
relations, and management—this dissertation took a multidisciplinary approach and 
showed the value of the concept of organizational legitimacy in predicting and 
explaining corporate responses to societal expectations voiced by shareholders. The 
theoretical foundation of organization legitimacy recognizes the power of the public to 
actively shape corporate policies and practices. The concept also explains the voluntary 
compliances of corporations to societal expectations that require them to act in socially 
acceptable ways even though these practices might conflict with economic benefits 
(Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Galaskiewicz, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
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Organizational legitimacy provides the theoretical basis for corporate disclosures for 
increasing organizational transparency, which is likely to create trust between 
organizations and stakeholders. This dissertation has agreed with public relations 
scholars (e.g., Boyd, 2000; Heath, 2006; Holmstrom, 2005; Ihlen & van Ruler, 2009; 
Raupp, 2004) who viewed that organizational legitimacy should be a foundational 
concept of public relations and argued the greater centrality of the concept for 
understanding the relationships between business and society in the 21
st
 century.   
Focusing on social shareholder activists, who play a dual role as shareholders 
and social activists, this dissertation has questioned the traditional dichotomous 
conceptualizations of stakeholders. The dissertation argued that, in today’s complex 
society, the concept of the public sphere, a central concept in public relations literature 
from societal perspectives (Bentele & Nothhaft, 2010; Ihlen et al., 2009; Raupp, 2007), 
could enrich the theorizing efforts in the field of management in regards to 
organization-stakeholder relationships. This dissertation has argued that the expanded 
role of public relations in society is to keep organizations fully cognizant of the societal 
norms and expectations and to ensure that organizations conduct socially desired 
actions in return for legitimacy in society. One of the ways in which corporations can 
achieve organizational legitimacy is through listening to and engaging with the public 
sphere. This is the most fruitful area where organizational theory, management, and 
public relations disciplines intersect to explore and understand relationships between 
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Table 2. Sustainability Report Requests in the Withdrawn Social Resolutions Sample, 1997-2011 
Target Corporations Levels Sponsors   Sponsor Types 
EL PASO CORP 0 Friends of Earth Special Interest 
KINDER MORGAN, INC. 1 New York City Pension Fund Public Pension fund 
NATIONAL OILWELL VARCO, INC. 2 California State Teachers' Retirement Public pension fund 
SOUTHWESTERN ENERGY COMPANY 2 California State Teachers' Retirement Public pension fund 
CHESAPEAKE ENERGY CORP 4 California Teachers’ Retirement Public Pension fund 
TESORO CORPORATION 4 California State Teachers' Retirement Public pension fund 
KINDER MORGAN, INC. 1 New York City Pension Funds Public pension fund 
BURLINGTON NORTHERN SANTA FE CORP. 1 New York City Funds Public pension fund 
EL PASO CORP 1 New York City Pension Funds Public pension fund 
ALLEGHENY TECHNOLOGIES, INC 1 New York City Pension Funds Public pension fund 
THE CHUBB CORP. 2 Walden Asset Management Public pension fund 
GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP. 2 New York City Pension Funds Public pension fund 
CIGNA CORP. 2 New York City Pension Funds Public pension fund 
NEWELL RUBBERMAID INC. 2 California State Teachers' Retirement Public pension fund 
WYNN RESORTS, LIMITED 2 California State Teachers' Retirement Public pension fund 
EAGLE MATERIALS INC. 2 New York City Pension Funds Public pension fund 
RANGE RESOURCES CORP 2 New York City Pension Funds Public pension fund 
DEAN FOODS COMPANY 3 New York City Pension Funds Public pension fund 
HARRAH'S ENTERTAINMENT, INC. 3 New York City Pension Funds Public pension fund 
THE WILLIAMS COMPANIES, INC. 3 New York City Pension Funds Public pension fund 
THE HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES 3 New York City Pension Funds Public pension fund 
NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORP. 3 New York City Pension Funds Public pension fund 
RAYTHEON CO. 3 New York City Pension Funds Public pension fund 
THE BOEING COMPANY 3 New York City Pension Funds Public pension fund 
SAFEWAY INC. 3 New York City Pension Funds Public pension fund 
UNION PACIFIC CORPORATION 3 California State Teachers' Retirement Public pension fund 
NUCOR CORP 3 New York City Pension Funds Public pension fund 







MARSH & MCLENNAN COMPANIES, INC. 4 General Board of Pension Public pension fund 
AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER CO. 4 New York City Pension Funds Public pension fund 
SPRINT NEXTEL CORP 4 New York City Pension Funds Public pension fund 
AK STEEL HOLDING 4 New York City Pension Funds Public pension fund 
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC. 4 New York City Pension Funds Public pension fund 
VULCAN MATERIALS COMPANY 4 New York City Pension Funds Public pension fund 
KBR, INC. 4 NY State Common Retirement Fund Public pension fund 
SEARS HOLDINGS CORP 2 ELCA Religious 
COMMUNITY HEALTH SYSTEMS 2 General Board of Pension Religious 
YUM BRANDS, INC 2 Sister of Charity of Virgin Mary Religious 
BROADCOM CORPORATION 3 Catholic Healthcare West Religious 
JOHNSON CONTROLS, INC. 4 Benedictine Sisters Religious 
KELLOGG CO. 4 General Board of Pension Religious 
NOVELL, INC. 0 As You Sow Foundation SRI fund 
BALDOR ELECTRIC COMPANY 0 Walden Asset Management SRI fund 
FAMILY DOLLAR STORES, INC. 0 Green Century Capital Management SRI fund 
SOUTHWEST GAS CORPORATION 0 Calvert Asset Management Co. SRI fund 
TIME WARNER INC. 0 Newground Social Investment SRI fund 
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC. 1 Trillium Asset Management SRI fund 
UNIT CORPORATION 1 Calvert Asset Management Co. SRI fund 
DENTSPLY INTERNATIONAL, INC. 1 Walden Asset Management SRI fund 
PENTAIR, INC. 1 Calvert Asset Management Co. SRI fund 
PULTEGROUP, INC. 1 Calvert Asset Management Co. SRI fund 
ST. JUDE MEDICAL, INC. 1 Walden Asset Management SRI fund 
CHICO’S FAS INC 1 Calvert Asset Management SRI fund 
ANN INC. 1 Calvert Asset Management Co. SRI fund 
ST. JUDE MEDICAL, INC. 1 Trillium Asset Management SRI fund 
STRYKER CORPORATION 2 Walden Asset Management SRI fund 
WENDY'S INTERNATIONAL, INC. 2 Domini Social Investments SRI fund 







ILLINOIS TOOL WORKS INC. 2 F&C Asset Management SRI fund 
RANGE RESOURCES CORPORATION 2 Calvert Asset Management Co. SRI fund 
SOUTHWESTERN ENERGY CO. 2 Calvert Asset Management Co. SRI fund 
LOWE'S COMPANIES, INC. 2 Domini Social Investments SRI fund 
J. CREW GROUP, INC 2 Calvert Asset Management SRI fund 
SIGMA-ALDRICH CORP. 2 Walden Asset Management SRI fund 
COSTCO WHOLESALE CORP 2 Green Century Capital Management SRI fund 
TIME WARNER CABLE INC. 2 Walden Asset Management SRI fund 
NICOR INC. 2 Calvert Asset Management Co. SRI fund 
WILLIAMS-SONOMA, INC. 2 Calvert Asset Management Co. SRI fund 
HEINZ (H.J.) 3 Calvert Asset Management Co. SRI fund 
FLOWSERVE CORPORATION 3 Calvert Asset Management Co. SRI fund 
ITRON, INC. 3 Calvert Asset Management Co. SRI fund 
DENBURY RESOURCES INC. 3 Calvert Asset Management Co. SRI fund 
VALMONT INDUSTRIES, INC. 3 Calvert Asset Management Co. SRI fund 
JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORP 3 Calvert Asset Management Co. SRI fund 
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO. 3 Calvert Asset Management Co. SRI fund 
J.M. SMUCKER COMPANY 3 Calvert Asset Management Co. SRI fund 
VALMONT INDUSTRIES, INC 3 Calvert Asset Management Co. SRI fund 
WATERS CORPORATION 3 Walden Asset Management SRI fund 
VARIAN MEDICAL SYSTEMS, INC 3 Walden Asset Management SRI fund 
CHESAPEAKE ENERGY CORP. 4 Calvert Asset Management Co. SRI fund 
CONSOL ENERGY 4 Walden Asset Management SRI fund 
HASBRO, INC. 4 Camilla Madden Charitable Trust SRI fund 
AMERICAN EXPRESS 4 Trillium Asset Management SRI Fund 
NORTHWEST NATURAL GAS COMP 4 Calvert Asset Management Co. SRI fund 
SOUTH JERSEY INDUSTRIES 4 Walden Asset Management SRI fund 
THE RYLAND GROUP, INC. 0 GBPUMC Union 
CENTEX CORP. 1 GBPUMC Union 







WASTE CONNECTIONS, INC. 2 Teamsters Union  
 
Notes. Levels refer to sustainability reporting implementation levels in the following year of the withdrawal outcome. Levels of 
sustainability reporting were based on GRI Application Levels (www.globalreporting.org/reporting/reporting-framework-
overview/application-level-information) with some modifications. The number zero (0) indicates an absence of a sustainability report 
by the time of analysis. The number one (1)-basic level indicates a sustainability report that met the basic standards of GRI Reporting 
Guidelines (C level). The number two (2)-middle level indicates a sustainability report that reported on three main GRI Performance 
categories (Economic, Environmental, and Social)—this level is somewhere between basic and advanced levels of sustainability 
reporting (B level). The number (3)-advanced level indicates a sustainability report in full compliance with the GRI Guidelines 
reporting on Profile Disclosures, Management Approach Disclosures, and Performance Indicators (A level). Finally, the number four 
(4)-upper level indicates full compliance with GRI guidelines and plus presence of a committee dedicated to social and environmental 









Table 3. Outcomes of All Shareholder Resolutions per Year, 1997-2011 
Year Withdrawn  Omitted Voted  Rejected 
1997 162 246 28 457 
1998 107 235 24 465 
1999 112 177 39 464 
2000 183 160 0 456 
2001 123 159 0 465 
2002 179 143 0 481 
2003 220 185 0 677 
2004 227 157 0 702 
2005 231 165 0 636 
2006 197 134 0 686 
2007 308 158 113 581 
2008 279 224 108 536 
2009 259 128 133 597 
2010 196 154 0 660 
2011 160 122 0 473 
Total (n) 2943 2547 445 8336 
 















Table 4. Top Five Issues in the Withdrawn Social Shareholder Resolutions, 1997-
2011 
Issues in Environmental Resolutions Frequencies 
Environmental sustainability  89 
Recycling 74 
Greenhouse gas emission 56 
Climate change 47 
Wildlife/animal protection 45 
Ceres Principles 23 
Miscellaneous 74 
Total 408 
Issues in Community Resolutions   
Political contributions and lobbying                                         92 
Health care/drug pricing 41 
Alcohol, tobacco, firearms 24 
Abortion/contraception 12 
Responsible media 11 
Ties to State sponsor of terror 5 
Miscellaneous 27 
Total 212 
Issues in Employee Relations Resolutions   
International conduct 56 
Antidiscrimination 39 
ILO standards & Third-party monitoring 27 
Workplace standards 15 
Health care reform 12 
Miscellaneous 10 
Total 159 
Issues in Diversity Resolutions   
Sexual orientation anti-bias policy 69 
Equal opportunity (glass ceiling) 24 
Board diversity 15 
Women/minority promotion 11 







Table 4. (Continued) Top Five Issues in the Withdrawn Social Shareholder 
Resolutions  
Issues in Human Rights Resolutions Frequencies 
Board of Committee on human rights 12 
Human rights criteria for China operations 9 
Forced child labor 7 
Human rights criteria for Mexican operations 7 
Human rights criteria for overseas sourcing 3 
Miscellaneous 2 
Total 40 
Issues in Product Responsibility Resolutions   
Labeling gene-engineered foods 13 
Product safety 6 
Phasing out use of with products with PVC 5 
Responsible product marketing/advertising 4 

















Table 5. Chi-Square Results Comparing Environmental and Community 
Resolutions    
Types of  Issues   n          %  df X2 
Environment   408      41  1 8.302*** 
Community     212         21                1  
Note. *** = p < 0.001. The analysis included withdrawn social resolutions. The other 
portion of the sample included employee (n = 159), diversity (n = 141), human rights (n 



















Table 6. Types of Requested Changes in the Withdrawn Social Resolutions  
Types of Changes n  % df X2 
      



















 Notes. * = p < .05. Percentages appear in parentheses below group frequencies. The 




















Table 7. Major Sponsor Types of Withdrawn Social Shareholder Resolutions  
Sponsor Types & Names n 
Public Pension Funds (Total) 342  
New York City Pension Funds 274 
New York City Employees' Retirement 34 
New York State Common Retirement Fund 23 
California State Teachers' Retirement 11 
Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) Funds (Total) 284 
Walden Asset Management 107 
Calvert Asset Management Co. 56 
Trillium Asset Management 36 
Domini Social Investments 21 
Green Century Capital Management 19 
As You Sow Foundation 17 
Harrington Investments 15 
Nathan Cummings Foundation 8 
Northstar Asset Management 5 
Religious Organizations (Total) 209  
Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR) 106 
General Board of Pensions of the United Methodist Church 23 
Adrian Dominican Sisters 16 
Presbyterian Church USA 11 
Sisters of St. Francis 11 
Capuchin Province of St. Joseph 9 
Oblates of Mary Immaculate 8 
Sisters of St. Dominic, Caldwell, NJ 8 
Sisters of Charity of St. Elizabeth 7 
Sisters of Mercy 5 
Christian Brothers Investment Services 5 
Unions (Total)  88 
AFL-CIO 51 
GBPUMC 15 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters 15 
Service Employees International Union 7 
Special Interests Groups (Total) 51 
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) 16 
Human Society of the US 11 
Pro Vita Advisors 7 
Sierra Club 7 
Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine 5 




Table 8. Descriptive Analysis of the Variables in Model 1: Probability of 
Withdrawal (H1-4) 
Variable M SD Min Max 
     Withdrawn Resolution 0.295 0.456 0 1 
Withdrawn Environment Resolution 0.148 0.355 0 1 
Withdrawn Community Resolution 0.075 0.264 0 1 
Corporate Environmental Commitment  0.112 0.315 0 1 
Corporate Community Commitment  0.266 0.442 0 1 
Company Size (Log Sales)  9.422 1.425 3.104 12.499 
Company Debt (Market Leverage) 0.391 0.227 0.021 0.955 
Financial Performance (Stock Return) 0.124 0.388 -0.847 3.476 
Growth opp. (Market-to-Book Ratio) 1.989 1.258 0.603 8.980 
Profitability (EBITDA/TA) 0.155 0.085 -0.244 0.439 
Financial Slack (Log Cash/TA)  0.109 0.150 0 1.355 
Total Asset 87.72 5.173 119.84 267.95 
n  = 3,449         
Notes. Company financial indicators (Company Size, Company Debt, Financial 
Performance, Growth Opportunities, Profitability, and Financial Slack) are control 
variables. Company size (Sales) in million dollars. Company Debt, Growth 




Table 9. Correlations among the Variables in Model 1: Probability of Withdrawal (H1-H4) 
Note. Pairwise correlation coefficients are reported. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 Withdrawn Resolution 1
2 Withdrawn Environment Resolution 0.645 *** 1
3 Withdrawn Community Resolution 0.441 *** -0.066 *** 1
4 Environment Commitment 0.057 *** 0.033 * 0.035 ** 1
5 Community Commitment 0.014 0.006 0.073 *** 0.111 *** 1
6 Log (Sales) -0.133 *** -0.108 *** 0.035 ** -0.019 0.132 *** 1
7 Market Leverage 0.030 * -0.030 * 0.075 *** -0.079 *** -0.044 ** 0.124 *** 1
8 Stock Return -0.009 0.009 -0.013 -0.013 -0.015 -0.035 * -0.084 ** 1
9 Market-to-Book Ratio -0.027 -0.011 -0.005 0.066 ** 0.159 ** -0.080 ** -0.677 ** 0.065 ** 1
10 EBITDA/TA -0.030 * 0.016 -0.046 *** 0.035 ** 0.078 ** 0.001 -0.716 ** 0.049 ** 0.655 ** 1








Table 10. Probability of Withdrawing a Resolution: Community Commitment 
(H1)   




Community Commitment 0.054** 
 
(0.013) 
  Control Variables 
Company Size  -0.046*** 
 
(0.000) 
  Company Debt 0.094 
 
(0.189) 
  Financial Performance 0.020 
 
(0.404) 
  Growth Opp. -0.003 
 
(0.853) 
  Probability 0.048 
 
(0.782) 
  Financial Slack -0.012 
 
(0.868) 
  Year Fixed Effects Yes 
n = 3,449  
p-value of model 0.000 
Note. Probit specification with robust standard errors in all models. Marginal effects are 
reported and p-values, which are based on two-tailed tests, are in parentheses.  
p-values *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Community Commitment refers to  
those corporations in the sample that had high level environment commitment as 
measured by KLD values in the community dimension. Company financial indicators 







Table 11. Probability of Withdrawing a Resolution: Environmental Commitment 
(H2) 
    Model (2) 
 Variable  
 
Marginal Effect 
Environmental Commitment 0.080** 
 
(0.038) 
  Control Variables 
Company Size -0.044*** 
 
(0.000) 
  Company Debt 0.113 
 
(0.130) 
  Financial Performance 0.017 
 
(0.482) 
  Growth Opp. 0.001 
 
(0.955) 
  Profitability 0.057 
 
(0.746) 
  Financial Slack -0.024 
 
(0.729) 
  Year Fixed Effects Yes 
n = 3,449 
p-value of model 0.000 
Note. Probit specification with robust standard errors in all models. Marginal effects are 
reported and p-values, which are based on two-tailed tests, are in parentheses.  
p-values *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Environmental Commitment refers to  
those corporations that had high level environment commitment as measured by KLD 
values in the environment dimension. Company financial indicators are control 




Table 12. Probability of Withdrawing a Resolution: Issue Type (H3)  




Environmental Issue Resolution     0.831*** 
 
(0.000) 
  Control Variables 
Company Size -0.038*** 
 
(0.000) 
  Company Debt 0.206** 
 
(0.018) 
  Financial Performance 0.018 
 
(0.555) 
  Growth Opp. 0.017 
 
(0.328) 
  Profitability -0.107 
 
(0.586) 
  Financial Slack 0.107 
 
(0.237) 
  Year Fixed Effects Yes 
n = 3,449 
p-value of model 0.000 
Note. Probit specification with robust standard errors in all models. Marginal effects are 
reported and p-values, which are based on two-tailed tests, are in parentheses.  
p-values *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Environmental Resolution refers to those 
resolutions that addressed an issue regarding the natural environment. Company 





Table 13. Probability of Withdrawing a Resolution: Sponsor Type (H4) 









 Company Size -0.043*** 
 
(0.000) 
  Company Debt 0.087 
 
(0.251) 
  Financial Performance 0.015 
 
(0.526) 
  Growth Opp. 0.001 
 
(0.960) 
  Profitability 0.044 
 
(0.803) 
  Financial Slack 0.107 
 
(0.237) 
  Year Fixed Effects Yes 
n = 3,449 
p-value of model 0.000 
Note. Probit specification with robust standard errors in all models. Marginal effects are 
reported and p-values, which are based on two-tailed tests, are in parentheses.  




Table 14. Descriptive Analysis of the Variables in Model 2: Level of 
Implementation (H5-H8) 
Variable         M        SD     Min.    Max. 
Level of Implementation 
 
2.281 1.168 0 4 
Environmental Commitment 
 
0.124 0.331 0 1 
Community Commitment 
 
0.135 0.343 0 1 
Public Pension Fund Sponsor 
 
0.348 0.479 0 1 
SRI Fund Sponsor                                       0.079 0.271 0 1 
Oil and Gas Industry  
 
0.517 0.503 0 1 
Control Variables      
Company Size 
 
8.213 1.292 5.895 11.225 
Company Debt 
 
0.396 0.19 0.087 0.955 
Growth Opp. 
 
0.132 0.075 -0.198 0.35 
Profitability 
 
1.567 0.66 0.827 4.933 
n = 89          
Note. The analysis included all withdrawn resolutions that asked corporations to 
issue sustainability reports. Company financial variables (Company Size, 
Company Debt, Growth Opportunities, and Profitability) are control variables. 
Company size (log sales) is in million dollars. Company Debt, Growth 
Opportunities, and Profitability are in ratios. 











Table 15. Predicting the Implementation Level of Sustainability Reporting  
 Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)   Model (4) 
Independent Variables      
Environmental 





































    Oil & Gas Industry  0.851* 0.891* 0.901*  0.855* 
 





    Control Variables  
    Company Size 0.110 0.133 0.118  0.103 
 




































(0.450) (0.651) (0.549) 
 
(0.426) 
n = 89  
    R-square 0.166 0.171 0.170   0.166 
Note. Company financial variables (Company Size, Company Debt, Growth 
Opportunities, and Profitability) are control variables. P values in parentheses. 
Coefficients are reported. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Two tailed tests. Model (1) 
tests corporate community commitment while Model (2) tests corporate environmental 




Table 16. Predicting Level of Implementation—Industry Classification Omitted 
 Variable   Model (5) Model (6) 












    Community Commitment 
 
___ 0.519 
   
(0.190) 
    Oil & Gas Industry  
 
____ ____ 
    Control Variables 


























n = 89 
 
   R-square   0.133 0.131 


















































1970: U.S. Court of Appeal 
ruling on Dow Chemical paves 
way for submission of social 
issues via resolutions 
1985: Council of 
Institutional Investors 
is formed, signaling the 
start of shareholder 
activism by institutions 
(public pension funds) 
1989: TIAA-
CREF creates the 
Social Choice 
Account (SCA) 




1990s: Union pension 




rule paved way 
for shareholder 
collaborations 
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Figure 5. Total Number of Shareholder Resolutions per Year, 1997-2011 
 
 





































































































Figure 6. Distribution of All Resolutions by Sponsor Type, 1997-2011 
 
 






























Figure 7. Distribution of All Resolutions by Outcomes per Year, 1997-2011 
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Figure 9. Distribution of Social and Governance Resolutions per Year, 1997-2011 
 
 
































Note. Y axis shows the ratio of corporate governance and social (corporate social responsibility) 






























Note. Y axis indicates distribution of the ratio of social shareholder resolutions outcomes filed 
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Figure 12. Distribution of Withdrawn Social Resolutions per Year, 1997-2011 
 
 
Note. Total number of withdrawn social resolutions is 1,017. Y axis shows the number of 




































































































Figure 13. Distribution of Withdrawn Social Resolutions by Issue Type, 1997-2011 
 
 































Note. Y axis shows number of shareholder resolutions that asked target corporations to adopt or 











































































































Note. Y axis shows the ratio of environment oriented-issue (n = 408) and community oriented-


























































































































































Note. Probit model analysis. Marginal effects are reported. Two-tailed tests.  
p-values *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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1. Corporate level variable  Control Variables 







































Figure 18. Empirical Results of Implementation Level of a Social Shareholder 

















Note. Results of OLS regression analysis model. Coefficients are reported. * p <0.1, 
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Two tailed tests.  
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Appendix A: Example of Shareholder Resolution (cont’d) 
 






Appendix B: Code Sheet for Types of Social Issues 
 Types of Social Issues 
Social issues addressed in the resolutions are coded based on the specific topics 
listed in the KLD corporate social performance ratings and GRI categories for 
corporate social performance. 
Unit of analysis is each shareholder resolution. 
Six categories are created: Community, Employee Relations, Diversity, Human 
Rights, Environment, and Product Responsibility.  
Social resolutions are coded under one of these six categories based on the topic 
they addressed. Examples of broader topics are presented below each category. 
The examples are generated from preliminary analysis of social resolutions and 
KLD sub-indicators for rating corporate social performance. 




Health care (drug pricing, AIDS impact) 
Indigenous people relations 
Political contributions and lobbying (e.g., concerns about political corruption) 
Alcohol, tobacco, gambling, firearms 
Responsible media/marketing/advertising campaigns (e.g., discouraging smoking) 
Military (contracting)  
Nuclear power 
Community relations 
Investment controversies (e.g., investment in sin industries) 
Other community issues 




Environmental communication (reports) 
Specific environmental principles, policies, procedures (e.g., Kyoto, CERES) 
Property, plant, equipment (e.g., energy efficient plants, equipments) 
Ozone depleting chemicals/toxic emissions 
Agricultural chemicals 
Climate change 
Greenhouse gas emissions 
Global warming 
Other environmental issues 
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 Employee relations 
Union relations 
Layoff policy  






Specific policies/principles (ILO principles, McBride Principles) 
Workplace safety 
Other employee issues 
 Human Rights 
Indigenous people relationships 
Overseas sourcing operations 
Corporate international conduct (e.g., South Africa, Burma, Mexico) 
Other human rights issues 
 Diversity 
CEO diversity 
Promotion of minority/women  
Board of Director diversity 
Women/minority contracting 
Employment of the disabled 
Gay & lesbian policies 
 Product Responsibility 
Product/service quality 
R&D expenditure for innovative product 
Products/services for economically disadvantaged 
Product safety 
Other product/service issues 
 Notes. The unit of analysis is a shareholder resolution. The categories are mutually 







Appendix C: Code Sheet for Types of Requested Changes 
 
 1) Structural changes 
This category includes resolutions that ask for a structural change within the corporate 
organization such as establishing a unit or a department that will require structural 
arrangements for the corporation. Structural changes concern “what the system is.” 
Structural changes require a paid position, titles, and employees. 
Example: 
Establish a Board Committee on sustainability 
Establish employee matching gift program 
Establish human rights committee 
 2) Policy/procedural changes 
This category includes resolutions that ask to implement policy/procedural changes. 
Procedural/policy changes concern “what the system does.” 
Examples: 
Implement MacBride principles 
Adopt sexual orientation anti-bias policy 
Implement ILO standards and third-party monitoring 
Make facilities smoke-free 
Use non-animal test methods 
 3) Communication-based changes 
This category includes resolutions concerning corporate communication to shareholders 
as well as to other stakeholders. The category includes sustainability reporting, CSR 
communication, and disclosure on corporate policy/operations/actions.  
Examples: 
Issue sustainability report 
Issue statements opposing affirmative action 
Disclose political contributions in newspapers 
Report on EEO policies, including for disabled 
Endorse Ceres principles 
Affirm political nonpartisanship 







Appendix D: Code Sheet Levels of Implementation of Sustainability Reporting 
 
 












4.1-4.4, 4.14 , 4.15  
Report on all criteria listed 
for Level C plus: 
1.2 
3.9, 3.13 
4.5-4.13, 4.16, 4.17 
Report on all criteria listed 
for Level B 
Disclosures on Management 
Approach 
Not Required Management Approach 
Disclosures for each 
Indicator Category 
Management Approach 
Disclosures for each 
Indicator Category 
Performance Indicators & 
Sector Supplement 
Performance Indicators 
Report fully on a minimum 
of any 10 Performance 
Indicators, including at least 
one from each of: social, 
economic and environment 
Report fully on a minimum 
of any 20 Performance 
Indicators, including at least 
one from each of: economic, 
environment, human rights, 
labor, society and product 
responsibility 
Respond on each core and 
sector supplement indicator 
with due regard to the 
materiality principle by 
either: a) reporting on the 
indicator or b) explaining 
the reason for its omission 
 











Appendix D: Code Sheet: Levels of Implementation of Sustainability 
Reporting (cont’d)  
 
GRI Sustainability Reporting Guidelines G3 – Reference Sheet Principles for Defining 
Report Content
Principles for Defining Report Content 
 
MATERIALITY: The information in a 
report should cover topics and Indicators 
that:  
• reflect the organization’s significant 
economic, environmental, and social 
impacts, or that  
• would substantively influence the 
assessments and decisions of stakeholders. 
 
STAKEHOLDER INCLUSIVENESS: The 
reporting organization should identify its 
stakeholders and explain in the report how 
it has responded to their reasonable 
expectations and interests. 
 
SUSTAINABILITY CONTEXT: The 
report should present the organization’s 
performance in the wider context of 
sustainability. 
 
COMPLETENESS: Coverage of the 
material topics and Indicators and 
definition of the report boundary should be 
sufficient to reflect significant economic, 
environmental, and social impacts and 
enable stakeholders to assess the reporting 
organization’s performance in the reporting 
period. 
 
Principles for Ensuring Report Quality 
BALANCE: The report should reflect 
positive and negative aspects of the 
organization’s performance to enable a 
reasoned assessment of overall 
performance. 
 
COMPARABILITY: Issues and 
information should be selected, compiled, 
and reported consistently.  Reported 
information should be presented in a 
manner  that enables stakeholders to 
analyze changes in the organization’s 
performance over time, and could support 
analysis relative to other organizations. 
 
ACCURACY: The reported information 
should be sufficiently accurate and detailed 
for stakeholders to assess the reporting 
organization’s performance. 
 
TIMELINESS: Reporting occurs on a 
regular schedule and information is 
available in time for stakeholders to make 
informed decisions. 
 
CLARITY: Information should be made 
available in a manner that is understandable 
and accessible to stakeholders using the 
report. 
 
RELIABILITY: Information and processes 
used in the preparation of a report should be 
gathered, recorded, compiled, analyzed, and 
disclosed in a way that could be subject to 
examination and that establishes the quality 
and materiality of the information. 
 
Standard Disclosures: Profile 
Strategy and Analysis 
1.1 Statement from the most senior 
decision-maker of the organization (e.g., 
CEO, chair, or equivalent senior position) 
about the relevance of sustainability to the 
organization and its strategy. 
 
The statement should present the overall 
vision and strategy for the short-term, 
medium-term (e.g., 3-5 years), and long-
term, particularly with regard to managing 
the key challenges associated with 
economic, environmental, and social 
performance. 
  
The statement should include: 
• Strategic priorities and key topics for the 
short/ medium-term with regard to 
sustainability, including respect for 
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internationally agreed standards and how 
they relate to long-term organizational 
strategy and success; 
• Broader trends (e.g., macroeconomic or 
political) affecting the organization and 
influencing sustainability priorities; 
• Key events, achievements, and failures 
during the reporting period; 
• Views on performance with respect to 
targets; 
• Outlook on the organization’s main 
challenges and targets for the next year and 
goals for the coming 3-5 years; and 
• Other items pertaining to the 
organization’s strategic approach. 
 
1.2 Description of key impacts, risks, and 
opportunities. 
 
The reporting organization should provide 
two concise narrative sections on key 
impacts, risks, and opportunities. 
 
Section One should focus on the 
organization’s key impacts on sustainability 
and effects on stakeholders, including rights 
as defined by national laws and relevant 
internationally agreed standards. This 
should take into account the range of 
reasonable expectations and interests of the 
organization’s stakeholders. This section 
should include: 
• A description of the significant impacts 
the organization has on sustainability and 
associated challenges and opportunities. 
This includes the effect on stakeholders’ 
rights as defined by national laws and the 
expectations in internationally agreed 
standards and norms; 
• An explanation of the approach to 
prioritizing these challenges and 
opportunities; 
• Key conclusions about progress in 
addressing these topics and related 
performance in the reporting period. This 
includes an assessment of reasons for 
underperformance or over performance;  
 
• A description of the main processes in 
place to address performance and/or 
relevant changes. 
 
Section Two should focus on the impact of 
sustainability trends, risks, and 
opportunities on the long-term prospects 
and financial performance of the 
organization. This should concentrate 
specifically on information relevant to 
financial stakeholders or that could become 
so in the future.  
 
Section Two should include the following: 
• A description of the most important risks 
and opportunities for the organization 
arising from sustainability trends; 
• Prioritization of key sustainability topics 
as risks and opportunities according to their 
relevance for long-term organizational 
strategy, competitive position, qualitative, 
and (if possible) quantitative financial value 
drivers; 
• Table(s) summarizing: 
– Targets, performance against targets, and 
lessons learned for the current reporting 
period; and 
– Targets for the next reporting period and 
mid-term objectives and goals (i.e., 3-5 
years) related to key risks and 
opportunities. 
• Concise description of governance 
mechanisms in place to specifically manage 
these risks and opportunities, and 
identification of other related risks and 
opportunities. 
 
Source: Global Reporting Initiative. (2013) 











Appendix E: Research Questions, Hypotheses, Methods, and 
Databases 
 
Research Questions/Hypotheses Methods 
RQ1: What is the landscape of all shareholder 
resolutions filed between 1997 and 2011? 
RQ1a: What types of institutional sponsors filed all 
shareholder resolutions between 1997 and 2011? 
RQ1b: What were the outcomes of all shareholder 
resolutions filed between 1997 and 2011? 
RQ1c: What is the proportion of shareholder 
resolutions devoted to social issues between 1997 and 
2011? 
 
Descriptive statistical analyses 
 
RQ2: What was the landscape of social shareholder 
resolutions between 1997 and 2011?  
 
Descriptive statistical analyses 
 
RQ3: What was the landscape of withdrawn social 
shareholder resolutions between 1997 and 2011? 
RQ3a: What types of issues were addressed in the 
withdrawn social shareholder resolutions filed 
between 1997 and 2011? 
RQ3b: What was the most common type of issue 
addressed in the withdrawn social shareholder 
resolutions? 
RQ3c: What types of changes did social shareholder 
activists demand from corporations in the withdrawn 
social shareholder resolutions filed between 1997 and 
2011?  
RQ3d: What was the most common type of change 
requested in the withdrawn social shareholder 
resolutions? 
RQ3e: What were the types of institutional sponsors 
who withdrew social resolutions after shareholder-
corporate engagement?  
RQ3f: What was the most common type of 
institutional sponsor who withdrew social resolutions? 
 
Descriptive statistical analyses 
Quantitative content analysis 
 
H1: Social resolutions filed at corporations with high 
levels of community commitment will be more likely 
to be withdrawn than the ones filed at corporations 
low levels of community commitment.  
 




H2: Social resolutions filed at corporations with high 
levels of environmental commitment will be more 
likely to be withdrawn than the ones filed at 
corporations low levels of environmental 
commitment.  
 
H3: Resolutions that raised an environmental issue 
will be more likely to be withdrawn than the 
resolutions that raised other social issues. 
 
 
H4: Social resolutions sponsored by public pension 
funds will be more likely to be withdrawn than those 
sponsored by other institutional shareholder activists 
 
H5: Withdrawn social resolutions filed at corporations 
with high levels of community commitment will be 
more likely to be implemented at a greater level than 
the ones filed at corporations with low levels of 
community commitment.  
 




H6: Withdrawn Social resolutions filed at 
corporations with high levels of environmental 
commitment are more likely to be implemented at a 
greater level than the ones filed at corporations with 
low levels of community commitment. 
 
H7: Withdrawn social resolutions filed at corporations 
within the petro-chemical industry are more likely to 
be implemented at a greater level than the ones filed 
at corporations within other industries.   
 
H8: Withdrawn social resolutions sponsored by public 
pension funds will be more likely to be implemented 




Shareholder resolutions Risk Metrics available at 
WRDS (Wharton School of 
Business, University of 




Corporate stakeholder commitment measures Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini 
Research & Analytics (KLD) 
social performance database 
available at WRDS (Wharton 
Research Data Services 
through OU) 
 




University of Chicago’s Center 
for Research in Securities 
Prices 
available at WRDS (Wharton 
School of Business, University 
of Pennsylvania, Research 
Data Services through OU) 
 
 
 
 
